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Executive Summary 
 
The UEFA home grown player rule was adopted by UEFA’s Executive Committee on February 2nd, 2005 
and accepted on April 21
st
 2005 when presented to UEFA’s 52 national member associations during its 
congress in Tallinn. Introduced for the 2006/07 season, the Rule currently requires every team entering 
European competitions to name eight home grown players in their 25 man squad. Four of these players 
must be ‘club-trained’ and four must be ‘association-trained’. A club-trained player is defined as a 
player who, irrespective of his nationality and age, has been registered with his current club for a period, 
continuous or non-continuous, of three entire seasons or of 36 months whilst between the ages of 15 and 
21.  An association-trained player fulfils the same criteria but with another club in the same association. 
In the event that a club fails to meet the new conditions for registration, the maximum number of players 
on the ‘A’ list will be reduced accordingly. Should a club list an ineligible player in the places reserved 
for home grown players, those players will not be eligible to participate for the club in the UEFA club 
competition in question and the club will be unable to replace that player on list ‘A’. This study provides 
an assessment of the practical implementation of UEFA's home grown player rule and of its effects, in 
particular in the field of free movement of workers. 
 
1. Having regard to the objectives of the European Union, sport is subject to EU law in so far as it 
constitutes an economic activity. Where a sporting activity takes the form of gainful employment or 
the provision of services for remuneration, which is true of the activities of semi-professional or 
professional sportspeople, it falls within the scope of Article 45 of the Treaty on the Functioning of 
the European Union (TFEU). EU footballers are workers and can seek the protections afforded to 
them by EU free movement law. 
 
2. It is settled case-law that Article 45 TFEU extends not only to the actions of public authorities but 
also to rules of any other nature aimed at regulating gainful employment in a collective manner. 
UEFA is a collective regulator and therefore the applicable free movement rules can be invoked 
against them by a private party. 
 
3. EU law applies to all legal relationships in so far as these relationships, by reason either of the place 
where they are entered into or the place where they take effect, can be located within the territory of 
the EU. Therefore despite being based in Switzerland, UEFA’s actions are subject to EU law. 
 
5 
 
4. Rules of purely sporting interest are not subject to the Treaty rules governing freedom of movement. 
The home grown player rule cannot be categorised as such a rule. Rules ‘inherent’ to a sport fall 
within the scope of the Treaty but are incapable of being defined as a restriction as long as the 
restrictive effects of the measure are inherent in the pursuit of a legitimate objective and remain 
proportionate. The home grown player rule cannot be categorised as an inherent rule because it does 
not derive from a need inherent in the organisation of the UEFA competitions.    
 
5. Article 165 TFEU does not remove sport from the scope of the Treaty’s prohibitions but its provisions 
do inform the question of what constitutes a legitimate sporting objective and (taking into account the 
specific nature of sport and questions of fairness and openness) what is considered suitable and 
necessary for the attainment of these objectives.  
 
6. The home grown player rule constitutes a restriction on a worker’s free movement. It amounts to a 
provision which precludes or deters a national of a Member State from leaving his country of origin in 
order to engage in employment in a different Member State. However, in EU law a distinction is 
drawn between restrictions on a worker’s freedom of movement that are (a) directly discriminatory, 
(b) indirectly discriminatory, and (c) non-discriminatory. The home grown player rule amounts to an 
indirectly discriminatory rule because even though the Rule is neutral in terms of nationality, national 
workers are placed at an advantage over migrant workers. 
 
7. An indirectly discriminatory measure that restricts a worker’s free movement can be accepted in law 
only if it pursues a legitimate aim compatible with the Treaty and is justified by overriding reasons in 
the public interest. The justifications presented by UEFA in support of the rule, namely that it 
promotes competitive balance and encourages the training and development of young players, must 
be accepted as legitimate. There is some evidence of declining competitive balance in European 
competitions but far less to suggest that clubs are failing to invest in youth development. Even though 
the Rule pursues these two legitimate aims, it still needs to satisfy the twin proportionality tests of 
suitability and necessity.  
 
8. There has been a significant increase in the number of home grown players in first team squads and 
starting XIs in both UEFA and domestic competitions since the Rule was introduced. There is no data 
to prove to any certainty that this is a direct result of the Rule. Moreover, an increase in the number of 
home grown players cannot in itself be considered a legitimate objective for restricting free 
movement.  
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9. The statistics measuring competitive balance suggest that the impact of the rule has been to rebalance 
the performance of teams across both the Champions League and Europa League competitions by 
reducing the success of teams finishing in the top two places of the Champions League group stage or 
the top three places of the Europa League group stage in favour of those towards the bottom. 
However, this impact on competitive balance is very modest. There is very little evidence to suggest 
that the Rule affects the final stages in either competition. There is insufficient data at the current time 
to make an accurate scientific assessment of whether, with time, the Rule’s impact on competitive 
balance will increase, diminish or remain static. 
 
10. From the quantitative and qualitative data gathered, the UEFA Rule appears to have had a very 
limited impact on youth player training and development throughout the European Union. The 
number of young players in first team squads has increased slightly during the time the Rule has been 
in place (particularly at clubs participating in UEFA competitions) but this trend was more evident in 
the years leading up to the introduction of the Rule. Club policy in this area appears to be more 
influenced by factors other than the Rule. Our data reveals no evidence of the potential for an upward 
or downward future trajectory in terms of investment in, or quality of, youth development as a result 
of the rule remaining in existence in its current form. 
 
11. The neutrality or very limited positive effect of the Rule in terms of improving competitive balance 
and the training and development of young European Union players must be balanced against the 
impact the Rule has on restricting a player’s freedom of movement. There is very limited evidence to 
suggest that this restriction is currently manifestly restrictive, but it remains intrinsically liable to 
restrict free movement.  
 
12. The proportionality of the Rule could be established on the grounds that, in its current form, its 
apparently limited restrictive effects do not appear to be disproportionate to the modest benefits 
generated thus far. This proposition can, however, be undermined by two considerations. First, should 
the benefits of the Rule diminish over time, the cost/benefit balance would shift, thus rendering 
current proportionality arguments less persuasive. In order to establish this, an additional future study 
into the Rule would be required. Second, alternative measures could potentially achieve a more 
uniform and substantial impact in terms of competitive balance and youth development, and be less 
restrictive on the fundamental freedoms of EU workers. If this were the case, the proportionality of 
the measure could not be made out. 
 
13. Amending the Rule to lower the home grown quota or to remove the association-trained criterion will 
reduce the suitability of the measure and make it less likely to satisfy EU free movement law. 
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Removing the ‘association-trained’ aspect of the Rule and instead classifying home grown players 
only as those trained by the club for which they are registered will remove the competitive balance 
improvements identified, potentially provide disincentives for smaller clubs to develop young players 
and could encourage larger clubs to recruit players from competitors at an earlier age.  
 
14. Given that our data supports the view that a modest increase in the quota could result in a modest 
improvement in competitive balance, a case could be made that a slightly strengthened rule satisfies 
proportionality control on these grounds. This proposition is conditioned on the assumption that less 
restrictive alternative measures do not exist.  
 
15. In discussing alternative regulatory measures, a general observation can be made that regulatory 
interventions within the professional football sector can take two forms: those affecting the product 
market (measures affecting clubs) and those affecting the labour market (measures affecting players). 
It stands to reason that interventions in the labour market are more likely to affect the rights of 
workers (such as free movement rights) whereas product market interventions are more likely to 
affect the rights of clubs (thus potentially engaging EU competition law). Product market 
interventions are, therefore, less likely to offend EU free movement of workers principles.  
 
16. It does not follow that simply because labour market interventions are historically rooted in sport, or 
that some professional athletes are now well remunerated, that labour market interventions are an 
appropriate default position for a governing body seeking to remedy a perceived weakness in the 
sports market. There are strong legal reasons why labour market restrictions should be considered the 
last resort and it is recommended that the institutions of the EU adopt this approach as their 
foundation principle when assessing measures that may conflict with the freedoms of athletes. 
Consequently, before the Rule can categorically be described as compatible with EU free movement 
law, less restrictive alternatives should first be examined, particularly those that do not carry 
discriminatory effects and are not located within the labour market. 
 
17. It cannot be categorically established at this stage that the restrictive effects of the Rule on the free 
movement of workers are proportionate to the very limited benefits of the Rule in terms of 
competitive balance and the training and development of young players. It is the view of the research 
team that the very modest benefits of the Rule are likely to be achieved in a more substantial manner 
by the adoption of alternative, less restrictive, means, particularly those not carrying discriminatory 
effects. UEFA, in conjunction with the key football stakeholders, hold the necessary experience and 
expertise to explore these alternatives and should be afforded reasonable time to do so (a period of 
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three years). This period should also allow UEFA to assess whether existing regulatory measures 
(such as Club Licensing and Financial Fair Play) are delivering such improvements to competitive 
balance and the quality of youth development to render discriminatory labour market restrictions 
unnecessary. In particular, the stakeholders are encouraged to make use of the social dialogue 
committee established for professional football in 2008.  
 
18. If UEFA can demonstrate that less restrictive alternative measures are not suitable to achieve the 
stated objectives of the Rule, and that existing measures have not delivered necessary improvements, 
then the Rule is to be considered compatible with EU law, complementary to existing measures (such 
as club licensing), and an incremental increase in the quota could be contemplated. This assessment is 
conditioned on the existing benefits of the Rule being maintained over the next three years.  
 
19. If less restrictive alternatives are able to achieve more substantial improvements in competitive 
balance and the quality of youth development, the proportionality of the Rule will not have been made 
out and the Rule should be removed from the UEFA Regulations.        
 
20. It is recommended that a further study should be conducted in three years in order to assess: (1) 
whether the competitive balance improvements identified have been maintained, improved further or 
have declined, (2) whether a closer connection between the Rule and improvements in youth 
development can be identified, and (3) whether less restrictive alternatives can deliver more 
substantial improvements to competitive balance and the quality of youth development.    
 
UEFA’s home grown player rule has resulted in improvements to competitive balance in 
Champions League and Europa League competitions but these improvements are very modest. 
Despite the increases in the number of home grown players at EU clubs, there is little evidence to 
suggest that the Rule has had an impact in improving the quality of youth development in 
European football. Although there is little evidence to suggest that the Rule has manifestly 
restricted the freedom of movement of professional footballers, it is intrinsically liable to do so and 
it is not possible, at this stage, to state that the benefits of the Rule outweigh the restrictive effects. 
The proportionality of the Rule cannot be categorically established until UEFA demonstrates that 
less restrictive alternative measures are ill equipped at securing the objectives of the Rule. It is 
recommended that, rather than adopting a negative position on the Rule, the European 
Commission should extend an invitation to UEFA to consult with key stakeholders on whether 
alternative measures, that do not carry discriminatory effects, can deliver more substantial benefits 
for European football. A further study in three years should assess the outcome of these discussions 
and report on whether the proportionality of the Rule has been made out.  
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Chapter 1 
The UEFA Home Grown Player Rule 
 
The UEFA home grown player rule was adopted by UEFA’s Executive Committee on February 2nd, 2005 
and accepted on April 21
st
 2005 when presented to UEFA’s 52 national member associations during its 
congress in Tallinn. The initial proposal was made after UEFA identified a number of perceived negative 
trends in European football, including: 
 a lack of incentive in training players, 
 lack of identity in local/regional teams, 
 “hoarding” of players, and  
 related problems for national teams.  
UEFA had also commissioned an economic study that identified a tendency towards:  
 less competitive balance in UEFA club competitions and domestic leagues,  
 an increased link between money and sporting success, and  
 fewer opportunities for local-trained players to play. 
As a result, it was claimed that clubs were re-evaluating whether it was worthwhile developing young 
talent when the best young players would gravitate to the richest clubs without necessarily providing a 
good return on the training club’s investment.  
The basis of the solution to these problems was to introduce a rule which encouraged clubs participating 
in UEFA club competitions to include a minimum number of locally trained players in their squad 
(commonly referred to as home grown players). The implementation of the rule was staggered to afford 
clubs a transition period with minimum numbers of home grown players to be implemented gradually as 
follows: 
 Season 2006/7: four locally trained players 
 Season 2007/8: six locally trained players 
 Season 2008/9 onwards: eight locally trained players 
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Clubs must submit an ‘A’ List of players (List A) and a ‘B’ List of players (List B) duly signed by the 
national association for verification, validation and then forwarded to UEFA. No club may have more 
than 25 players on List A during the season
1
. 
Locally trained players can be either club-trained or association-trained as set out in Article 18 of the 
UEFA Regulations: 
18.10 A “club-trained player” is a player who, between the age of 15 (or the start of the season 
during which he turns 15) and 21 (or the end of the season during which he turns 21), and 
irrespective of his nationality and age, has been registered with his current club for a period, 
continuous or not, of three entire seasons (i.e. a period starting with the first official match of the 
relevant national championship and ending with the last official match of that relevant national 
championship) or of 36 months.  
 
18.11 An “association-trained player” is a player who, between the age of 15 (or the start of the 
season during which the player turns 15) and 21 (or the end of the season during which the player 
turns 21), and irrespective of his nationality and age, has been registered with a club or with other 
clubs affiliated to the same association as that of his current club for a period, continuous or not, of 
three entire seasons or of 36 months. 
 
In all cases the nationality of the player is of no importance but at least half of the locally trained players 
must be club-trained. The rule is the same in both Champions League and Europa League competitions 
and is set out fully in Appendix A. 
According to UEFA, the home grown player rule was therefore intended, in conjunction with their club 
licensing system, to provide more incentive for clubs to train their own players, as well as for the 
restoration of a competitive balance, first at UEFA club competition level, and then at national level if 
associations accept and implement UEFA’s recommendations2. We now move on to discuss the literature 
written from a legal perspective on both the reasons for the devising and implementation of the Rule, and 
the potential legal problems under EU law that have led to the construction of this report. 
 
 
                                                          
1
 Players may be transferred into the club but under those circumstances another player must be removed from the list so there 
are never more than 25 on the List A at one time. 
2
 UEFA statement available at 
http://www.uefa.com/uefa/footballfirst/protectingthegame/youngplayers/news/newsid=276829.html 
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Chapter 2 
Review of Legal Literature 
 
2.1 Introduction 
The following section will provide a legal literature review on the home grown player rule (hereafter ‘the 
Rule’) as applied by UEFA. The review of this literature (primarily articles in peer-reviewed academic 
journals or respected practitioner journals) provided the basis for our own initial interpretation of the 
Rule’s status under EU Law and what tests are to be applied. However it should be noted that the 
identification of the arguments below should not be taken to mean that the research team necessarily 
agree with them. Much of the work completed prior to the current study was speculative and did not have 
the benefit of the data assembled for this study (set out in chapters 4-7) against which the relevant legal 
tests can be applied to assess the legality of the Rule under EU law. While much of the previous literature 
was supported by our data, our findings have run contrary to some of the arguments set out in the 
following sections.  
2.2 The Rationale for Introduction of the Rule 
The current study will focus on the twin stated aims of the Rule: (a) improving the training of, and 
opportunity for, young players, and (b) improving competitive balance. However, it should be recognised 
that although these were the primary stated aims at the UEFA 2005 Congress in Tallinn when the 
Declaration of local training of players was introduced,
3
 they are only two of several that were given to 
justify the Rule and these should also be acknowledged in the event that they indicate a discriminatory 
objective behind the Rule. 
All studies into the legality of the Rule identified that improving the training and development of young 
players was a fundamental aim of the Rule. Following the Bosman and Kolpak cases, “major deficits”4 in 
the current operation of club training regimes was leading to a perceived lack of opportunity for domestic 
                                                          
3
 Smokvina, V. (2012), The UEFA “Home-grown Players” Rule: Does it Fulfil its Aim? Paper presented to the Sport and 
Society Conference, University of Cambridge, 22-25 July 2012. 
4
 Conzelmann, R, (2008), Models for the Promotion of Home Grown players for the protection of National Representative 
Teams, International Sports Law Journal, 3-4: 26. 
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young players
5
 in the big five leagues in particular.
6
 It was therefore hoped that the Rule would, “promote 
and protect the quality training of young footballers within the EU”7 and “ensure a steady supply of 
young academy players for the first team”.8 This would be achieved through the Rule’s insistence on a 
minimum number of club and association-trained players in playing squads and also the limitation on 
squad sizes, which was intended to prevent “hoarding” of good young players by the wealthiest clubs, in 
turn giving them opportunity of more playing time.
9
 This, it was felt, might also have the effect of 
reducing the amount of money spent on transfer fees (which have also been identified as legally 
problematic) and enabling financially weaker clubs to afford better quality players in the transfer system, 
in turn increasing competitive balance in line with second fundamental objective detailed below.
10
 
Following the ruling in Bosman, and statements by the Council on the EU (most notably the Nice 
Declaration), the Commission,
11
 and the European Parliament, it is clear that the training and 
development of young players is seen as a legitimate aim under European Union law.
12
 
The second fundamental stated aim of the Rule was to protect, “consolidate”13 or increase competitive 
balance within domestic competitions.
14
 The concern was that as a result of increased player migration 
following Bosman, the wealthier clubs and leagues were able to ‘buy-up’ the best talent throughout the 
EU, which in addition to restricting the opportunities for young domestic players,
15
 was also reducing 
                                                          
5
 Gardiner, S., and Welch, R. (2011a), ‘Bosman - There and Back Again: the Legitimacy of Playing Quotas under European 
Union Sports Policy’, European Law Journal Vol. 17, No. 6: 828-49: 840 
6
 Conzelmann (2008). 
7
 Majani, F. (2009), ‘One Step Forward, Two Hops Backwards: Quotas – The Return. An Excavation into the Legal 
Deficiencies of the FIFA 6+5 Rule and the UEFA Home-Grown Players Rule in the Eyes of European Union Law’, 
International Sports Law Journal Vol. 1-2: 20; see also Miettinen, S. and Parrish, R. (2007), ‘Nationality Discrimination in 
Community Law: An Assessment of UEFA Regulations Governing Player Eligibility for European Club Competitions (The 
Home-Grown Player Rule)’, Entertainment and Sports Law Journal, Vol. 5, No. 2; McDermott, J. (2010), ‘Direct v. Indirect 
Discrimination in European Football: The Legal Differences Between UEFA’s Homegrown Player Rule and FIFA’s ‘6+5’ 
Proposal’, Texas Review of Entertainment & Sports Law, Vol. 11: 285, and Hart S. (2004), Call to “Create Level Playing 
Field”, UEFA.com 4/10/04. 
8
 Geey, D and Ward, J, (2009), FAPL Rules: new ownership and “home grown” Premier League Rules’, World Sports Law 
Review, 7(11): 4. 
9
 Lynam, I. (2006), ‘UEFA’s Homegrown Player Rule – does it Breach Article 39 of the EC Treaty?’ Sport and the Law 
Journal, Vol. 14, No. 2: 33; Miettinen and Parrish (2007): para 2. 
10
 Chaplin, M. (2005) ‘UEFA “Out to Get Balance Right”’ UEFA.com 3/2/05; McDermott (2010): 284-5. 
11
 “Rules requiring that teams include a certain quota of locally trained players could be accepted as being compatible with the  
Treaty provisions on free movement of persons if (...) possible indirect discrimination effects pursued, such as to enhance and 
protect the training and development of talented young players” (Commission White Paper on Sport 2007, at 2.3(9)). 
12
 Conzelmann (2008): 27-9; Lynam (2006); Smokvina (2012). Although Vermeersch and Van den Bogaert challenge this 
popular assumption: “It can... rightly be questioned whether the training and development of young players really constitutes a 
legitimate aim which is sufficiently specific to the sports sector so as to justify restrictions to the freedom of movement of 
athletes” (Vermeersch, A. and Van den Bogaert, S. (2006), ‘Sport and the EC Treaty: a tale of uneasy bedfellows?’, European 
Law Review, Vol. 31 No. 6: 821-40). 
13
 Majani (2009): 20. 
14
 Lynam (2006); McDermott (2010): 285. 
15
 This belief should be contrasted with Advocate-General Lenz’s view in Bosman that the migration of foreign players was 
unlikely to lead to fewer chances for young domestic payers (para 145). 
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competitive balance.
16
 Therefore by limiting squad sizes and providing incentives for clubs to train their 
own players it was hoped that the Rule would enable financially weaker clubs and leagues to compete 
more capably. 
Two other objectives and underlying reasons for the introduction of the Rule were revealed at the time of 
its conception, of varying veracity and legality in terms of being seen as legitimate objectives under EU 
law. Neither appear to be central to the current justifications put forward for the Rule, possibly due to 
their weak or uncertain standing in terms of objective justification under EU free movement law. The 
Rule was brought in following the victory by un-fancied Greece in the 2004 UEFA European 
Championship and it was suggested by UEFA Chief Executive Officer Lars-Christer Olsson that the poor 
performance by the traditionally strong nations at Euro 2004 was the result of a lack of training and 
opportunity for (indigenous) young players (in contrast to Greece, where the domestic league was 
dominated by home grown players).
17
 Therefore the perceived weakening of national teams, in particular 
England,
18
 was a key stated reason for the introduction of the Rule at the time.
19
 This does, however, 
appear to contradict the claims noted above that the Rule will protect or increase competitive balance.
20
 
The protection of international sport is seen as a potential objective justification for restrictions on 
fundamental freedoms, although the success of particular nations in winning competitions is not.
21
 It 
should also be noted at this stage that there does not appear to be any peer-reviewed evidence to suggest 
that there has been a decline in the standard of national teams, or that of the traditionally stronger nations. 
It has also been suggested that post Bosman, the performance of the England national team has improved 
compared with the equivalent time prior to the ruling.
22
 
Finally, statements prior to the introduction of the Rule (in particular by UEFA CEO Lars-Christer 
Olsson), suggested that it was necessary to prevent what was perceived to be an erosion of clubs’ regional 
and national identity and a severing of links between clubs and their communities and fan bases.
23
 In 
                                                          
16
 Gardiner, S., and Welch, R. (2011a), ‘Bosman - There and Back Again: the Legitimacy of Playing Quotas under European 
Union Sports Policy’, European Law Journal Vol. 17, No. 6: 828-49: 840. 
17
 Lynam (2006): 33. It should be noted that Greece’s surprise victory was not the first in the European Championships. In 
1992 (prior to Bosman), Denmark had pulled off an arguably more surprising tournament win. Miettinen and Parrish also note 
that the Greek and French winners of the 2000 and 2004 Euros had “significant numbers of leading players” playing in foreign 
leagues (2009). 
18
 Majani (2009): 20. 
19
 Miettinen and Parrish (2007): para 2. 
20
 Lynam (2006). 
21
 Henderson, T. (2011), ‘The English Premier League’s Home Grown Player Rule Under the Law of the European Union’, 
Brooklyn Journal of International Law, Vol. 37 Issue 1: 259-90: 287, applying Lehtonen. 
22
 Huxtable, F. (2008), ‘The Good, the Bad and the Illegal’, Soccer Investor; Gardiner and Welch (2011a): 840. 
23
 Majani (2009): 20; Miettinen and Parrish (2007): para 2. Freeburn L, (2009), ‘Labor and Employment Law Issues in Sports: 
European Football’s Home-Grown Players Rule and Nationality Discrimination Under the European Community Treaty’, 
Marquette Sports Law Review, Vol.: 20: 177 and Parrish and Miettinen (2007) point out that there is no evidence to support the 
claim that fan allegiances to their teams weaken due to foreign players and free agency, and considerable evidence from 
Europe and the US to the contrary. Indeed, in all of the major leagues bar Italy, attendances have increased post-Bosman 
(Miettinen and Parrish (2007): para 21). 
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Bosman, this justification was expressly dismissed as being capable of legitimising restrictions on the 
rights of EU workers.
24
 It appears, therefore, that several justifications that were given at the time of the 
Rule’s introduction have been sidelined, possibly due to the fact that they are not seen as capable of 
objective justification for legitimising the Rule under EU law. However, the justifications on record 
around 2005 may cast doubt on whether it is purely the aims of competitive balance and training of young 
players that should be taken into account when assessing the legality of the Rule, or whether there is a 
more directly discriminatory motive underpinning it; “The rationale for requiring ‘home grown players’ 
as per UEFA’s regulations is to enable markets in commercial sport to maintain a geographic character 
and reinforce partitions within the Community by discriminating against Community workers”.25 
Freeburn notes that, “there is the prospect for the inference to be drawn that the Rules are, at least in part, 
motivated by a discriminatory objective”,26 especially due to the fact that non club-trained players, but 
who are trained in the same nation/association, are given preferential treatment. This does not incentivise 
club training schemes, but does have an indirectly discriminatory effect.
27
 
2.3 Is the Rule Exempt from EU Law? 
Legal and socio-legal comment in peer-reviewed and established practitioner journals on the Rule is clear 
that it is not ‘purely sporting’ or ‘inherent’ in a way that might enable it to be removed from the rigours of 
EU law.
28
 Majani argues that following the Walrave test, the Rule is economic and not “purely sporting” 
as it concerns the establishment of (expensive) academies and the education of minors.
29
 Manville 
specifically discounts the possibility that the Rule could be an “indispensible condition” due to the 
success of the UEFA Champions League in the ten years prior to the Rule’s introduction.30 All of the 
work reviewed identified that the Rule is a potential breach of EU law, but that under certain 
circumstances this potential breach could be justified. Indeed, much of the work identified the current 
European Commission-funded study as being key to identifying whether the potential breaches could be 
justified under EU law.
31
 The primary legal problems with the Rule identified in the work reviewed was: 
(a) that it is a potential breach of the fundamental rights of workers to move freely between, and work 
without impediment within, EU members states,
32
 and (b) that it is a potential breach of competition law
33
 
                                                          
24
 Lynam (2006): 34. 
25
 Miettinen and Parrish (2009): para 36. Henderson goes as far as to claim that the aim of the EPL version of the Rule was to 
increase number of English players, not home-grown ones and limit number of foreigners (2011: 282).  
26
 (2009): 211. 
27
 Ibid: 213. 
28
 Manville, A. (2009), ‘UEFA, the ‘Home-Grown Player Rule’ and the Meca-Medina Judgement of the European Court of 
Justice’, International Sports Law Journal, Vol. 1-2: 25: 26; McDermott (2009): 286; Miettinen and Parrish (2009): para 9. 
29
 Majani also notes that as minors are not classed as workers under EU law, they could not challenge the Rule (2009: 22). 
30
 (2009): 27. 
31
 Gardiner, S., and Welch, R. (2011b), ‘Nationality and protectionism in football: why are FIFA's “6+5 Rule” and UEFA’s 
“home-grown player Rule” on the agenda?’ Soccer and Society Vol.12, No 6: 774-87: 781; McDermott (2010): 288; Miettinen 
and Parrish (2009): para 17; Williams, R. and Haffner, A. (2008), ‘FIFA Quotas Ruled Offside?’ New Law Journal, 158: 7330. 
32
 Article 45 TFEU. 
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in that it restricts the freedom of undertakings (i.e. clubs) to compete in the market for quality players. It 
has also been suggested that the Rule has the potential to be classed as Age Discrimination
34
 primarily 
because it places players who become professional later in their career at a disadvantage.
35
 We do not 
discuss this issue in this literature review beyond noting the potential problem. It should also be noted that 
this current study is purely focussed on the legality of the Rule under free movement laws and that we 
will not be assessing it against the rigours of EU competition law (although initial work in this area is 
noted below).   
It should be recognised at this stage that the vast majority of work carried out assessing the legality of the 
Rule is of the opinion that it breaches EU law in an unjustifiable way and that legal action challenging it 
is likely. McDermott suggests that the only reason that the Rule has “not met with significant opposition 
either in the press or among most football insiders” is because in reality it has had “very little impact on 
most clubs”.36 Freeburn argues that “the current ambivalence of the EC to the UEFA Home Grown rule 
appears inappropriately deferential to the objectives of UEFA... it may reasonably be expected that the 
European Court of Justice would be far less accommodating if a challenge to the home grown player rules 
was litigated”.37 Furthermore, he claims that, “the Commission’s inaction in the 4+4 rule, pending further 
evidence and information on its operation, is also open to be criticised as being plainly inconsistent with 
European Court of Justice decisions regarding indirect discrimination.”38  Majani agrees with the first 
point, identifying the Rule as “legally weak and vulnerable”39 and contrary to EU law if there are 
loopholes in the operation of the regulations, if the regulations discriminate on the grounds of nationality, 
if they infringe on the right to engage in sport, or if they infringe freedom of competition. His conclusion 
was that a challenge in CAS and the ECJ is “inevitable”.40 Miettinen and Parrish note that, “UEFA’s 
justifications may be attacked on the grounds that they are disproportionate, unfit for the purposes they 
are relied upon or pursue economic as well as legitimate and justifiable non-economic objectives”.41  
The impact of Article 165 TEFU on the situation receives little attention from the work reviewed. In 
terms of its impact more generally, academic experts such as Weatherill
42
 are of the view that the first 
signs are that it will change little in terms of the EU’s relation to sport. Conzelmann alone argues that the 
Lisbon Treaty, “strengthens the legal position of the sporting associations by way of putting the basic 
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right of freedom of associations on the same level as the freedom of movement”.43 He suggests that 
freedom of association
44
 should provide a level of autonomy for sporting institutions and should be 
balanced against other fundamental rights.
45
 As a result it is claimed that this means that the European 
Court of Justice must now “balance these positions in a convincing way” in the event of conflict.46 
2.4 Freedom of Movement 
The majority of work in this area focuses on the impact of the Rule upon the free movement of workers 
within the EU under what is now Article 45 TFEU. Work in this area is clear that (in contrast to FIFA’s 
“6+5” proposal or the previous “3+2” UEFA Quota system), the UEFA Rule does not constitute direct 
discrimination.
47
 The authors of previous work are also in agreement that because any discrimination that 
occurs as a result of the Rule is indirect, “categories of objective justification beyond the normal Treaty 
grounds may be available... consequently, the Rule will be tested against the strengths and proportionality 
of the objective justifications presented by UEFA.”48 The Rule’s indirectly discriminatory effect is 
identified by all the authors writing on the Rule’s impact on free movement of workers; while the Rule is 
drafted in such a way that it allows young foreign players who transfer at the age of 18 to be classified as 
“home grown” after staying at that club until they are 21, the likely effect is that fewer foreign players (in 
contrast with indigenous players) will be able to meet to classification as home grown in a particular 
league by the age of 21.
49
 
Lynam,
50
 puts forward the most comprehensive assessment of the relevant EU case law in this area, 
focussing on Wurtembergische Milchverwertung-Sudmilch-AG v Salvatore Ugliola [1969] 363, Scholz v 
Universitaria di Cagliari [1994] ECR I-505, O’Flynn v Adjudication Officer [1996] ECR I-2617, Sotgiu v 
Deutsche Bundespost [1974] ECR 153 and Schumacker [1995] ECR I-225. Importantly, the jurisprudence 
in this area makes it clear that it is not necessary to prove the Rule has a discriminatory effect, only that it 
is “intrinsically liable” to have that effect.51  
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However, non- (directly) discriminatory restrictions or “indistinctly applicable” restrictions can be 
justified by “mandatory requirements”52 and Article 36 of the Treaty exempts quantitative restrictions 
which are justified on grounds of “public morality, public policy or public security; the protection of 
health and life of humans, animals or plants; the protection of national treasures possessing artistic, 
historic or archaeological value; or the protection of industrial and commercial property”. Lynam notes 
that the restrictions must not, “constitute a means of arbitrary discrimination or a disguised restriction on 
trade between Member States” and that following this, “it is at best unclear that Cassis de Dijon-type 
‘mandatory requirements’ are legitimate restrictions for restrictions of this type”.53 However, even if 
‘mandatory requirements’ are available, the Rule would still be illegal if it was a disproportionate means 
of attaining UEFA’s aims.54  
In order to test whether the Rule’s indirectly discriminatory effects can be justified against legitimate 
objectives, the test from Gebhard v Consiglio dell’Ordine degli Avvocati e Procuratori di Milano [1995] 
ECR I-4165 should be applied.
55
 This test applies to “national measures liable to hinder or make less 
attractive the exercise of fundamental freedoms”56 and states that an indirectly discriminatory Rule may 
be objectively justified if and where: 
(1) measures must be applied in a non-discriminatory way,  
(2) they must be justified by imperative requirements in the public interest,  
(3) they must be suitable to accomplish their stated goal, and 
(4) they must be narrowly tailored to meet that goal.  
Miettinen and Parrish observe that the European Court in particular would not simply accept any 
measures put forward as an objective justification and would instead consider if they were consistent in 
their effect with the stated objectives.
57
 McDermott also highlights that following Bosman, it is clear that 
with regard to parts (3) and (4) of the Gebhard test in particular, the Court would “require an actual 
showing of fit and proportionality for Rules to be upheld via objective justification”.58  
The work reviewed raises considerable questions about the extent to which the Rule achieves UEFA’s 
stated objectives. McDermott notes that it is “not a given” that the Rule would satisfy the first part of the 
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Gebhard test, although the second part of the Rule appears to be accepted as proven.
59
 For parts (3) and 
(4) of the test, however, the work in this area is almost unanimous in challenging UEFA’s stated 
objectives in terms of both the Rule’s “fit” with its objectives in practical terms (this is largely 
speculative) and also in terms of whether it is the “least restrictive alternative” to achieve those aims. 
With regard to the training of young players, Lynam argues that, “In order for a restriction to be 
proportionate, it must meet an existing need. There is no evidence to suggest that clubs are neglecting the 
training of young players.
60
 In fact clubs are spending ever increasing amounts of money on youth 
development”.61 He notes that in the FA Premier League, the average annual cost of running an academy 
when the Rules were introduced was £500k-£1.5m, and that UEFA had already introduced a licensing 
scheme that required any club wishing to participate in UEFA competitions to have an approved youth 
development scheme.
62
 Lynam also argues that there was no evidence that clubs were “hoarding 
players”63 and that FIFA Rules brought in following negotiations with the European Commission in 2001, 
introduced Rules on “sporting just cause” that prevented players who were not being played for more than 
10% of playing time during a season from being retained by that club.
64
  
Furthermore, even if it could be established that there was a pressing need for the Rule, the consensus is 
that “the Rule is a clumsy method of achieving the objective”.65 There is considerable doubt expressed 
about whether the Rule will achieve this objective of increasing the number of club-trained players 
(particularly indigenous ones) by a number of commentators. For example, Littlewood et al.
66
 note the 
increasing propensity for clubs in the ‘big five’ leagues to bring in talent from abroad at a young age in 
order for them to qualify as being home grown. In the years 2004-06, the researchers noted a reduction in 
indigenous home grown players and also an increase in the number of players from South America and 
Africa. Further questions about the short-term effectiveness of the Rule are raised by Smokvina’s 
statistical analysis of the number of club-trained players in these leagues.
67
 This study noted that after a 
small initial rise, between 2009 and 2011 there was an overall reduction across the big five leagues in the 
number of club-trained players. 
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The consensus on whether the other justifications given for the introduction of the Rule are achieved is 
even more damning. In terms of whether the Rule protects or increases competitive balance, the view was 
that, “There is no evidence that the local training of young players will improve the competitive balance 
of club competitions”.68 It was felt that as a result of the ‘association-trained’ aspect of the Rule, the 
wealthier clubs would still sign the best home grown players, pay the highest salaries and would have the 
best scouting systems to identify association-trained talent.
69
 Even without the association-trained Rule, 
the richest clubs would still be able to invest most in academies.
70
 McDermott notes that the European 
Court has already ruled that regulations of this type would not increase competitive balance
71
 because rich 
clubs could still purchase the best indigenous talent, in turn driving up the prices of home grown 
players.
72
 It is also suggested that the Rule would upset competitive balance in international tournaments 
by allowing nations with the strongest and wealthiest domestic competitions a monopoly of success.
73
 
Certainly it would seem that the Rule is advantageous for bigger member states as they would have more 
players to select from.
74
 It appears therefore that there is a tension between the justifications of improving 
the training of young players and competitive balance,
75
 and that if the Rule does achieve an improvement 
in the training of young players, the effect of this would be to protect the dominance of the biggest teams, 
rather than encourage competitive balance.
76
 As is set out in Chapter 6, we have found evidence to contest 
this consensus.    
There is also some criticism of the justification of protecting the international game. McDermott argues 
that the Rule will not increase talent pools for national teams, drawing on statements in Bosman that 
stated that migration increased the prospects of achieving an international level of performance for 
players willing to move abroad.
77
 It was considered that there was no evidence that the Rule would 
achieve the aim of increasing the quality of international sides
78
 and that in any case, this argument would 
only work if only players performing in the domestic league were permitted to play for the national teams 
connected with it.
79
 
However, according to the literature reviewed it was part (4) of the Gebhard test that provided the biggest 
hurdle for the Rule being declared compatible with EU laws on free movement. All the literature that 
addressed the test of proportionality that needed to be applied to the Rule stated that this included the 
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question of whether the Rule was the least restrictive alternative of achieving the stated aims.
80
 In other 
words, “the objectives secured by [the] Rule must not be outweighed by the discriminatory impact of it, 
and there must be no other means by which these objectives can be met just as effectively”.81  
This, according to the consensus, provided the biggest obstacle for UEFA in proving that the restrictions 
of Article 45 TFEU were proportionate and therefore justifiable. A number of similar and overlapping 
‘least restrictive alternatives’ were proposed, including greater income redistribution (mainly of TV 
money).
82
 Other suggestions included salary caps,
83
 a cap on transfer fees,
84
 greater compensation for 
training players (or financial inducements for international success)
85
 and stricter club licensing and 
luxury taxes for those failing to comply with minimum training standards.
86
 In terms of improving the 
standard (and status) of international football, it was suggested that more time should be allowed for this 
in the football calendar.
87
 All of these measures, it was felt, would have a greater chance of achieving 
UEFA’s stated aims, but with fewer restrictions on the fundamental freedoms of EU workers.  
In summary, the reviewed literature on whether the home grown player rule could be justified under 
article 45 was firmly of the opinion that the Rule could not be seen as a legitimate restriction. McDermott 
summarises the position taken by almost all of those commentators assessing the Rule under Article 45: 
“As it stands right now, the home grown player Rule would have a difficult time surviving a legal 
challenge based on the principles of Bosman and Gerhard”.88 
2.5 Competition Law 
In addition to the potential of the Rule to breach Article 45 by limiting the right to freedom of movement 
of players based on their nationality, academics and practitioners have also identified a potential legal 
problem with regard to EU competition law. There is less work in this area than on free movement, but 
what work has been done has identified that in placing restraints on the freedom of clubs (as 
undertakings) in the purchase and sale of players, the Rule is prima facie a breach of Article 101 (in that it 
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may be an anti-competitive agreement between clubs) and Article 102 (in that it may indicate the abuse of 
a dominant market position by governing bodies insisting on adherence to the Rule as a condition of entry 
to their competitions). There is unfortunately little analysis of the Rule’s legality under Article 102, 
although Manville argues that through its imposition of the Rule, UEFA is abusing a dominant market 
position in an unjustifiable way.
89
   
Majani claims that home grown player Rule will, “restrain the abilities of clubs to engage in the market 
competition for both players and ‘trophies’” under Article 81 EC (now 101 TFEU).90 Manville agrees, 
citing the MOTOE case to argue that the Rule must comply with what is now Article 101.
91
 According to 
Manville’s analysis, the Rule is not a unilateral imposition by UEFA because it is the co-owner of their 
competitions with clubs and national associations and as these clubs and associations have agreed to the 
restrictions, this makes it an agreement between associations in line with article 101 that restricts and 
distorts access to the market of professional football players:  
“The Rule restricts the possibilities for the individual clubs to compete with each other by 
engaging players. Consequently the normal system of supply and demand does not apply to 
clubs and the clubs are deprived of the possibility of making use of the chances, with respect 
to the engagement of players, which would be available to them under normal competitive 
conditions. That is a restriction of competition between those clubs... a trans-frontier 
competition for those 8 seats is completely foreclosed. This view cannot be changed by the 
fact that a player can, in principle, play everywhere... Whereas this constitutes trans-frontier 
trading, however, it does not constitute an unrestricted competition. A club may search for a 
new player in other member states; but the club may ‘acquire’ only ‘domestic products’... 
Consequently the club may have to decline opportunities of better quality but not fulfilling 
the criteria for the 8 seats. Eventually, this means protectionism of domestic products”.92  
That there is a prima facie breach of competition law is the clear consensus, but this does not mean that 
the Rule is unlawful. The Arnaut Report,
93
 for example, states that the measure could qualify for an 
exemption under EU competition law.
94
 Manville
95
 embarks upon the most rigorous attempt to apply EU 
competition law principles to the Rule that we have so far encountered, considering the potential defences 
                                                          
89
 (2009): 34. 
90
 (2009): 23. 
91
 Ibid: 26. 
92
 Ibid: 27. 
93
 (2006): para 6.59. 
94
 See Gardiner and Welch (2011a): 845-6. It should be noted that the report itself has received some criticism (e.g. Garcia, B., 
(2007), ‘The Independent European Sport Review: Half Full or Half Empty?’ Entertainment and Sports Law Journal, Vol. 4, 
No. 3), particularly concerning the level of input made by UEFA and its claims of independence.  
95
 (2009). 
22 
 
and justifications for prima facie anti-competitive restrictions provided by Wouters and Article 81(3) 
EC.
96
 
Regarding the Wouters test, although Manville agrees that the objectives of improving the quality of, and 
investment in, player training “are legitimate in UEFA’s sport promotion and development efforts in 
football”, he claims that “there is no obvious inherent connection between the restrictions and the 
objectives as there are alternatives given to also pursue the legitimate objectives effectively (...) In any 
case, the Rule will eventually fail the test of proportionality in light of the objectives pursued”.97 In 
particular, Manville argues that the Rule will not have an impact upon the smaller clubs that do not 
qualify for European competition, but will have most effect on the larger clubs that are typically already 
investing in player training.
98
 As with the arguments noted above regarding Article 45, the most serious 
legal problem for the Rule appears to be the existence of many less restrictive alternatives – e.g. bonuses 
for playing home grown players and financial support to assist smaller clubs in training.
99
 His conclusion 
is that, “‘The Home-Grown player Rule’ may just be suitable to achieve its objectives pursued but it is not 
the least restrictive measure which is equally appropriate to achieve the objectives pursued. There are 
alternative measures which are more appropriate and less restrictive to the competition in the pursuit of 
the objectives.”100 Consequently, “the ‘home grown player Rule’ fails the Wouters test being not 
proportionate”.101 
Manville is similarly unconvinced about the ability of Article 81(3)
102
 to provide a defence. He considers 
it questionable whether the Rule satisfies the first condition (i.e. whether players are “goods” and whether 
the Rule leads to improved production or distribution) and argues that the “efficiency gains are vague and 
uncertain”.103 In particular, Manville asks what television viewers and spectators actually receive as a 
result of the Rule: “It is rather an illusion that the Rule will lead to an increase in the quality and this to an 
increase of the entertainment of football matches”. Consequently, “The conditions of Article 81(3) are not 
met and the ‘home-grown player Rule’ cannot be exempted”.104  
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2.6 Conclusions 
There is a clear consensus (in English-language literature) amongst legal commentators, both academic 
and practitioner, that there are considerable problems under EU law with the existing UEFA (and 
domestic) home grown player rules. These problems arise under laws protecting freedom of movement
105
 
and competition law.
106
 There may also be questions to be answered with regard to protection against Age 
Discrimination (although at first blush the Rule looks like it could be justified under paragraph 25 of the 
Directive). A number of the stated objectives for the UEFA Rule are not recognised by EU law (e.g. the 
protection of ties of locality in club football) but the commentators are broadly in agreement that the Rule 
could be potentially defended under the grounds of: 
1. Increasing the quality of training and development of young players, 
2. The protection of competitive balance, and 
3. The protection of international competition. 
However, it is clear from the literature that the Rule’s achievement of these objectives should not be 
accepted at face value and that there needs to be a rigorous and independent analysis of whether: 
1. The Rule achieves one or more of these aims, and 
2. Whether any less restrictive alternatives exist that could achieve the same aims but without 
restricting the rights of employees and undertakings under EU law to the same extent.  
  
                                                          
105
 Article 45 TFEU. 
106
 Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. 
24 
 
Chapter 3 
Review of Competitive Balance Literature107 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Competitive balance refers to the relevant sporting capabilities of teams in a competition. The more 
evenly balanced the competitive strengths of the teams involved, the more uncertain the outcome of each 
match and by extension the more uncertain the outcome of the competition overall. In a perfectly 
balanced match each team would have an equal probability of winning; this reasoning also extends to 
championship level.  
Competitive balance and uncertainty of outcome are key issues in the development and survival of sports 
leagues, without which the nature of the competition is undermined. Low levels of uncertainty of outcome 
at the match or championship level can lead to predictable leagues. These are often unpopular with 
supporters in the long term, and potentially lead to financial difficulties for all but the top clubs, resulting 
in large income gaps within and between leagues as well as the threat of the establishment of rival 
leagues.
108
 Ceteris paribus, demand for the football product is maximised with the greatest degree of 
uncertainty of outcome. Maintaining and promoting competitive balance is therefore considered to be 
important and can be a justification for sports leagues adopting regulatory rules to redistribute income and 
promote competitive balance. However the degree to which competitive balance matters is open to debate 
with its quantitative impact not well established. 
3.2 Measures of Competitive Balance 
Cairns et al. distinguished four temporal forms of uncertainty of outcome (UO).
109
 First, short-run UO 
where the emphasis is upon the outcome of a particular game; second, medium-term UO where the 
identity of the season’s winners is unknown; third, within-season UO where several teams are ‘in 
contention’. Finally they recognised long-term UO (competitive balance), which is concerned with 
persistent domination that may damage the whole league.  
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3.2.1 Short-Run (Match) Uncertainty of Outcome 
Match UO is the notion that spectators prefer close contests and are more likely to attend the next game if 
the competing teams are of much the same level of ability. There have been three broad approaches 
adopted to measure this form of UO; Relative league standings, implied prior probabilities (p) of a home 
win through the use of betting odds, and direct estimates of the probabilities of home wins. In general, 
one would expect teams in league positions immediately beside each other to be of a similar quality, and 
ignoring both home advantage and the probability of a draw suggests that both have an equal chance of 
winning. Likewise this might be measured by betting odds of ‘evens’. This suggests that the closer p is to 
0.5 the more attractive the match should be and the greater the attendance. In the presence of home 
advantage and ignoring draws the most attractive game would be where p is less than 0.5. This is to allow 
home advantage to offset the visitors’ greater quality, and research can be designed to estimate the value 
of p that maximises attractiveness in the presence of home advantage.  However a mixed set of results are 
apparent although on balance league standings, rather than their differences, and betting odds appear to be 
significant determinants of attendance. There is also some indication that this is more likely to be 
discovered with more recent studies. The different approaches are summarised in the table below: 
Table 3.1: Match Uncertainty Findings 
Author/Date Sport/Period Dependent 
Variable  
Indicator(s) Comment 
Hart, Hutton and 
Sharot 1975  
English soccer 
4 teams 3 seasons 
starting 1969/70 
Log of match 
attendance 
Log home standing 
Log away standing 
Log of absolute 
difference 
Insignificant 
Significant 
Insignificant 
Borland and Lye 
1992 
Australian Rules 
Football 1981/86 
Log of match 
attendance 
Difference of league 
standings 
Insignificant 
Peel and Thomas 
1988 
Football League all 
teams 1981/2 
Log of match 
attendance 
Home standing 
Away standing 
Probability of home 
win 
Significant 
Significant 
*Significant 
*Not a test of 
home advantage 
Dobson and 
Goddard 1992 
Football League 
24 teams 2 seasons 
starting 1989/9 
Log of match 
attendance 
Log home standing 
Log away standing 
 
 
Significant 
Significant 
Wilson and Sim 
1995 
Malaysian semi-pro 
soccer 1989/91 
Log of match 
attendance 
Absolute difference 
of league points 
Square of above 
Insignificant 
 
*Insignificant 
*Not a test of 
home advantage 
Baimbridge, 
Cameron and 
Dawson 1996 
Premier League 
football 1993/94 
Log of match 
attendance 
Absolute difference 
of standings 
Square of above 
Insignificant 
 
*Insignificant 
*Not a test of 
home advantage 
Peel and Thomas 
1997 
English rugby 
league 1994/95 
 
Match attendance Absolute value of 
the handicap betting 
spread 
Significant 
26 
 
Dawson, Dobson, 
Goddard and 
Wilson 2005 
English Premier 
League football 
1996-2003 
Log of disciplinary 
points y=1, r=2 
issued per match 
Home team 
uncertainty 
Away team 
uncertainty 
Significant 
 
Significant 
Kuypers 1996 English Premier 
League football 
1993/94 
Match attendance 
 
Proportion of Sky 
subscribers 
watching live 
football  
Estimated odds on a 
home win 
As above 
Insignificant 
 
Insignificant 
Carmichael, 
Millington and 
Simmons 1999 
English rugby 
league, season 
1994/95 
Log of match 
attendance 
Pre-match odds Significant 
 
           
Falter and Perignon 
2000 
 
 
 
 
French soccer 
1997-98  
Log of match 
attendance 
Home standing 
 
Away standing 
 
Goal Difference 
 
Absolute Difference 
Significant 
 
Insignificant 
 
Significant 
 
Insignificant 
Price and Sen 2003 
 
 
 
NCAA Div 1-A 
Football 
Match Attendance Home wins in last 11 
games 
 
Away ditto 
 
Squared difference 
of above 
 
 
Significant 
 
 
Significant 
 
Insignificant 
Forrest, Simmons 
and Buraimo 2005 
BskyB live Premier 
League football 
1993/4 – 2001/2 
Log of TV 
audience (millions) 
 
 
 
Probit of decision 
to broadcast 
Composite index 
involving league 
form and home 
advantage* 
 
As above* 
 
Pre-Boxing Day 
difference in relative 
wages* 
*See F S &B 
Significant 
 
 
 
 
Significant 
 
Significant 
Garcia and 
Rodriguez 2002 
Spanish League 
football 1992/93 
to5/96 
Log of match 
attendance 
Difference of league 
positions 
 
Square of above 
Significant 
 
 
Significant, 
wrongly signed 
Forrest, Beaumont, 
Goddard and 
Simmons 2005 
The Football 
League 1997/8 
Log of match 
attendance 
PROBRAT  
(ratio of the probability of 
a home win relative to that 
of an away win) 
PROBRAT
2 
 
HOMEPPG 
(home team prematch 
points per game) 
AWAYPPG 
(away team prematch 
points per game) 
Both probability 
ratios were 
correctly signed 
and significant 
 
Significant 
correctly signed 
 
Insignificant 
 
FBG&S regard 
the PPG’s as 
indexes of 
absolute team 
quality rather than 
27 
 
of u/o per se 
 
Meehan et al 2007 
 
 
 
MLB 2000-03 Match attendance WINDIFF (Abs) 
(absolute difference in 
teams’ win percents) 
WINDIFFP 
(+ home team difference 
in win percent) 
WINDIFFN 
(- home team difference in 
win percent) 
 
Games Left 
Significant 
 
 
Significant 
 
Significant 
 
 
 
Significant* 
*Interacted with 
WINDIFFP and 
WINDIFFN. 
Owen and 
Weatherston 2004  
 
 
 
Super 12s Rugby 
Union, New 
Zealand 1999-2001 
Log of Match 
Attendance 
SUMPLACE 
(sum of the places each 
team lies behind fourth in 
the table) 
PROBH 
(probability of home win) 
PROBH
4
 
Insignificant 
 
 
Insignificant 
 
Insignificant 
Alavy, Gaskell, 
Leach and 
Szymanski 2006 
 
 
 
Premier League 
Football, 248 
games broadcast on 
Sky 2002-5 
The (minute by 
minute) rate of 
change of TV 
ratings  
SQDIFF 
(squared difference of 
probability of home/away 
win)  
PSDRAW 
(probability of score 
draw) 
PNDRAW 
(probability of no-score 
draw) 
 
SUMSQ 
(sum of squared 
deviations of 
probabilities) 
Significant 
 
 
Significant 
 
 
Significant 
 
 
 
Significant 
 
 
3.2.2 Within-Season Uncertainty of Outcome 
Within-season UO concerns which team will take the championship title.  There is also limited agreement 
on how to measure this facet of UO. Borland
110
 used four measures of UO in an analysis of annual 
attendance at Australian Rules football.  In each of the four measures an average of observations was 
made at four points during the season. The intention was to obtain measures of UO as the season develops 
rather than to compute a single measure for the whole season, with the latter parts of the season more 
heavily weighted. The first of the four measures considers the spread between the top and bottom teams 
in the league. The second is the sum of the coefficients of variation of the numbers of games won by all 
teams, which incorporates information about the performances of all teams. Calculated by dividing the 
standard deviation of the data by its mean value, the coefficient of variation is a standardised measure of 
dispersion. The third measure is the average number of games a team is behind the leader. Ceteris 
paribus, the fewer the number of games in hand, the lower the probability that the lead will change. The 
                                                          
110
 Borland, J. (1987), ‘The demand for Australian rules football’, The Economic Record, 63, 182: 220 – 30. 
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final measure is the number of teams that have been in, or at most two games out of, the leading four (at 
that time) teams that are eligible for the (play-off) finals, at each of the four measurement points. As with 
earlier studies that used similar variables, for example, Demmert
111
 and Noll
112
, there is inevitably some 
arbitrariness in how one defines ‘close to’ championship success. Table 3.2 presents some studies and 
also measures of UO. As with match UO, within season UO research produces some mixed results, 
though here there is less agreement that the UO hypothesis receives support.   
Table 3.2: Key Studies Related to Uncertainty of Outcome 
Author/Date Sport/Period Dependent 
Variable 
Indicator/s Comment 
Jennett 1984 Scottish Premier 
League football 
1975/76 to1980/81 
Match attendance Home significance  
 
Away significance  
Relegation (H&A) 
significance 
Significant 
 
Significant 
Insignificant 
Borland 1987 Australian Rules 
football 1950/86 
Log of attendance 
per round* per 
capita 
*See Borland 
Average number of 
games in hand over 
leader 
Three other indexes 
Insignificant 
 
 
All insignificant 
Borland and Lye 
1992 
Australian Rules 
football 1981/86 
Log of match 
attendance 
Sum of the number 
of games required 
for both teams to 
reach the finals 
Games where both 
are in the top 5 
Significant 
 
 
 
Significant 
Dobson and 
Goddard 1992 
 
 
Football League 
24 teams 2 seasons 
starting 1989/9 
Log of match 
attendance 
Log of home 
significance 
Log of away 
significance 
 
Significant 
 
Insignificant 
 
 
Baimbridge, 
Cameron and 
Dawson 1996 
 
Premier League 
football 1993/94 
Log of match 
attendance 
Both in top 4 
Both in bottom 4 
Team has won title 
Insignificant 
Insignificant 
Insignificant 
Kuypers 1996 English Premier 
League football 
1993/94 
 
 
 
Live Sky football 
matches 1993/94 
Match attendance 
 
 
 
 
 
Proportion of Sky 
subscribers 
watching live 
football 
 
Home champ sig, 
games left times 
points behind  
Home relegation 
sig index  
 
Home champ. sig. 
 
Home rel sig. 
Significant 
 
 
Significant 
 
 
Significant 
 
Significant 
 
 
Falter and Perignon 
2003 
 
 
 
French soccer 
1997-98 
Log of match 
attendance 
Season dummies 
for each match 
Significant. 
  
                                                          
111
 Demmert, H. (1973) The Economics of Professional Team Sports. Heath, D.C. 
112
 Noll, R. (1974) Government and the Sports Business. Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C.. 
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Dawson, Dobson, 
Goddard and 
Wilson 2005 
English Premier 
League football 
1996-2003 
Log of disciplinary 
points y=1, r=2 
issued per match 
Home team champ 
sig* 
Away team champ 
sig* 
*See D & G above 
Insignificant 
 
Significant 
 
 
Carmichael, 
Millington and 
Simmons 1999 
English rugby 
league, season 
1994/95 
Log of match 
attendance 
Pre-season odds on 
the division title 
Significant 
 
 
Garcia and 
Rodriguez 2002 
Spanish League 
football 1992/93 to 
1995/96 
Log of match 
attendance 
Product of points 
behind and games 
left 
 
Significant  
Owen and 
Weatherston 2004 
 
 
Super 12s RU Log of Match 
Attendance 
SEASON, numbers 
matches 1 – 11. 
Significant 
 
3.2.3 Long Run Uncertainty of Outcome - Competitive Balance  
The desire to promote long run UO, also known as competitive balance, in sporting leagues is due to the 
fear that domination by a few teams may result in a loss of spectator interest, revenue and profit, as 
discussed above. 
Borland’s113 seminal piece of work investigating medium-term UO also attempted to capture the effects 
of long-term UO on Australian Rules football match attendance by measuring the number of teams that 
have reached the previous three years’ play-offs, divided by the number of places available. A larger 
value of the variable is consistent with a lower level of long run concentration. No significant results were 
identified but it could be that three years does not constitute a sufficient indication of the long run. In turn 
Borland and Lye
114
 employed a related index that consisted of the sum of the number of times both 
contestants had made it to the final stages in the previous three years. The significance of this variable 
was uncertain.  
Most research focussing upon competitive balance has examined the evolution of the dispersion of 
seasonal rankings of teams over time. Many researchers focussing on US professional team sports have 
used the standard deviation of win percent (a measure of dispersion of success) as an indicator of within-
season UO. For example, Fort and Quirk
115
 inquire whether the sample standard deviation of win per cent 
is significantly greater than the level that would characterise a perfectly balanced league.  
                                                          
113
 Borland, J. (1987) ‘The demand for Australian rules football’. The Economic Record 63, 182: 220 – 30. 
114
 Borland, J., and Lye, J. (1992) ‘Attendance at Australian Rules Football: A panel study’ Applied Economics 24, 9: 1053 – 
58. 
115
 Fort, R., & Quirk, J. (1995) ‘Cross subsidization, incentives, and outcomes in professional team sports leagues’. Journal of 
Economic Literature 33, 3: 1265 – 99. 
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In a long-run study of English soccer Dobson and Goddard
116
 used the logs of the teams’ mean final 
league positions and the season prior to that in which the match took place as indexes of historical success 
and found them to be significant and correctly signed determinants of attendance. Schmidt and Berri
117
 
examined how well balanced major league baseball has been since 1901 using the Gini Coefficient. Their 
analysis suggests that concentration is not a serious problem and has if anything declined since 1901. 
However, their procedure was criticised by Utt and Fort
118
 on the basis that the Gini coefficient is useful 
in measuring horizontal industrial concentration as its values range from ‘1’ where the industry is a pure 
monopoly to around ‘0’ where it comprises lots of very small firms, but no team can monopolise a 
season’s wins in baseball.  They adjust the Gini coefficient by comparing the actual distribution of win 
percents against the most unequal case where the champions win all their games, the runners-up win all 
but those lost to the champions, and so on down to the bottom team which loses every game. Not 
surprisingly their adjusted Gini coefficients exceed those of Schmidt and Berri, suggesting the leagues are 
in fact rather less competitively balanced than the latter authors had concluded.  
Utt and Fort’s criticism applies equally to Michie and Oughton119 who estimate Lorenz Curves of team 
shares of total points earned in English soccer for the seasons 1950/1, 1993/4 and 2004/5. The 
calculations are based on point shares to allow for the fact that in football games can be won, drawn or 
lost, and consequently win percents are misleading. Michie and Oughton find that competitive balance in 
English soccer has (apparently) declined sharply since 1993/4
120
. Significantly Utt and Fort suggest that 
as nobody knows how to adjust for these departures from the ideal, researchers should stick to standard 
deviations of win percents as indexes of competitive balance.  
The problem with this recommendation, however, is that standard deviations measured over several 
seasons do not permit reliable distinction between cases where the overall spread of results is more or less 
identical year-on-year but the distribution of success is more highly concentrated in one instance than 
another. This question is addressed by Eckard
121
 and Humphreys
122
. Using essentially the same approach 
they  partition the total league win percent variability, into a component that captures the variation of 
teams’ annual win percents about their own mean win percent or ‘time variance’ and ‘cumulative 
                                                          
116
 Dobson, S. and Goddard, J. (1992) ‘The demand for standing and seated viewing in English non-league football’. Applied 
Economics 24, 10: 1155 – 64. 
117
 Schmidt, M. & Berri, D. (2001) ‘Competitive balance and attendance: The case of Major League Baseball’. Journal of 
Sports Economics 2: 145 – 67. 
118
 Utt, J. & Fort, R, (2002) ‘Pitfalls to measuring competitive balance with gini coefficients’. Journal of Sports Economics 3, 
4: 367 –73. 
119
 (2004). 
120
 See also Szymanski, S. and Kuypers, T. (1999) Winners and losers: The business strategy of football. Penguin Books, 
London. 
121
 Eckard, W. (2001) ‘Baseball’s blue ribbon report: Solutions in search of a problem’. Journal of Sports Economics 2, 3: 213 
– 27. 
122
 Humphreys, B. (2002) ‘Alternative measures of competitive balance in sports leagues’. Journal of Sports Economics 3, 2: 
133 – 48. 
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variance’ that captures the variation in teams’ cumulative win percents across all teams.123 Other things 
equal an increase in the first element implies an increase in competitive balance whereas an increase in 
the latter element a decrease in competitive balance. The ratio of the first element to the total variation of 
win percents defines a competitive balance ratio (CBR). Applying this approach to European sports may 
be more problematic because promotion and relegation changes leagues’ memberships annually, and 
draws are commonplace. 
Eckard also examines the degree of concentration among the top four and (separately) the bottom four 
placed teams in both the NL and AL in all sub-periods; with five years in each there are 20 slots available 
in each sub-period. Herfindahl Indexes (HI) of team shares in those leading positions are then calculated. 
The Herfindahl Index is the sum of squares of team shares (win percents in Eckard’s study) in the 20 
positions available in each five-year period. For example, if the same four teams feature every year (the 
highest concentration by this definition) each obtains 25% of all the places so the HI takes the value HI = 
25
2
 + 25
2
 + 25
2
 + 25
2
  = 2500. If genuine shares of wins were used in the analysis then the HI would 
emerge as 0.25. In this regard the index reveals the ‘representative’ number of teams that dominate the 
championship; in this respect 0.25 implying four teams. 
Eckard finds that the HI for the AL is highest in 1995-99, which is also the five-year period in which the 
number of teams securing places in the top four is at its lowest, that is six. This is consistent with the 
findings based on his decomposition of win percents. In every sub-period more NL (than AL) teams made 
it into the top four while the HI tended downwards consistent with his findings that competitive balance 
in the National League improved over the period.  
Humphreys
124
 computes decade-by-decade CBRs and HIs of first place finishes, again only for teams that 
played each year in the decade. The CBRs trend slightly upward and the HIs downward over the period 
suggesting improved balance in both the NL and the AL. Humphreys examines if CBR, HI and the 
standard deviation of win percent affects attendances and finds that only the CBR is statistically 
significant and positively signed suggesting that other things equal more competitive balance drew more 
spectators to MLB.  
As we have seen there is great variation between the measures used to determine competitive balance and 
the findings of those studies. Table 3.3 presents an overview of the main methods of studies employed as 
well as strengths and weaknesses of each approach. 
 
 
                                                          
123
 Humphreys uses standard deviations. 
124
 (2002). 
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Table 3.3 Main Approaches to Measuring Uncertainty of Outcome3 
 
 
Method Measure Properties Advantages Disadvantages 
Standard 
deviation 
of win 
percent Within season 
Ratio of standard deviation of actual win 
percentages and ideal standard deviation 
of win percentages in a perfect league. 
(Standard deviation of actual win 
percentages/ standard deviation of win 
percentages in an ideal league where the 
denominator is 0.5/√N and N is the 
number of matches played by each team. 
The higher the measure, the lower the 
degree of competitive balance in the 
league. 
Simple to 
understand 
Derived based on US sport so 
doesn't take account of draws. 
Does not take account of 
dominance or the balance of 
competitive power of leading 
clubs compared to the rest. 
Measure is not dynamic - can be 
the same value when comparing 
leagues with different outcomes 
over time 
Five Club 
Concentrat
ion Ratio 
(C5) and 
Index of 
Competitiv
e Balance 
Inequality 
between the 
top five clubs 
and the rest of 
the league. 
Concentration 
of points 
among the top 
5 teams. 
C5 Ratio = Total points won by the top 5 
clubs/ Total points won by all clubs 
Easy to 
understand - 
higher 
concentration of 
points equates to 
greater 
imbalance 
No indication of inequality 
within top 5 teams or amongst 
teams below the top five 
Herfindahl
-
Hershman
n Index 
Inequality 
across all 
teams in a 
league 
Looks at each clubs share of points in a 
season and aggregates them into an index 
using each club's share of points as 
weights 
Insight into 
league 
domination over 
time (across 
seasons). 
Controls for 
variation in 
league size 
No indication of whether any 
team or teams dominates year 
after year. Sensitive to changes in 
the number of teams. 
Persistence 
Frequency a 
team has 
occupied a 
given position 
or positions 
over a given 
period of time 
Counts the number of times the same 
team has appeared 
Gives insight 
into dominance 
No indication about closeness of 
the league. Vulnerable to 
structural changes 
Gini 
coefficient
s and 
Lorenz 
curves 
Calculates 
points share 
for each team 
compared to 
an ideal 
distribution. 
Extent of 
inequality is 
measured by 
the gap 
between ideal 
and actual 
Lorenz curve measures the actual 
distribution of the points and the area 
between it and the ideal 45 degree line 
measures the inequality. The Gini 
coefficient measures the share of the area 
between the Lorenz curve and the 45 
degree line. 
Gives an 
indication of 
dominance 
within a league 
In reality no team could take 
100% of the points. Not 
appropriate for measuring within-
season competitive balance. 
 
3.3 Balance in European Football 
An initial consideration of outcomes of European Competitions may suggest a lack of competitive 
balance. As outlined in the ‘persistence’ measure above, at a very simple level it is possible to compare 
the winners of a competition overall. From 1956 – 1960 Real Madrid was absolutely dominant, followed 
by Ajax from 1971 – 1973, Bayern Munich from 1974 – 1976 or eight English winners between 1977 and 
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1984 which suggests a historic problem in uncertainty of outcome
125
. While this is less evident in terms of 
win dominance today, Hill suggests that “a new form of dominance has taken shape in recent years, 
driven by a growing inequality of financial means and diversity of national regulation which leaves the 
European playing field increasingly uneven”.126  
A decrease in competitive balance over the last five decades at the domestic league level is suggested in 
Figure 3.1.  
Figure 3.1: Total Number of Different Champions across Five Decades for 25 Top Divisions 
 
(Reproduced from UEFA 2010: 40). 
The graph shows that in the decade from 2001 – 2010 there were 100 domestic Champions across 
Europe, an average of four per country. This is at the lowest level it has been in the last fifty years 
(though similar figures to the 1970s) and a clear drop from the average of 4.5 winners per country in the 
1960s. However, when this data is disaggregated it becomes evident that some countries have in fact seen 
an increase in competitive balance as measured by the number of different title winners, with eight 
countries having more winners in the most recent decade (Figure 3.2). 
  
                                                          
125
 Hill, J. (2011), ‘UEFA and the European Union: the green shoots of a new European public space?’ in The Transformation 
of European Football: Towards the Europeanisation of the National Game, Niemann A., Garcia B., and Grant W., (eds.), 
Manchester University Press: 40 – 56. 
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Figure 3.2: Two Decade Comparison in the Total Number of Different Domestic Champions 
 
(Reproduced from UEFA 2011: 40). 
Professional sports leagues have an inherent tendency towards imbalance – particularly as big market, 
richer clubs get richer and smaller clubs get poorer, with this trend exacerbated when increased 
commercial revenues are available. The nature of UEFA competitions in which not only a higher 
proportion of clubs qualify from bigger leagues but also a greater proportion of the prize money is 
distributed to clubs in bigger leagues by virtue of the size of their television markets, may contribute to 
the dominance of a relatively small number of clubs. Unregulated leagues tend to widen the gap between 
clubs and in an effort to stop this happening governing bodies tend to intervene in sports competitions; 
particularly to redistribute resources and enforce regulations, such as club licensing and player restrictions 
which may help to balance leagues.  
From a cursory examination of the descriptive statistics on UEFA competitions in the 2011 and 2012 
seasons, of the 20 richest clubs according to the Deloitte Money League, only eight reached the final 16 
of the Champions League in 2012. Of those final 16 in 2011 only two clubs were not from the big five 
leagues (FC Copenhagen and Shakhtar Donetsk). However, this number increased to four in 2012 (Apol, 
Basel, CSKA Moskva, Zenit)
127
. 
The Champions League has been won by 13 different teams in the last 20 years, with no team winning in 
consecutive years. However FC Barcelona has won four times, with Real Madrid and AC Milan both 
winning three times. There does also appear to have been a decline in the number of teams reaching the 
latter stages of the competition between 1992 and 2009. Figure 3.3 shows the number of different teams 
reaching the quarter finals of the Champions League during three year periods over the last two decades.  
                                                          
127
 Deloitte Money League 2012 available at http://www.deloitte.com/assets/Dcom-
UnitedKingdom/Local%20Assets/Documents/Industries/Sports%20Business%20Group/uk-sbg-dfml-2012-final.pdf. 
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Figure 3.3: Number of teams reaching the Quarter Finals in the Previous Three Years 
 
In 1992, 20 teams may have expected to reach the quarter finals at least once in a three year time period, 
but this number declined from the mid 1990s to 15 or 16 clubs at the beginning of the 2000s. However 
from 2008 there appears to have been a reversal in this trend with consecutive increases in the number of 
teams qualifying for the quarter final stage since. Though of course this is not a conductive measure and 
may be unrelated to the home grown player rule, it is certainly an indication of a movement towards a 
more balanced competition. However there are still concerns that a small number of wealthy clubs tend to 
dominate the later stages of European competition, particularly those from the top leagues. Table 3.4 
highlights this trend, showing the proportion of clubs reaching the semi-finals of the UEFA Champions 
League from 2006 -12. All clubs reaching this stage have been from the top five European leagues. 
 
 
Table 3.4
128
: Origin of Clubs Reaching the Semi-Finals of European Competitions from 2006 - 2012 
 Germany England Spain France Italy Other 
2006 – 12 3 11 7 1 2 0 
Proportion 12.50% 46% 29% 4% 8% 0% 
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 Zylberstein, J., (2012) La Regle de l’UEFA sur les Joueurs Formes Localement: Un Instrument au Service de la Formation, 
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3.4 Conclusions 
Various methods have been employed to consider competitive balance and its impact mainly on 
attendances in both US and European sports. While competitive balance is thought to be an essential part 
of maintaining a healthy competition, the level of competitive balance necessary has not been determined 
with any agreement in the literature. Nor has the most appropriate method to calculate it. 
A variety of studies have been reviewed above with an assessment of the methods used presented in Table 
3.3. However, it has been decided that while each of the methods listed has advantages and disadvantages 
for measuring specific issues, none of the methods set out in previous studies are appropriate to measure 
competitive balance across European competitions at an adequate level. This is for a number of reasons 
relating to the limitations set out in the table above and also due to the nature of the competition where 
qualification takes place in a separate group stage format which is then unrelated to the end knock-out 
phase of the competition. While some rudimentary analysis of the persistence measure has been presented 
above, Chapter 6 sets out an innovative approach using regression analysis to consider the isolated impact 
of the home grown players rule on the dispersion of teams in the Champions League and Europa League. 
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Chapter 4 
Domestic Rule Audit 
 
4.1 Introduction 
This Chapter provides a comprehensive audit of domestic foreign player quotas and home grown player 
regulations in existence in the European Union. With the exception of Italy, where the regulations are 
from the 2011/12 season, these regulations were all in existence in the form outlined in Table 4.1 (below) 
for the season 2012/13. 
 
4.2 Summary of Table 4.1 
When the UEFA home grown player rule was first mooted, UEFA announced that they hoped that it 
would also be adopted by domestic governing bodies, so that it would impact upon domestic competitions 
and clubs who typically did not qualify for European competition. As Table 4.1 demonstrates, a number 
of domestic federations and event organisers have incorporated the UEFA Rule or similar versions of it 
into their regulations in recent years. However this is not a uniform development and some domestic 
competitions currently have no such rules in place. Other domestic competitions have regulations that 
provide more stringent restrictions on how many non-locally trained players or foreign players can be 
selected in a squad, or even play in a particular match. Furthermore, some domestic federations imposing 
more restrictive rules than UEFA may well be infringing European Union laws on free movement where 
these regulations have the effect of reducing the ability of EU players from other member states to 
participate in squads or matches.  
Finally, the plethora of domestic rules currently in operation makes it very difficult to isolate the impact 
of the UEFA Rule on the improvements to competitive balance and, in particular, the training and 
development of young players. The impact of domestic rules and incentives governing the training and 
playing of home grown players was noted by a number of clubs interviewed in Chapter 7 as a more 
significant reason for increases in the number of both home grown and under-21 players being selected 
for first team squads. 
 
An audit of the domestic rules in place is outlined in Table 4.1 below.  
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Table 4.1 
Country; 
Organiser; 
Competition 
Nationality-based regulation  
on players 
Home-grown player regulation Additional information 
 
Austria 
 
Austrian 
Football 
League 
 
tipp 3-
Bundesliga 
powered by T-
Mobile 
None  None No HGP rule. Instead a solidarity fund (“Funding Pot for 
Austrian Players”). To receive money from this pot, in the 
top division 12 out of 18 players must be Austrian citizens 
or no bonus for the quarterly season in which condition was 
not fulfilled. Financial advancement is calculated quarterly 
according to the minutes Austrian players played (see §11 
of the competition regulations: 
Durchführungsbestimmungen). 
Belgium 
 
Pro League 
 
Jupiler Pro 
League 
None At least 8 home-grown players (trained at a Belgian 
club) have to be on the squad list of a club. At least 
six players formed by a Belgian club have to figure 
on the score sheet. 
 Players who are classed as Belgian according to Belgian 
law and who spend at least three full years at a club in 
Belgium - EEA nationals who have spent at least 3 years 
before their 23rd birthday at a Belgian club - non EEA 
nationals, who have spent at least 3 years before their 23rd 
birthday at a Belgian club  
Czech  Rep. 
 
Football 
Association 
 
Gambrinus 
liga 
Max. 3 players from non EU countries Squad list of 25 from which 4 must be HGP “Home Grown Player” means a player who, irrespective of 
his nationality or age, has been registered with any club (or 
clubs) affiliated to the Football Association of the Czech 
Republic for a period, continuous or not, of three seasons or 
36 months between ages 15 -21.  
Denmark 
 
Dansk 
Boldspil-Union 
 
Superliga 
None HGP Rule introduced in the Danish Football League 
in season 2009/10. Each club’s ‘Player List A’ has a 
maximum 25 players. At least 8 of these must be 
home grown players. 4 out of the 8 Home Grown 
players must be club-trained (the other 4 trained at 
other Danish clubs). If a club cannot meet the 
requirements of 8 Home Grown players in the list of 
The definition of a ‘Home Grown Player’ is a player who 
has been eligible to play in a certain club for a minimum of 
36 months (totally) between the age of 15 and 21. 
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players, the number of players on ‘Player List A’ is 
reduced by the number of missing home grown 
players. Besides the ‘Player List A’ each club has 
the opportunity to submit a ‘Player List B’ with an 
unlimited number of players under the age of 21, 
registered and eligible to play at least for 2 years 
since his 15th birthday. Players at the age of 16 can 
be registered if they have been a member of the 
same club for the past 2 years. 
England 
 
Premier League 
 
Barclays Premier 
League 
No regulation, but players from outside  the EU 
will need a work permit 
The HGP rule was introduced from the start of 
2010/11. Clubs cannot name more than 17 non home 
grown players aged over 21 in their squad. Some 
clubs will have a squad list of 23, for example, 
because they may have 17 over 21 non home grown 
players. A maximum of 25 players can be named in 
the squad list 
“Home Grown Player” means a player who, irrespective of 
his nationality or age, has been registered with any club (or 
club) affiliated to the Football Association or the Football 
Association of Wales for a period, continuous or not, of 
three seasons or 36 months prior to his 21st birthday (or the 
end of the season during which he turns 21) and for the 
purposes of this definition of “Home Grown Player” a 
Season will be deemed to commence on the date on which 
the first transfer window closes and expire on the date of 
the final League match of the season;  
Finland  
 
Jalkapalloliiga ry 
 
Veikkausliiga 
Maximum number of three ‘foreign players’ in 
a squad for an official match. A foreign player 
is a player from a country which isn't a member 
of UEFA or from a country which doesn't have 
an agreement with the EU about the free 
movement of workers. A player who has been 
registered in a team which is a member in the 
Finnish FA for at least five seasons is not 
regarded a foreign player. 
At least half of the players who are named in the 
team squad in an official match have to be home-
grown players. At least four of these home-grown 
players in the squad have to play in the match. 
The teams in the high divisions of Finnish football 
(Veikkausliiga, the 2nd and the 3rd division for men, 
Women's League and the 2nd division for women) have had 
to comply with the home-grown player rules of the Finnish 
FA since 2012 (season ending in October was the first one 
with these rules). 
 
A player is regarded a home-grown player, if he/she has 
been registered to a Finnish team for a period of three years 
(minimum) between the age of 12 and 21.  
France 
 
Ligue de Football 
Professionnel 
 
Ligue 1 and 
Ligue 2 
Ligue 1 and 2 clubs cannot have in their squad 
more than 4 players that are not citizens of an 
EU country, a country of the European 
Economic Area (EEA) or a country that has an 
association or cooperation agreement with the 
EU. The total number of players, which are not 
citizens of an EU country, a country of the 
European Economic Area (EEA) or a country 
that has an association or cooperation 
agreement with the EU, cannot exceed four in 
None  
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Ligue 1 and two in Ligue 2. 
Germany 
 
DFL Deutsche 
Fussball Liga 
GmbH 
 
Bundesliga 
None Local player rule was implemented in 2006/07. 
Clubs must have at least 4 club-trained players and 4 
association-trained players on their squad lists. 
There is no limitation of the number of players on 
that list. This rule is mandatory in Bundesliga and 
Bundesliga 2.  
see source § 5a LOS 
Greece 
 
Super League 
Greece 
 
Super League 
OPAP 
In youth competitions (U17 and U20) at least 
13 out of the 18 players must be eligible to 
participate in the Greek National Team.  
“Home Grown Player” means a Player who, 
irrespective of his nationality or age, has been 
registered with any Club (or club) affiliated to Super 
League Greece for a period, continuous or not, of 
three seasons or 36 months prior to his 21st birthday 
and for the purposes of this definition of “Home 
Grown Player” a season will be deemed to 
commence on the date on which the first Transfer 
Window closes and expire on the date of the final 
league match of the season; Clubs which have not 
been licensed according to UEFA's licensing 
programme, have two restrictions: They can sign up 
to three players over the age of 24 (Greek, non-EU 
and EU) and they can sign an unlimited number of 
players under the age of 24 who are eligible to play 
for the Greek national team or they are home grown 
players.” 
 
Ireland 
 
The FA of 
Ireland 
 
Airtricity League 
None None  
Italy 
 
Lega Nazionale 
Professionisti 
Serie A 
1) Clubs holding a 2011/12 Serie A license, on 
30/6/11 with more than two players who are 
non-EU/EAA citizens, can acquire a maximum 
of two non-EU/EEA players, coming from 
abroad, provided that:  
None  
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Liga Serie A 
(NB. Rule relates 
to 2011/12 
season) 
 
 
 
a) One player replaces another non-EU/EEA 
player that (i) is transferred abroad by signing a 
contract with a foreign club, or (ii) has a 
contract expiring by 30.06.2011, or (iii) has 
acquired, for whatever reason, the nationality 
of a EU/EEA country; 
b) One player replaces another non-EU/EEA 
player who (i) is transferred abroad by signing 
a contract with a foreign club, or (ii) has 
acquired, for whatever reason, the nationality 
of a EU/EEA country; 
Players referred to in paragraphs a(i), a(ii) and 
b(i) will not register in the same season for the 
latter sports. Former young players that have 
obtained the first professional contract after 
30/6/09 cannot be used as replacement. 
 
2) Clubs holding a 2011/12 Serie A license on 
30/6/11, which owned no or just one non-
EU/EAA player can register, without 
obligation to replace their other football 
players, up to 3 players who are non-EU/EAA 
citizens. 
Clubs holding a 2011/12 Serie A license on 
30/6/11, with 2 non-EU/EAA players, can sign, 
without obligation to replace their other 
football players,  a non EU/EAA player from 
abroad provided that this player replaces  
another non-EU/EEA player that (i) is 
transferred abroad by signing a contract with a 
foreign club, or (ii) has a contract expiring by 
30.06.2011, or (iii) has acquired, for whatever 
reason, the nationality of a EU/EEA country. 
 
The player being replaced must be clearly 
indicated by the company and, if in the case (i) 
or (ii), the player will not register in the same 
season. Former young players that have 
obtained the first professional contract after 30 
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June 2009 cannot be used as replacement. 
Latvia 
 
Latvijas futbola 
Virsīga 
 
Virslīga 
 No limit on squad list or number of non ‘home-
grown’ (in effect non-Latvian) players on that list.  
 
Only 5 non ‘home-grown’ players can be on the 
field during the game 
A non home-grown player is the player with non-Latvian 
Republic issued passport.  
Malta  
 
Malta Football 
Association 
 
BOV Premier 
League 
None Only 4 players who did not form part of the Youth 
Sector of the Association can be on the pitch at any 
one time. These limitations shall not apply to those 
players who although they did not form part of the 
Youth Sector of the Association, are players who in 
accordance with the FIFA rules and regulations, are 
qualified to represent the Association in a FIFA or 
UEFA Competition for national teams. Not 
applicable to those players who on 1/2/04 were 
qualified to play for the Association in a FIFA or 
UEFA competition for national teams or who had 
the legal right to freedom of movement and the legal 
right to work within the Republic of Malta. 
‘Forming part of the Youth Sector of the Association’, 
means a player has been registered with the Association and 
duly registered with any member club and/or club affiliated 
with the Gozo Football Association for at least 4 seasons, 
including the season during which the first registration with 
a member club or club affiliated to the Gozo Football 
Association was made, and who during each of such 4 
seasons was eligible to take part with his club in the youth 
and/or junior competitions organised by the Association 
and/or The Youth Football Association and/or the Gozo 
Football Association and/or the Gozo Youth Football 
Association. 
Northern Ireland 
 
Irish Football 
Association 
 
Danske Bank 
Premiership 
No regulation, but players from outside  the EU 
will need a work permit. 
None  
Poland 
 
Ekstraklasa SA 
 
T-Mobile 
Ekstraklasa 
None HGP rule introduced from 2007/08. Clubs cannot 
name more than 17 non home-grown players aged 
over 21 in their squad and limit is 25. 5 must be 
home grown players and 3 club-trained players 
Some clubs will have a squad list less than 25, for 
example, because they may have 17 over 21 non 
home grown players. 
 
A maximum of 25 players can be named in the 
squad list. 
“Home Grown Player” means a player who, irrespective of 
his nationality or age, has been registered with any Club (or 
club) affiliated to the Polish Football Association for a 
period, continuous or not, of three seasons or 36 months 
prior to his 21st birthday (or the end of the season during 
which he turns 21) and for the purposes of this definition of 
“Home Grown Player” a season will be deemed to 
commence on the date on which the first Transfer Window 
closes and expire on the date of the final League Match of 
the Season; “Club-trained players” - as above but referring 
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to respective clubs. 
Romania 
 
Romanian 
Professional 
Football League 
 
Liga I 
Non-EU player restrictions and HGP rule (introduced for 2009/10): 
  
Foreign players originating in member states of the European Union (EU players) or foreign players 
originating in countries that do not belong to the EU (non-EU players) can be registered with or 
transferred to Romanian clubs in accordance with the relevant regulations of FIFA/FRF [Romanian 
Football Federation] and may participate in official matches within any of the competitions organized 
by FRF/LPF [Romanian Professional Football League]/CFA [County Football Association], provided 
that the following conditions for each category are met. 
 
46.7.1.1. First League teams: 
a) for the 2012/13 and 2013/14, these teams can field 5 non-EU players at one time and have the 
obligation to include in the referee’s report at least 5 locally-trained players for each official match; 
b) for 2014/15, teams can field 3 non-EU players at a time and have the obligation to include in the 
referee’s report at least 6 locally-trained players for each official match; 
c) for 2015/16 competition year, teams can field 2 non-EU players at a time and have the obligation to 
include in the referee’s report at least 8 locally-trained players for each official match; 
 
46.7.1.2. Second League teams: 
a) for 2012/13 and 2013/14, teams can field up to 3 non-EU players at a time and have the obligation 
to include in the referee’s report at least 10 locally-trained players for each official match; 
b) for 2014/15, teams can field up to 2 non-EU players at a time and have the obligation to include in 
the referee’s report at least 11 locally-trained players for each official match; 
c) From 2015/16, teams can field up to one non-EU player and have the obligation to include in the 
referee’s report at least 12 locally-trained players for each official match; 
 
46.7.1.3. Third League teams and women’s football teams: 
a) for 2012/13, teams can field up to one non-EU player and have the obligation to include in the 
referee’s report at least 14 locally-trained players for each official match; 
b) for 2013/14, teams cannot field any non-EU players and have the obligation to include in the 
referee’s report at least 15 locally-trained players for each official match; 
 
46.7.1.4. Futsal teams: 
a) for 2012/13, teams can include in the referee’s report up to 5 non-EU players and have the 
obligation to include in the referee’s report at least 5 locally-trained players; 
b) for 2013/14, teams can include in the referee’s report up to 3 non-EU players and have the 
obligation to include in the referee’s report at least 7 locally-trained players; 
“Home Grown Player” means a player who, irrespective of 
his nationality or age, has been registered with any club (or 
clubs) affiliated to the Romanian Football Federation for a 
period, continuous or not, of three Seasons or 36 months 
prior to his 21st birthday (or the end of the Season during 
which he turns 21). 
 
‘Locally-trained’ players are players that, irrespective of 
their citizenship, have been registered with and have 
participated in competitions for a Romanian club for at least 
3 years (either consecutive or non-consecutive years) 
between the ages of 15 and 21. The three-year period shall 
be reduced accordingly for players under 18. 
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46.7.1.5. Teams from other senior and junior categories: 
a) for 2012/13 competition year, these teams have the right to field up to 2 non-EU players at a time 
and have the obligation to include in the referee’s report at least 15 locally-trained players for each 
official match; 
b) starting with the 2013/2014 competition year, these teams do not have the right to field any non-EU 
players and have the obligation to include in the referee’s report at least 16 locally-trained players for 
each official match. 
Scotland 
 
Scottish Premier 
League 
 
Scottish Premier 
League 
None None In each match-day squad of 18, there must be at least 3 
outfield players who qualify as under-21 players (no 
nationality and HGP restrictions attached to this) 
Slovakia 
 
League Clubs 
Union 
 
Corgon Liga 
Maximum of 5 Players from non-EU nations can 
be placed on a club roster (Player's List) for one 
particular match of the competition. 
None  
Spain 
 
Liga de Fútbol 
Profesional 
 
Liga BBVA/ 
Liga Adelante 
 
Squad size limit of 25 players per team. Out of 
these 25 players, there can only be 3 non-
European or players coming from countries with 
no bilateral agreements with Spain nor EU.   
None.  
Swedish FA 
 
Allsvenskan 
None Half of the name at the squad-list for every league 
match has to be made up of “home grown players” 
 
Wales 
 
Welsh Premier 
League 
None None  
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Chapter 5 
Overview of Descriptive Statistics 
 
5.1 Introduction 
By considering some trends that have been observed in the data we have collected we are able to analyse 
in more detail the impact of the home grown player rule. Specifically this section identifies whether or not 
home grown players are actually featuring in matches as opposed to simply on squad sheets. This helps to 
determine whether or not the rule is having the effect of offering more possibilities for young and locally 
trained players to play. 
Further, we consider the issue of nationality and how many of the home grown players are national or 
non-nationals. This helps to assess the impact of the Rule on the free movement of players. Finally the 
differences between the two types of home grown players – club and association-trained - are evaluated.  
 
5.2 How many home grown players do the clubs have on their squad lists?  
According to the UEFA rule, the minimum number for home grown players is eight, but do some clubs 
have more than eight?
129
 The number of home grown players on the squad lists of clubs competing in 
UEFA competitions has increased steadily since the introduction of the rule. Figure 5.1 charts this 
progression. 
Figure 5.1: Numbers of Home Grown Players in Squad Lists for Europa League and 
Champions League 
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While this is in part due to the staggered introduction of the rule, there has clearly been an increase in 
these numbers while the rule has been constant. The growth has been more pronounced for the 
Champions League.
130
 
Based on data from UEFA, Table 5.1 presents the average numbers of home grown players in the squads 
of clubs competing in UEFA competitions since 2007. This is further broken down into club-trained 
players (CTP) and association-trained players (ATP). 
Table 5.1: Average Number of Home Grown Players per Squad 
 Champions League Europa League 
Season HGP CTP ATP HGP CTP ATP 
2007 7 3 4 6 3 3 
2008 9 3 6 9 3 6 
2009 9 4 5 10 3 7 
2010 12 5 6 12 5 8 
2011 12 5 7 12 4 8 
2012 12 5 7 15 6 9 
 
The numbers of home grown players registered on average across both competitions are far in excess of 
the minimum standards imposed, with clubs tending to comply with the more stringent necessity of 
having eight home grown players in a squad, comprising at least four club-trained players, in advance of 
its full implementation. The data indicates that on average greater adherence to the rule is met through the 
use of association-trained players.
131
 Figure 5.2 shows that on average the proportion of squads made up 
of home grown players has increased dramatically over the last six seasons from under 30% in 2007 to 
over 50% in 2012 in both the Champions league and Europa League competitions.  
Figure 5.2: Proportion of Home Grown Players in Squad Lists for UEFA Competitions 
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 This is consistent with the greater effects of the rule for the Champions League in the statistical analysis, suggesting greater 
reallocation of talent. 
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 See the statistical analysis, which identifies the importance of these players. 
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It is interesting to note that when the rule was originally introduced the Champions League teams 
comprised, on average, a greater proportion of home grown players than clubs in the Europa League. 
However, this trend had shifted by 2010, coinciding with the full implementation of the Rule and for the 
last three seasons there was a higher proportion of home grown players in Europa League squads. 
The differences between the impacts in Europa League and Champions League can possibly be explained 
by comparing squad sizes. Figure 5.3 charts the development in the numbers of players registered with 
UEFA to compete in the Champions League and Europa Leagues. 
Figure 5.3: Average Squad Size for Teams in UEFA Competitions 
 
While for the period 2007–09 Champions League squad sizes on average tended to be smaller than in the 
Europa League, the trend over the last six seasons has been for the size of Champions League squads to 
increase and they are now, on average, larger than Europa League squads. This may be a reflection of the 
economic climate where clubs need to reduce the size of their squad. This data may suggest that as the 
rule has been fully implemented, the Champions League clubs have increased the size of their squad in 
order to accommodate the rule. There would be a concern that some of these players are simply ‘making 
up the numbers’. It is necessary to look at some further data on clubs individually across this time period 
to further understand the impact.  
Disaggregating this data to consider the impacts on individual countries it is clear that there has not been 
a uniform impact of the rule on home grown player numbers. On average since the introduction of the 
Rule in 2006/07 teams from Cyprus competing in European competition have the largest amount of non-
home players (16) in their squads. Clubs from Greece, England and the Republic of Ireland are next with 
an average of 15 non-home grown players in their squads in recent UEFA competition. In the case of the 
Republic of Ireland, this may be linked to the number of players that migrate to the UK aged 16 in search 
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of a professional contract. At the other end of the spectrum, the huge media revenues from the domestic 
game in England means that clubs can afford to buy in the best talent from overseas. Spain and Portugal 
feature next with an average of 14 non-home grown players along with five other nations. 
Estonia, Iceland and Georgia have the highest number of home grown players since the rule was 
introduced with an average of 13. Eleven nations including Italy, Montenegro and Sweden have 12. 
Seven nations including the Netherlands have an average of 11 home grown players. Appendix B presents 
a full list of countries and their corresponding numbers of home grown players. 
 
5.3 How many of the home grown players are nationals and how many are non-
nationals? How many of the non-nationals are EU-nationals and how many are third 
country nationals? 
The Rule does not make any reference to the nationality of players, simply to where they were trained and 
as such we find that a proportion of the players that qualify as home grown are not nationals of the 
country in which they play football. Table 5.2 shows the proportion of players registered with teams in 
the Champions League who are classed as home grown but are not nationals of the domestic league in 
which they play. 
Table 5.2: Nationality of Home Grown Players in the Champions League 
Season 
Club-trained Association-trained HGP 
Total Foreign EU Total Foreign EU Total Foreign EU 
2007 8.27% 8.60% 93.55% 4.36% 4.08% 100.00% 12.62% 7.04% 95.77% 
2008 24.27% 11.41% 91.61% 25.49% 2.88% 99.04% 49.76% 7.04% 95.42% 
2009 11.16% 6.82% 98.48% 25.95% 5.54% 95.44% 37.11% 5.92% 96.36% 
2010 17.89% 9.09% 94.74% 26.28% 6.51% 94.79% 44.18% 7.56% 94.77% 
2011 15.01% 13.61% 94.67% 29.22% 7.29% 94.53% 44.23% 9.44% 94.58% 
2012 20.77% 12.81% 93.80% 29.10% 8.26% 93.81% 49.87% 10.15% 93.80% 
 
As we can see, the number of foreign home grown players has increased as a proportion of home grown 
players overall since the rule was fully implemented from 7% in 2007 to over 10% in 2012. The same 
trend is true for non EU players. It is interesting to note that a larger proportion of club-trained players 
than association-trained players are not nationals of the country in which they play. However, while there 
has been a large increase in non EU players that are association-trained, this has not been the case for non 
EU club-trained players, though there are fluctuations from year to year. Similar data for the Europa 
League is presented in Table 5.3. 
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Table 5.3: Nationality of Home Grown Players in the Europa League 
Season 
Club-trained Association-trained HGP 
Total Foreign EU Total Foreign EU Total Foreign EU 
2007 7.69% 7.78% 95.21% 4.19% 3.30% 96.70% 11.88% 6.20% 95.74% 
2008 10.30% 4.24% 96.61% 28.28% 1.08% 99.38% 38.59% 1.92% 98.64% 
2009 10.76% 7.14% 95.24% 30.76% 5.69% 96.94% 41.52% 6.07% 96.50% 
2010 17.89% 5.20% 96.80% 34.99% 5.32% 95.91% 52.88% 5.28% 96.21% 
2011 14.18% 6.05% 96.84% 32.89% 4.77% 97.28% 47.07% 5.15% 97.15% 
2012 21.83% 8.97% 95.35% 34.59% 7.65% 96.12% 56.42% 8.16% 95.82% 
 
As we can see, the same trend as the Champions League clubs is apparent - that the numbers of foreign 
home grown players have increased over the time that the Rule has been in place. However, it is difficult 
to give an overall trend as the figures are heavily influenced by the composition of the clubs taking part. It 
is however clear that the proportion of foreign home grown players (both club and association-trained) for 
Europa League teams is significantly lower than Champions League teams. This reinforces the view that 
Champions League teams are able to compete for the best players at all age groups – even academy level, 
irrespective of the nationality of those players. However, there may be some indication that Europa 
League teams are seeing the rewards of investments made in club-trained players as in 2012 Europa 
League teams had one more club-trained players on average than Champions League teams. This is also 
supported by the qualitative evidence presented in Chapter 6. The data suggests that the Rule is not in 
general terms restricting the free movement of football players across borders, but there may be an issue 
of players transferring at younger ages. 
It is also important to consider whether there has been any impact on teams in their domestic league. 
From data produced by CIES we are able to determine the proportion of national and non national players 
in domestic leagues and also cross check this against their training status (i.e. their being club-trained or 
not). This is particularly pertinent given the comparison we can make between clubs which are in the top 
five positions domestically, who would qualify for European competitions and the rest of the clubs in the 
league. 
We begin by considering the number of expatriate players in the top five leagues overall. It is important to 
consider any changes in the numbers of foreign players in order to estimate whether the Rule has limited 
the free movement of players. As can be seen from Figure 5.4 there does not appear to have been any 
particular uniform change in the numbers of foreign players in the top five leagues since the introduction 
of the rule. If it was having a negative effect, one would expect to see persistent falling numbers of 
expatriate players who would not have their contract renewed when it came to an end. But this does not 
seem to be the case and actually in Italy there appears to have been a substantial increase. 
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Figure 5.4: Number of Expatriate Players in the Big Five Leagues 
  
Similarly across the other European Leagues there are different trends. According to CIES, in the Polish 
and Hungarian Leagues for example, the numbers of foreign players have increased considerably since 
2009/10 (from 18.3 to 34.4% in Poland and 23.5 to 33.4% in Hungary). Cyprus (70.3%) have the highest 
number of foreign players, though this is likely to be caused by domestic regulations (see Chapter 4). 
High numbers of foreign players are also present in other leagues such as Portugal (55.1%)
132
. 
Focussing on the top 5 leagues in Europe, 3.88% of expatriate players are club-trained, compared to 
23.42% of nationals. This is broken down further in table 5.4 below 
Table 5.4 Percentage of Expatriate Players in the Big Five Leagues that are Club-
Trained 
 France Germany Spain Italy England 
 All Top All Top All Top All Top All Top 
2008 11.02 7.88 0.03 0 1.22 2.63 0.72 0 4.53 10.22 
2009 3.58 1.96 0 0 0.92 2.07 1.34 0 5.84 11.71 
2010 3.59 6.32 0.56 2.07 2.6 5.88 1.53 0.09 6.09 12.08 
2011 6.08 5 0.29 0.03 3.8 6.27 3.23 5.07 6.14 14.55 
2012 5.42 7.59 1.84 2.25 3.04 5.86 0.89 0.57 7.58 16.72 
Average 5.94 5.75 0.54 0.87 2.32 4.54 1.54 1.15 6.04 13.06 
 
It is clear to see that there are vast differences between the recruitment of club-trained players between 
countries with the data suggesting that in England across the last five seasons, 6.04% of expatriate players 
have qualified as club-trained. This is in stark contrast to Germany where less than 1% of expatriate 
players are club-trained. This highlights the variety of ways in which international recruitment takes 
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place. The differences are also marked within leagues between clubs at different levels. For example on 
average 13.06% of the expatriate players in England’s top five teams are club-trained, whereas the 
average for the league is 6.04%. These differences are highlighted in Figure 5.5 below, which shows that 
the top clubs in the Premier League behave differently to the majority of clubs. 
Figure 5.5: Proportion of Expatriate Players that are Club-trained 
 
There has been a dramatic reduction in the numbers of expatriate club-trained players in France, however 
this trend is not observed in the other top five leagues and France appears to have been increasing this 
figure since 2009. In leagues such as Germany almost all of the club-trained players are from the 
domestic market, however figures from ECA and interview data suggest that this is not a consequence of 
the home grown player rule, but instead may be owing to the domestic rules which were introduced in 
2001. 
The origin of club-trained players is explored in more detail in Table 5.5 which looks at the proportion of 
players from each region that are club-trained. These figures are for the big five leagues in Europe. 
Table 5.5: Origin of Club Trained Players 
 
Western 
Europe 
Eastern 
Europe 
Africa 
Latin 
America 
Other All 
2008 19.51 0 11.18 1.02 0.13 14.82 
2009 20.09 0.19 4.12 1.07 2.01 14.84 
2010 19.86 0.06 3.27 2.85 4.26 14.93 
2011 21.43 1.26 5.92 3.11 3.75 16.41 
2012 19.37 2.94 4.5 1.56 8.95 15.12 
 
As we can see, the number of Western European players which qualify as club-trained in the big five 
leagues are much higher than players from elsewhere, which is to be expected. There appears to have 
been a sharp decrease in the proportion of African players who qualify as club-trained since 2008. When 
examined more closely there are again marked differences in where players are recruited from in different 
countries and consequently whether or not they qualify as club-trained. Looking in more detail at Africa 
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as an example, Table 5.6 shows that there are only significant numbers of African club-trained players in 
France and Italy. This is probably due to domestic rules, historic recruitment sources and not the home 
grown player rule. 
Table 5.6: African Players in the Big Five Leagues 
 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
France 23.65 8.35 6.65 10.57 8.53 
Germany 0.44 0 0.52 0 0 
Spain 2.08 0 0 0 0 
Italy 0 12.35 3.22 6.65 0.15 
England 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Similar country specific effects are found with analysis of the other individual regions of origin. 
CIES 2012 states that since 2009/10, Austrian teams have seen the biggest relative increase in presence of 
club-trained footballers (from 17.3 to 25%). The opposite is true in Bulgaria, where the proportion of 
club-trained players decreased from 23.2 to 14.1%. Club-trained players represent at least 50% of squad 
members only in 33 clubs out of 500 that CIES surveyed. The Croatian team NK Osijek recorded the 
greatest percentage of club-trained footballers (77.8%). At a league level, while the Iceland 
Championship has 43.4% club-trained players overall, this is in sharp contrast to Italy with only 7.4% 
club-trained. This suggests that Italian clubs are more likely to buy in talent than produce their own 
players for the first team.  
 
5.4 How many home grown players are actually playing on the field (i.e. out of 11 
players on the field, how many are home-grown)? 
According to UEFA, the average number of club-trained players on the pitch at any one time, in UEFA 
Champions League group stage matches, has increased from 2.16 before the rules to 2.50 in the 2011 
season. Indeed looking back further, we see that the current representation is above the level of a decade 
ago. This is demonstrated in Figure 5.6 below. 
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Figure 5.6: Average Number of Club-trained Players on the Pitch for UCL Group Stage 
Clubs 
 
 
(Reproduced from UEFA, 2012: 48). 
 
Furthermore, it seems that there has also been a secondary knock-on effect in the domestic league 
competitions, where the same clubs competing in the UEFA Champions League have also increased the 
usage of their club-trained players.
133
  
 
 
5.5 How many minutes have the home grown players played in UEFA matches, in 
comparison to players not home-grown? (Data refers to clubs from EU  Member 
states unless otherwise stated) 
 
While Figure 5.2 charts the increase in the number of home grown players being named in squads for 
UEFA competitions, this increase has not translated to minutes on the pitch as readily. UEFA 2012 states 
that the proportion of locally trained players playing has been relatively consistent at just over 50%, all 
the way through the five years of implementation of the locally trained player rule. This is shown in 
Figure 5.7. 
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Figure 5.7: Proportion of Minutes Played by Home Grown Players in Group Stages of UEFA 
Competitions 
 
(Reproduced from UEFA 2012: 48). 
 
 
It is similarly difficult to highlight any particular trends in the average number of minutes played by home 
grown players compared to the average number of minutes played by players overall as shown in Figure 
5.8. It seems that in the last three seasons the average number of minutes played by home grown players 
in the Champions League has been higher than the average minutes played by players in the Champions 
League overall. This may be an indication of clubs beginning to produce a higher quality of home grown 
player, although to make a firm conclusion with respect to this it would be necessary to continue to 
measure this over a longer time period. 
 
Figure 5.8: Average Minutes Played in UEFA Competitions 
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When considering the number of minutes played overall by home grown players compared to other 
players, Figure 5.9 demonstrates that the rate of change has been similar between the types.  However, 
more recently, the gap between minutes played by association-trained and club -trained players in the 
Europa League appears to be closing. 
Figure 5.9 
 
However it is again difficult to identify the same trends on a country by country basis. Comparing the 
proportion of minutes played by locally trained players in 2006/07 and 2010/11, German, Dutch, Swiss 
and Ukrainian clubs in the UEFA Champions League and UEFA Europa League group stages have 
significantly increased the playing time of locally trained players. This is contrast to the trend in Belgian, 
Portuguese and Turkish clubs. Locally trained players were most used by the Swiss and French clubs in 
2010/11 with more than two thirds of playing time coming from locally trained players.  
Figure 5.10 
(Reproduced from UEFA, 2012)  
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There also appear to be differences in the number of minutes that players in different positions play 
according to their training status as demonstrated in Table 5.7. Across the period that the Rule has been in 
force, home grown players in every outfield position consistently play less minutes of football than their 
counterparts on average. This trend is most pronounced with respect to forward players who play on 
average 349 minutes compared to an average of 551 minutes for non-home grown players. However this 
is not true with goalkeepers who on average play slightly more minutes if they are home grown. 
Table 5.7: Playing minutes by position 
Forward Average 
Total Minutes 
Midfielder Average 
Total Minutes 
Defender Average 
Total Minutes 
Goalkeeper Average 
Total Minutes 
HGP 
Non-
HGP 
HGP 
Non-
HGP 
HGP 
Non-
HGP 
HGP 
Non-
HGP 
349 551 800 927 808 940 234 216 
 
5.6 How many of the current home grown players were trained by the club itself 
(“club-trained”) and how many were trained by another club affiliated to the same 
national association (“association-trained”)? 
The UEFA Rule stipulates that of the eight home grown players in each squad, players may be either club 
or association-trained, with at least four club-trained. While it has been identified above that many clubs 
exceed this minimum standard it is interesting to note that there are significantly more association-trained 
players in squad lists than club-trained players. A summary of the 2012 squads for the Champions League 
and Europa League are presented below. 
Table 5.8: 2012 squads for the Champions League and Europa League 
 Home Grown Club-trained Association-trained 
Champions League 924 392 532 
Europa League 2474 958 1516 
 
This suggests that the proportion of home grown players that are club-trained is slightly higher in the 
Champions League (42.4%) than in the Europa League (38.7%). In some ways this is unsurprising since 
the stronger teams are more likely to have good academies and therefore promote players from there to 
the first team whereas Europa League teams may have to recruit players from the domestic market to 
meet their quotas for home grown players.
134
 This is explored further in Table 5.9 which outlines the 
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 This might also explain why it is association based players that affect the statistical results, as most adjustment takes place 
in this context. 
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numbers of players currently in the academy systems of selected teams throughout the European Union 
and their origin. There is a clear relationship between the success of teams and their recruitment policies. 
 
Table 5.9: Academy Players and Investment 
Club Number of players 
(approx) 
Origin of Players Costs per year (euro) 
Arsenal 180 95% London, 5% abroad 3m 
Barcelona 250 70% local Spanish 20% 
Spanish, 10% foreign 
10m (excluding U19 
and Barcelona B) 
FC Bayern 
Munich 
185 90% Bavarian, 5% national, 
5% foreign 
3m 
FC Internazionale 
Milano 
230 95% Italian, 5% foreign 6m 
FC Levadia 
Tallin 
over 300 (including 
girls) 
75% Estonia, 25% Russia (all 
local) 
120,000 
NK Dinamo 
Zagreb 
200 97% Croatian 1.3m 
RC Lens 182 85% Northern France, 10% 
France, 5% foreign 
6m 
R. Standard de 
Liege 
250 98% Belgian nationality 1.5m 
Sporting Clube de 
Portugal 
340 90% Portuguese, 10% Brazil, 
Cape Verde, Angola 
5m 
Besiktas JK 200 Mainly Turkish 750,000 
FC Basel 220 91% from the region 3m 
FC Honka Espoo 250 (184 in the elite 
academy squad) 
90% Uusimaa region 500,000 
FC Gelsenkirchen 
Schalke 04 
190 83% Gelsenkirchen and region 3m 
FC Shakhtar 
Donetsk 
180 50% Donetsk Oblast, 50% 
Ukraine 
2.5m 
FK Teplice 284 87% Teplice 500,000 
Glentoran 140 93% Belfast and region 250,000 
Heart of 
Midlothian FC 
109 Edinburgh and region 750,000 
Helsingborg IF 334 99% Southern Sweden 750,000 
Panathinaikos FC 142 84% Athens, 15% Greece, 1% 
other 
1m 
 
Data from the ECA suggests that the origin of academy players (aged 16–23) differs according to the 
level of the club. 60% of clubs have players from abroad in their over-16 age group squad, with 3% of 
academy players being from abroad. Based on the FIFA categorisation, a median of five foreign players 
are playing in a category one club academy. This figure reduces to 2.5 players for category two clubs and 
1.5 players for category three clubs. 
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5.6 Are there any clubs that do not adhere to the home grown player rule (i.e. clubs 
that have less than eight home-grown players amongst the 25 List A players)? 
A complete list of squad numbers is given in Appendix C. The clubs who do not have eight home grown 
players in their current squad are highlighted, however these clubs are still able to comply with the UEFA 
rule by reducing the size of their squad accordingly. In reality a club could contain no home grown 
players, but it would only be able to register 17 players in the squad.   
 
5.7 Conclusions 
It is clear from the descriptive statistics presented that many clubs exceed the minimum requirement for 
numbers of home grown players in their squad lists. The number of home grown players actively taking 
part in both Champions League and Europa League matches has increased dramatically since 2007 from 
30% to over 50% in 2012. While it was a concern that home grown players were simply ‘making up the 
numbers’ and not actually participating in starting XIs this has been found not to be the case. Overall the 
number of minutes played by home grown players has remained relatively stable over the period that the 
Rule has been in place, although this figure fluctuates depending on which teams reach the UEFA 
competitions. Although most clubs in both competitions have more association-trained players than club-
trained players, there is some evidence that there may in future be more equality.  The data suggests that 
the Rule is not restricting the free movement of players across borders; in fact there has been an increase 
in the number of foreign players that qualify as home grown. This may be an issue which is in need of 
further research with relation to the migration of young people. Although there are some clear positive 
trends in the data, it is not possible to state that the Rule is the only contributing factor.  
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Chapter 6 
Analysis of the Rule’s Impact  
on Competitive Balance 
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
While Chapter 5 presents an overview of the trends in the numbers of home grown players, their origin, 
and the frequency with which they play in comparison to other players, it is not possible from that data 
alone to infer causation in relation to the impact of the home grown players rule. In order to examine the 
impact of the home grown player rule on the performance of teams, and hence indirectly examine 
competitive balance, regression analysis was performed. This was undertaken separately for the 
Champions League and Europa League, and for the performance of teams in the group stages, and then 
their progression through to the various final stages of the competition. The next sections outline the 
dependent and independent variables in each case, the methods of analysis undertaken, as well as 
presenting and discussing the results. Statistical outputs are presented in Appendix D. 
 
6.2 The Model 
In examining the effects of the Rule we are primarily concerned with the success of teams in the UEFA 
competitions. Both UEFA competitions have a group qualifying stage based on a round-robin tournament 
format and then a set of knockout stages leading to the final. In the group stage, each season, teams are 
ranked from 1
st
 to 4
th
 in the Champions League, and 1
st
 to 5
th
 in the Europa League. This naturally defines 
an ordered dependent variable scored between 1 and 4, and 1 and 5 respectively to indicate the relative 
success of the team. In the finals stage in both competitions, clubs either make it through to the quarter-
finals, semi-finals, or final or can become champion. Achieving each of these outcomes or not defines a 
binary dependent variable in each case.  
 
In order to examine the effect of the Rule on these dependent variables, an ‘event-study’ design is 
adopted.  This requires identifying the independent variables that capture the ‘event’ under study, as well 
as variables that control for the influence of other factors on the dependent variable. In the former case the 
‘event’ or ‘intervention’ of the Rule was measured in two ways. The first was a set of binary variables 
that captured the seasons 2004-06, 2007-09 and 2010-12. The first period preceded the Rule and therefore 
provides a control where there was no intervention of this sort. The second captured transition towards the 
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Rule.
135
 The final period relates to after the implementation of the rule having given the clubs chance to 
adapt to it. The impact of the Rule was also captured by examining the total number of home grown 
players in the team, with the numbers of club and association-trained players also being identified.
136
 
 
In order to control for the impact of other factors that might affect team performance, the UEFA ranking 
of the team for that season was identified as the most relevant independent variable.
137
 The logic for the 
use of this variable is that it captures all other factors that can contribute to the team’s success.  
 
6.3 Results 
Statistical models based on a pooled sample comprising the teams who made it into the group stages and 
for the seasons 2004 to 2012 (as described in Appendix D) have been estimated in order to measure the 
impact of the policy intervention on the outcomes of UEFA competitions.
138
  
6.3.1 Champions League 
The results connected with the Rule indicate that by the time the policy had been fully implemented, there 
is evidence that there is a reduction in the performance of teams, and that this is affected by primarily 
association-trained players. The implication is that having to retain players from within a more localised 
national market, as defined by the association, team performance falls. This could be from not being able 
to make use of better players that could be purchased on broader international markets. This result 
appears to concur with the descriptive statistics presented in Chapter 5. In contrast, however, there is no 
discernible effect of the Rule on success in reaching the finals’ stages of the Champions League, or 
becoming Champion. 
6.3.2 Europa League  
Again, the impact of the UEFA ranking variable is consistent with the Champions League, in that higher 
ranked teams perform better in the group stages. However, the results of the impact of Rule are less 
strong statistically, though a similar pattern of results are observed. All measures of the Rule suggest that 
a reduction in teams’ success follows the introduction of the Rule; however, the impact is only 
statistically significant for association-trained players at the usual p value of 0.05 or less. In the case of 
the finals’ stages of the Europa League, as with the Champions League, the results are broadly 
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 As explained in Chapter 1, the introduction of the rule was staggered in order to give clubs enough opportunity to alter their 
playing squads in order to comply.  
136
 The proportion in the squad could also have been employed, but as the rule focuses on the absolute number of players, 
though squad sizes can vary, actual numbers are discussed here.  
137
 The club coefficient rankings are based on the results of clubs competing in the five previous seasons. The rankings 
determine the seeding of each club in all UEFA competition draws. Club coefficients are determined by the sum of all points 
won in the previous five years, plus 20% of the association coefficient over the same period. 
138
 It was decided not to treat the data as a panel dataset because of the variability of teams included in each stage and the fact 
that the properties of panel-data estimators with discrete dependent variables are less well understood. 
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insignificant. However there is some evidence of a positive effect on quarter final and semi-final 
achievement if the Rule is measured by the transition of seasons. 
There is also some evidence of a positive effect on the semi-final achievement of teams if the Rule is 
measured by the number of club-trained players. This suggests that there is some limited evidence of 
contrary effects of the clubs of the Rule in the Europa League compared to the Champions League. 
Moreover it suggests that more home grown players, that are perhaps more likely to be club-trained, can 
improve the success of such teams. This is perhaps correspondent to such teams having less access to the 
relevant players to achieve international success than typical Champions League teams, which get 
constrained further by the Rule. The results are sketchy but seem to suggest some rebalancing of the 
performance of teams across the competitions.  
   
6.4 Conclusions 
The above analysis has suggested that the main impact of the Rule appears to be located in the 
Champions League group stages, particularly through the accumulation of association-trained players. 
There is some evidence that there are similar effects for the Europa League group stage, although the 
effects are much smaller and less likely to be statistically significant. In general the effects are modest, 
but nonetheless it does appear that some limitation of the players’ labour market through encouraging the 
recruitment and retention of players from a home association can constrain the success of higher ranked 
teams. In this respect, there has been a small improvement in competitive balance in the early stages of 
UEFA competitions as a direct result of the Rule. 
In contrast there is very little evidence that the Rule affects the finals’ stages, particularly in the 
Champions League. Intuitively, this suggests that once teams have qualified from the group stage then 
they are more likely to be of equal competitive ability. Under such circumstances player redistributions 
are unlikely to affect performance.  This analysis, particularly of the transition phase, combined with the 
descriptive statistics in Chapter 5, suggest that the Rule may take time to be fully effective as clubs alter 
their training and development of young players. However, there is little evidence in support of this in 
Chapter 7. In the latter stages of the Europa League, there is some suggestion of an impact of improving 
competitive balance between the quarter-final to semi-final stages. 
This analysis, combined with the descriptive statistics presented in Chapter 5 suggest that the more 
minutes association-trained players play in UEFA competitions, the greater the effect on competitive 
balance, particularly in the Champions League. On average, teams playing in both competitions have 
more association-trained players than club-trained players but the gap is narrowing. The immediate 
impact of the Rule seemed to be for clubs to register association-trained players. However now that the 
62 
 
rule has bedded in the numbers of association-trained players are fairly static, while numbers of club-
trained players seem to be increasing slightly. This is assisted by an increased number of foreign club-
trained players, suggesting that perhaps the clubs are beginning to produce players through their youth 
development systems.  
While the above analysis has shown that the Rule has had an effect in improving competitive balance in 
certain areas, and the transition period in particular suggests that increasing the numbers of both club-
trained and association-trained players does impact competitive balance, there is insufficient data at the 
current time to make an accurate scientific assessment of trajectory in the long run. Experience from 
regulation of player markets in other sports shows that it is possible we have already seen the impact of 
association-trained players and that this will not increase, and may even reduce, in future.
139
 It is equally 
possible, however, that there will be an additional gradual increase in competitive balance as club-trained 
players start to have an impact on the first team squad. Therefore in our view it would be unwise to 
speculate on either a future increase or decrease in competitive balance as a result of the Rule. For the 
purposes of the legal analysis, future trajectory should be viewed as neutral until further data is available 
to measure the effect over the longer term. 
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Chapter 7 
Analysis of the Rule’s Impact on  
Youth Training and Development  
 
7.1 Methodology 
In order to assess the impact of the home grown player rule on the training and development of young 
players in the European Union, we have adopted a mixed methodology. Comprehensive statistical data on 
the number of home grown players utilised in European and Domestic competition was gathered and is 
analysed in Chapter 5. However it is important to note that this data in and of itself cannot not prove that 
the Rule is having an impact in terms of increasing home grown player numbers and that even if it could, 
this would not necessarily demonstrate that the Rule is achieving the legitimate objective under EU law of 
improving the training and development of young EU players. Therefore we also carried out a series of 
qualitative interviews with stakeholders and governing bodies to gain an understanding of whether they 
thought the Rule was having an impact on the training and development of young players. These views 
were then compared with data gathered from a sample of clubs throughout the European Union who 
regularly qualify for European competition. The qualitative data demonstrated a largely consistent 
viewpoint amongst clubs and stakeholders as to the past and current impact of the Rule, as well as a likely 
trajectory in terms of future impact. 
 
7.1.1 Statistical Analysis 
The UEFA Rule has as one of its main objectives to increase the number of players that are trained locally 
in order to encourage clubs to invest in youth development and also to retain a local identity. Although 
the former objective is essential to achieving the latter, it is only the latter objective that can be considered 
when determining if the Rule is compliant with EU law (see Chapter 8). Therefore it is essential to 
measure the impact of the Rule not only in terms of whether it increased the number of home grown 
players participating in UEFA competitions, but more importantly if it has increased the number of young 
EU players competing in matches. Even an increase in the number of young players competing would not 
prove that the Rule was achieving its aims as there may be other factors behind an increase, but it would 
be a strong correlative indicator to support qualitative findings on training and development. Therefore in 
this section we analyse the statistical data on the numbers, origin and age of players competing in UEFA 
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competitions as well as looking at whether they were qualified as club or association-trained and their 
nationality. The source of the following quantitative data was directly from UEFA unless otherwise 
stated. 
Figure 7.1 
 
As was detailed in Chapter 5, it is clear that there has been an increase in the number of home grown 
players appearing in first team squads. The above analysis demonstrates that there has also been a 
substantial increase in the number of home grown players participating in UEFA Champions League 
matches following the introduction of the home grown player rule. The average number of club-trained 
players on the pitch at any one time in UEFA Champions League group stage matches, has increased 
from 2.16 before the Rule, to 2.50 in the 2010/11 season. While a similar trend can be seen for domestic 
competitions, the absolute number of home grown players is lower. This suggests that while there may 
have been a secondary effect in the domestic league competitions, where the same clubs competing in the 
UEFA Champions League have also increased the usage of their club-trained players, the increases in 
locally trained players in domestic leagues are likely related to changes in domestic rules. Some domestic 
competitions have seen a significant increase in the number of home grown players (most notably the 
Bundesliga), but this is most likely to be the result of domestic rules and resultant trends. 
However, more significant for this report is whether there is a significant increase in the number of under-
21 players fielded in Champions League matches following the introduction of the rule. Such an increase 
may be an indicator that the Rule is having an impact on the quality of training and development of young 
players (although it would remain possible that other factors were equally or more influential). The 
number of under-21 players playing in UEFA matches has increased by 50% over the last decade. 
However, while Figure 7.1 shows a slight increase in the number of under-21 players fielded following 
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the introduction of the Rule at the start of the 2006/07 season, the significant increase had taken place in 
the seasons before the introduction of the Rule. It could be argued that this increase was a result of clubs 
preparing for the Rule’s introduction, but we have found little corroborating evidence for this assertion. 
While still increasing, the table shows that the upward trajectory in the number of under-21 players 
fielded in the UEFA Champions League group stages slowed once the Rule was brought in.    
This can be contrasted with figures from some domestic competitions, which show more recent increases 
in the number of under-21 players participating in matches. For example in the 2010/11 English Premier 
League season there was a 28% increase on the previous year in the number of on-pitch appearances by 
English players under-21. While the overall number of players under-21 went down slightly, from 59 to 
55, the number of appearances they made increased from 483 to 616, potentially indicating an increase in 
quality that is disconnected to the UEFA Rule. 
Nevertheless, in terms of an overall improvement in the quality of training and development of young 
players throughout the EU, with the available statistics it is difficult to demonstrate whether or not the 
home grown player rule has had a significant impact, and the correlation above shows a dropping off in 
terms of the growth in the number of under-21 players participating in the UEFA Champions League. It is 
therefore necessary to consider qualitative data on whether stakeholders and clubs consider that the Rule 
has had a positive impact in this respect.  
 
7.1.2 Qualitative Interviews with Stakeholders and Clubs  
Qualitative interviews were carried out with UEFA, FIFPro, ECA, EPFL, and a number of domestic 
federations and leagues. These canvassed opinions on the impact of the Rule on the training and 
development of young players at clubs in the European Union. The ECA (European Club’s Association) 
were particularly useful in this regard, representing 207 clubs from 53 associations;
140
 typically those with 
the most regular participation in UEFA’s competitions.  
To supplement this and corroborate opinions canvassed from the stakeholders, qualitative interviews were 
also carried out in person, via telephone and Skype and in a few cases by e-mail correspondence with 
qualified personnel at a selection of clubs throughout the European Union. We targeted individuals who 
had direct knowledge of how the training and development of players operated at their club (e.g. 
Academy Managers and Sporting Directors) but where this was not possible we identified other 
executives (e.g. CEOs and Directors) who were able to canvass opinions of the relevant personnel prior to 
the interview. Clubs were selected to meet the following criteria: 
                                                          
140
 http://www.ecaeurope.com/ Accessed 19.12.12. 
66 
 
 Clubs that were based in the European Union. 
 Clubs that regularly qualified for senior UEFA competitions. 
 A selection of clubs from different member states. 
 A balance between larger and smaller clubs in terms of income. 
 A balance between clubs with a reputation for developing young players and those with a 
reputation for ‘buying in’ proven talent.  
Between November 2012 and March 2013, qualitative interviews were conducted with 20 clubs based in 
the following EU-based associations: 
 Denmark 
 England 
 France 
 Germany 
 Greece 
 Ireland 
 Italy 
 Latvia 
 Netherlands 
 Poland 
 Scotland 
 Spain 
The majority of clubs approached agreed to participate in the study. For reasons of promised anonymity 
we cannot publish the names of the clubs or personnel who provided data (or who refused to assist), 
although a full list of those who assisted has been made available to the European Commission. Questions 
focussed on how investment in the training and development of young players at EU clubs had changed 
since the introduction of the Rule and what factors were responsible for any notable changes. Investment 
was defined to include finance, infrastructure and staffing. 
We also asked clubs about future trajectory in terms of increasing investment in youth training and 
development in relation to the impact of the Rule. Finally, we contacted each of the football leagues based 
in EU member states to clarify their domestic rules on foreign and locally-trained players. 
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7.2 Club Investment in Youth Training and Development 
The spending of clubs on the training and development of players is highlighted above in Chapter 5 Table 
5.1. According to the European Clubs Association, “In almost half of the youth academies, the budget 
increased significantly in the last five years”.141 However the majority of clubs questioned about future 
investment (55%) suggested it would remain unchanged.
142
 These results are presented in the pie charts in 
Figure 7.2. 
 
Figure 7.2 
 
(Reproduced from ECA, 2012: 102). 
 
This was verified by qualitative interviews we carried out with clubs that revealed that spending on youth 
development was not consistently increasing. At some clubs, spending on youth development had 
increased significantly season by season, whereas other clubs reported no additional spending. 
Significantly in terms of this study, no interviewed clubs suggested their spending would significantly 
increase in the future as a result of the Rule. 
 
Furthermore, with only four exceptions, interviews with clubs where recent increases in spending were 
noted told us that this was not a result of the UEFA Rule. Instead clubs suggested that the increase would 
have occurred regardless of the Rule; one frequently cited reason for this, particularly at clubs with lower 
turnovers, was the local economic climate that made expenditure on transfer fees difficult. Clubs with 
higher turnovers and stronger UEFA pedigrees were more likely to indicate that they had significantly 
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increased their budget for the development of young players, but that this was a result of domestic rule 
changes as opposed to the UEFA Rule.  
 
Clubs were asked if they had invested in infrastructure (e.g. a training centre) or staffing as a result of the 
Rule. With only four exceptions, all clubs who responded indicated that they had not invested in this way 
as a direct result of the Rule, although some increases in both areas were identified during the same time 
period. One club suggested that it had increased the number of qualified coaches at the academy as a 
result of the Rule; however, this increase in staffing was not reflected in an increase in overall financial 
investment in youth training and development. Another club suggested that it had “scaled back its 
international scouting network to focus on the [domestic] market and resource areas strategically”, 
demonstrating an impact of the UEFA Rule but not one that resulted in an increase in investment. 
 
Nearly all clubs interviewed suggested that the Rule had between “no impact” and “little impact” upon 
their strategies for training and development of players. Some clubs suggested that this was because the 
minimum number of home grown players was too small for the rule to have any “bite”. This view was 
particularly prevalent at clubs with smaller turnovers and/or based in smaller member states, who stated 
that they already had more locally-trained players in their first team squads than the minimum UEFA 
requirement. Across Europe, the CIES report states that club-trained footballers account for 22.2% of 
squad members, with 19% of the eleven most fielded players per club being trained at that club.
143
 This is 
obviously greater than the mandatory minimum of 16% from the squad of 25 being club-trained set out in 
the UEFA Rule. 
 
A minority of clubs suggested that the UEFA rule had no impact because domestic rules on player 
eligibility were more stringent or provided better incentives to train home grown talent. Several 
respondents suggested that for the UEFA Rule to have a greater impact on the training of home grown 
players, financial incentives needed to be offered to clubs who train young players. This view was also 
supported by the European Clubs Association. 
 
A significant number of respondent clubs (mainly, but not exclusively, those with smaller budgets) 
thought they had identified a negative impact of the rule because they believed it interfered with their 
existing strategies for recruiting young players by encouraging clubs with bigger budgets to ‘poach’ or 
‘hoard’ young home grown talent. However, none of these bigger-budget clubs told us that they were 
recruiting more young players in this way as a direct result of the Rule. On the balance of the evidence, 
we believe that the Rule is likely to lead to an increase in the practice of bigger teams poaching younger 
talent. There is some evidence of this from transfer figures: a 2012 report by CIES states that on average 
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teams across Europe in 2011 recruited ten players from other senior clubs (an increase of 7.7% on 2010 
figures and up 16.6% since 2009). When this measure is expanded to include youth academy players, the 
average number of transfers in to a club is eleven (which equates to just under 45% of the average 
squad).
144
  
The trend of recruiting younger and domestic players is also evident when we consider individual 
leagues. In the English Premier League, for example, transfer spending appears to have been affected by 
the domestic and UEFA rules on home grown players; although the total outlay by English clubs remains 
large, the overall net spend has reduced as a result of a shift towards domestic transfers. In 2010 Premier 
League clubs spent £356m on players, of which £99m (28%) went to other English league clubs. In 2011 
well over half of total expenditure was on players from other English clubs. Similarly, in the summer 
2011 transfer window, Premier League clubs spent more than £130m on players under the age of 21 
compared to £60m in 2010 and £21m in 2009. 
Clubs were asked whether the number of young players in their academies had increased after the 
introduction of the UEFA Rule in 2006/07. While some clubs identified that numbers had increased, none 
said that this was as a direct result of the UEFA Rule (even the club claiming to be investing in coaching 
staff had not increased the number of young players being trained). Several clubs noted that the number 
of young players in their academies had started increasing prior to, and disconnected with, the 
introduction of the Rule. This is supported by the data set out in Figure 7.1 above. ECA statistics suggest 
that on average 7.4 players in a club’s first team squad spend at least three years in their academy (this 
equates to 28.2% of the first team squad on average), while at least half of the clubs have 20% of their 
first team squad that have been in the academy for five years or more. Furthermore, it is estimated that on 
average six academy players (almost one quarter of the senior team) effectively play for the first team.
145
 
However there are wide variations across clubs. 
 
Club respondents told us that strategies and policies on developing home grown talent were affected not 
by the UEFA Rule, but by other factors. These included: 
 
 Changes in managerial structure and personnel. 
 A club’s “ethos” or “tradition”. 
 Local economic conditions and/or the global financial situation. 
 A club’s financial success or failure. 
 UEFA Financial Fair Play regulations. 
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 Domestic rules (e.g. the Premier League’s EPPP, Bundesliga Licensing System). 
 
The influence of domestic rules in particular was noticeable in the English Premier League and 
Bundesliga. English Premier League clubs with a tradition of developing young players told us that they 
had increased investment in youth player training in order to qualify for Category 1 status of the new Elite 
Player Performance Plan (EPPP). This is particularly interesting for this study as it may have implications 
for assessing whether the home grown player rule is the ‘least restrictive alternative’ for increasing club 
investment in young EU players in line with the test of proportionality under EU free movement law. 
 
Only four clubs we interviewed suggested that the UEFA Rule had a significant (positive) impact on their 
strategy and investment with regard to the training and development of young players. It was notable that 
three of these clubs were what we might call ‘big fish in small ponds’; they dominated small leagues (in 
terms of income and recent European accomplishments) due to their domestic on-pitch success and 
disproportionately high income and nationwide support. The sample size of these ‘big fish small pond’ 
clubs was too small to be able to reach any definitive conclusion, but it is possible that for this handful of 
clubs, the home grown player rule does have a significant effect on player recruitment policies. 
 
A few clubs also suggested that it was too early to assess whether the Rule was having an impact on 
player training and development policies, although none suggested there were plans to change theirs in 
the foreseeable future as a result of the UEFA Rule. The most positive outcome of the club interviews for 
the UEFA Rule was that no clubs indicated that it had resulted in a negative impact on the development of 
quality young players, as was a possible explanation for Figure 7.1 above. 
  
 
7.3 Conclusions 
The number of club-trained and association-trained players in the squads of EU clubs has increased 
overall during the period the Rule has been in place when clubs are participating in UEFA competitions. 
The number of club and association-trained players who start competitive matches has also increased 
along with the number of minutes they play on average. The general number of club-trained players 
participating in domestic competitions has remained relatively stable since the Rule was introduced. 
There is, however, a slight increase in the number of club-trained players participating in domestic 
competitions at the top five clubs in the top five leagues. We cannot say with any certainty that the 
increases identified in the number of club or association-trained players in first team squads and starting 
XIs is a result of the UEFA Rule.  
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More significantly for the purposes of this study is whether the Rule has led to an increase in the quality 
of, or investment in, the training and development of young EU players. It is difficult to isolate the impact 
of the Rule in this area because other European and domestic regulations encouraging investment in 
training and development have been introduced during the same period and have been noted by a number 
of clubs and stakeholders as being more significant. Once we took these factors into account, we found 
little evidence that the Rule has had any significant impact on the quality of, or investment in, the training 
and development of young EU players. Only four clubs interviewed identified any real impact, with most 
dismissing the Rule as irrelevant to their longer-term strategies.  
The Rule has of course only been in place for five years and it is possible that there will be an increase in 
investment in training and development the longer it remains in place. However this is speculation which 
we found little evidence in support of. Clubs and stakeholders interviewed did not identify planned future 
investment that would result from the Rule in its current form. Moreover, statistics on the number of 
young players participating in UEFA Champions League matches indicate that the real increase in the 
number and/or quality of young players occurred in the seasons prior to the introduction of the Rule. 
Indeed, the trajectory, in terms of the increasing number of young players competing in these matches, 
slows dramatically from the season when the Rule is first introduced, although this may be because most 
clubs had already exceeded their quota of home grown players (see Chapter 5).  
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Chapter 8 
Free Movement of Workers: General Framework 
 
8.1 Introduction, Scope and Limitations 
The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has established that the general principle of equality 
“is one of the fundamental principles of Community law”.146 This principle requires that similar situations 
are not treated differently unless this differentiation is objectively justified. The fundamental principle of 
equal treatment finds specific expression in the general prohibition of any discrimination on grounds of 
nationality, as laid down in Article 18 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (hereafter 
TFEU) and further specified in Articles 45, 49 and 56 TFEU. For this study, the authors have been 
requested to focus on whether the home grown player rule (‘the Rule’) breaches Article 45, which 
prohibits nationality discrimination that restricts the free movement of workers. This assessment will not 
consider whether the Rule breaches EU Competition Law under Articles 101 or 102. 
 
8.2 Establishing the Legal Test 
8.2.1 Article 18 TFEU 
Article 18 TFEU provides that “within the scope of application of this Treaty and without prejudice to 
any special provisions contained therein, any discrimination on grounds of nationality shall be 
prohibited”. The logic underpinning this provision reflects the EU’s desire to ensure that national 
governments are prevented from protecting domestic producers and workers from foreign competition, 
and to transmit to the peoples of Europe that the European project is not merely a commercial 
arrangement between states but a project from which they derive benefit.
147
 In practical terms, Article 18 
forms part of a series of provisions designed to prevent the unjustified unequal treatment between 
nationals of the host Member State and nationals of other Member States. This differential treatment can 
derive from the actions of the state itself. For example, in Cowan a British tourist in France was denied 
access to a state compensation scheme for victims of violent crime.
148
 In referring to Article 18, the Court 
concluded that when EU law guaranteed a natural person the freedom to go to another Member State, that 
person should be accorded the same treatment as nationals residing there.  
                                                          
146
 Cases 117/76 and 16/77 Ruckdeschel [1977] ECR 1753: 1769. 
147
 Craig, P. (2012), EU Administrative Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press: 508-9. 
148
 Case 186/87, Cowan v Le Trésor Public [1989] ECR 195. 
73 
 
The prohibition of discrimination on the grounds of nationality is not however solely directed at the 
actions of Member States. In Angonese the Court concluded that “the prohibition of discrimination on 
grounds of nationality laid down in Article 48 [now 45] of the Treaty must be regarded as applying to 
private persons as well”.149 The general principle of non-discrimination contained in Article 18 TFEU can 
only be invoked independently of the other Treaty provisions where the activity is not covered by a more 
specific Treaty prohibition of discrimination, such as a worker’s right to free movement contained in 
Article 45 TFEU. These more specific Treaty prohibitions of nationality discrimination are however to be 
interpreted in the light of the general prohibition provided by Article 18 TFEU. 
 
8.2.2 Free Movement of Workers 
8.2.2.1 Article 45 
Article 45 prohibits nationality discrimination that restricts the free movement of workers. Article 45(2) 
TFEU stipulates that freedom of movement of workers “shall entail the abolition of any discrimination 
based on nationality between workers of the Member States as regards employment, remuneration and 
other conditions of work and employment”.  Article 45(3) further provides that:  
 
 [I]t shall entail the right, subject to limitations justified on grounds of public policy, public security 
or public health: 
(a) to accept offers of employment actually made; 
(b) to move freely within the territory of Member States for this purpose; 
(c) to stay in a Member State for the purpose of employment in accordance with the provisions 
governing the employment of nationals of that State laid down by law, regulation or 
administrative action; 
(d) to remain in the territory of a Member State after having been employed in that State, 
subject to conditions which shall be embodied in regulations to be drawn up by the 
Commission. 
 
8.2.2.2 Citizens’ Rights 
In addition to Article 45, workers enjoy rights under the Directive 2004/38 (the Citizens’ Rights 
Directive) and Regulation 492/2011 of 05/04/2011 on the freedom of movement for workers within the 
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EU, codifying Regulation 1612/68 and its successive modifications (Council Regulations No 312/76 and 
No 2434/92, and Article 38(1) of Directive 2004/38/EC). These rights grant a worker the right of access 
to the labour market on non-discriminatory terms and also the right to equal treatment whilst in post. 
Three conditions must be met for the provisions on the free movement of workers to apply:
150
  
 
8.2.2.2.1 Personal Scope 
Free movement rights only apply to nationals of one of the Member States.
151
 Individuals and companies 
need to be engaged in economic activity. Workers benefit from free movement rights. The term ‘worker’ 
is an EU concept independent of definitions to be found in national laws.
152
 If this were not the case, 
national law could adopt a narrow definition of the term thus preventing those carrying out genuine 
economic activity from benefitting from the rights contained in Article 45 and rendering that provision 
ineffective. For this reason the Court has consistently favoured a broad interpretation of the term. 
According to the Court in Lawrie Blum “[t]he essential feature of an employment relationship… is that 
for a certain period of time a person performs services for and under the direction of another person in 
return for which he receives remuneration”.153 As long as the work constitutes an “effective and genuine” 
activity and it is not “purely marginal and ancillary” it will benefit from the protections offered by Article 
45.
154
 For the sake of completeness it should also be noted that those who are not carrying out economic 
activity can still take advantage of free movement and non-discrimination rights as a consequence of 
developments in the EU’s citizenship provisions. The legal basis for the EU’s citizenship provisions 
resides in Article 9 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and in Articles 20 and 21 TFEU. Article 21 
TFEU grants each EU citizen “the right to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member 
States, subject to the limitations and conditions laid down in the Treaties and by the measures adopted to 
give them effect”. The ‘Citizenship Directive’ has further strengthened the EU’s citizenship provisions155 
as has the European Court’s desire to link citizenship rights with the principle of equal treatment and non-
discrimination on the grounds of nationality found in Article 18 TFEU. The effect of these provisions is 
to remove the economic activity requirement thus bringing within the scope of the Treaty non-economic 
activities previously excluded. 
 
                                                          
150
 For extended discussion see Bernard, C. (2010), The Substantive Law of the EU, Oxford: Oxford University Press: 
226 - 35. 
151
 Article 20(1) TFEU. 
152
 Case 75/63 Hoekstra [1964] ECR 177. 
153
 Case 66/85 Lawrie-Blum [1986] ECR 2121, paragraph 17. 
154
 Case 53/81 Levin [1982] ECR 1035, paragraph 17. 
155
 Directive 2004/38/EC on the rights of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely 
within the territory of the Member States [2004] OJ L 158/77.  
75 
 
8.2.2.2.2 Material and Territorial Scope 
There must be a cross border element for the free movement provisions to apply – for example an 
individual moving their residence to another Member State for the purpose of employment. This 
requirement prevents situations wholly internal to a Member State from engaging the Treaty. The purely 
hypothetical prospect of exercising the right to free movement is also insufficient to engage the Treaty.
156
 
 
8.2.2.2.3 Invocation of the Rules 
If the above two criteria are satisfied, the remaining question concerns whether the free movement rules 
can be invoked against the party imposing the alleged restriction. Article 45 is both vertically and 
horizontally directly effective. Therefore, it is not solely directed at the actions of Member States 
(vertical) but also applies to the actions of private bodies, the rules of which are aimed at collectively 
regulating gainful employment and services (horizontal).
157
 This applies not only to bodies carrying out 
quasi-state functions but also applies to purely private persons.
158
 Furthermore, “the rule on non-
discrimination applies in judging all legal relationships in so far as these relationships, by reason either of 
the place where they are entered into or the place where they take effect, can be located within the 
territory of the EU”.159  
 
8.2.3 Direct Discrimination 
The Court does not treat all restrictions under Article 45 in the same way. In particular, the Court draws a 
distinction between directly and indirectly discriminatory measures that restrict a worker’s free movement 
and other restrictions that are non-discriminatory in nature. Direct discrimination is an overt form of 
differential treatment to be found in circumstances in which the migrant worker is treated less favourably 
than the national worker. Such differential treatment is prohibited by Article 45 and related secondary 
legislation. This prohibition applies not only to circumstances in which migrant workers are totally 
excluded from a particular activity
160
 but also to situations in which a quota on the number of migrant 
workers is adopted. So in Bosman, nationality quotas in professional club football were condemned
161
 and 
in Commission v France the Court struck down a French rule requiring a ratio of three French seamen to 
one non-French seaman on a merchant ship.
162
 Similarly, Article 4(2) of Regulation 492/2011 provides 
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that if there is a requirement that an undertaking has to employ a minimum percentage of national 
workers, then migrant workers should count as national workers. Direct discrimination can only be 
justified with reference to one of the express Treaty derogations, namely public policy, public security or 
public health.
163
 It should also be recognised that free movement of rights of workers does not apply to 
“employment in the public service” (Article 45(4)). This exception applies only to those posts that 
involve “…participation in the exercise of powers conferred by public law and duties designed to 
safeguard the general interests of the State…”164 and enables exclusion from employment but not 
differential conditions once employed.
165
  
 
8.2.4 Indirect Discrimination 
Indirect discrimination is a less overt form of differential treatment and is also prohibited by Article 45 
and related secondary legislation. In O’Flynn, the Court of Justice stated that conditions imposed by 
national law must be regarded as indirectly discriminatory where, although applicable irrespective of 
nationality, they only affect migrant workers, or the great majority of those affected are migrant workers, 
where they are indistinctly applicable but can more easily be satisfied by national workers than by 
migrant workers, or where there is a risk that they may operate to the particular detriment of migrant 
workers.
166
 Article 3(1) of Regulation 492/2011 specifies that even though the national measure is applied 
without reference to nationality, it will still be prohibited if the “principal aim or effect is to keep 
nationals of other Member States away from employment offered”. Classic examples of indirectly 
discriminatory measures include residency requirements.
167
 Proof of indirect discrimination does not 
require the applicant to prove that the national measure in practice affects a higher proportion of foreign 
workers, but merely that the measure is intrinsically liable to affect migrant workers more than nationals 
and that there is a risk that it will place migrant workers at a particular disadvantage.
168
 As with directly 
discriminatory measures, indirect discrimination can be saved by one of the express Treaty derogations. 
In addition, indirect discrimination can also be justified with reference to an open-ended set of 
justifications discussed below.  
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8.2.5 Non-Discriminatory Measures 
From the above it would appear that only discriminatory measures fall foul of EU free movement law. 
However, the Court has moved beyond the non-discrimination model to a market access model which 
focuses on removing discriminatory and non-discriminatory obstacles or restrictions to free movement.
169
 
Therefore, Article 45 prohibits not only direct or indirect nationality discrimination, but also any 
restriction applied without reference to the nationality of the worker concerned but which is liable to 
prohibit or otherwise impede their freedom of movement.
170
 So in Bosman the Court concluded that 
“[p]rovisions which preclude or deter a national of a Member State from leaving his country of origin in 
order to exercise his right to freedom of movement… constitute an obstacle to that freedom even if they 
apply without regard to the nationality of the workers concerned”.171 In Kraus, the Court stated that even 
though a measure was neutral in terms of nationality, the question was whether it was “liable to hamper or 
to render less attractive” the exercise of the fundamental freedoms.172 If the effect of the national measure 
is “too uncertain and indirect… to be capable of being regarded as liable to hinder free movement for 
workers”, then the measure is not prohibited by Article 45 and the applicable secondary legislation. The 
same justificatory regime as is presented under indirectly discriminatory measures applies.  
 
8.2.6 Justifications 
As stated above, directly discriminatory measures can only be saved with reference to one of the express 
Treaty derogations of public policy, public security or public health. Indirectly and non-discriminatory 
restrictions are subject to a wider justificatory regime. Beyond the Treaty derogations, such restrictions 
can be potentially justified with reference to an open-ended set of ‘objective justifications’ which, 
according to Bernard, are the functional equivalent of “public” or “general interest” or “imperative 
requirements” found in establishment and services law.173 In essence, by adopting this approach, the 
Court is recognising that certain objectives and interests are sufficiently important to trump the rights 
enshrined in free movement law. In Gebhard, the Court of Justice confirmed the test of objective 
justification applicable to the free movement of workers, services and establishment. It stated that:  
“…national measures liable to hinder or make less attractive the exercise of fundamental freedoms 
guaranteed by the Treaty must fulfil four conditions: they must be applied in a non-discriminatory 
manner; they must be justified by imperative requirements in the general interest; they must be 
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suitable for securing the attainment of the objective which they pursue; and they must not go 
beyond what is necessary in order to attain it”.174 
One such category of justifications recognised by the Court relates to the protection of certain ‘socio-
cultural’ practices and it is here that the categories of justifications most relevant to sport exist.175 It 
should be noted that the Court has rejected economic aims as justification for placing restrictions on the 
free movement of workers even though it is in practice difficult to distinguish economic from non-
economic aims. The Court has also made clear that the burden of demonstrating the strength and 
proportionality of the justifications relied on rests with the party that has imposed the measures.      
 
8.2.7 Proportionality: The Tests of Suitability and Necessity 
Even if the Court has accepted that the indirectly or non-discriminatory measure pursues a legitimate 
objective, the third and fourth strands of the Gebhard test must still be satisfied. This involves 
demonstrating the suitability of the measure for securing the attainment of the objective which they 
pursue and persuading the Court that the measure does not go beyond what is necessary in order to attain 
it. This is often referred to as the suitability and necessity test. The first is essentially a ‘means and end 
test’ whilst the second involves balancing competing interests. Again, the burden of proof lies with the 
party imposing the measure. According to Harbo, “[h]ow the court decides to interpret the proportionality 
principle depends… on how strictly or not it reviews the regulatory authorities’ assessment of the 
suitability of the measures and how creative it is when proposing the less restrictive alternatives”.176  
In this regard Tridimas claims that when assessing the proportionality of a measure, the CJEU adopts a 
less intensive level of scrutiny when reviewing EU measures as opposed to national measures.
177
 This is 
because the underlying interests which proportionality seeks to protect are different in each case. 
According to Tridimas, in relation to EU measures the Court seeks to balance private interest with a 
public interest and will generally defer to the expertise of the legislature. Therefore, the Court will only 
strike down an EU measure if it is “manifestly inappropriate” to achieve its objectives. In contrast, the 
Court adopts a much stricter approach in relation to assessing the compatibility of national measures with 
EU law, the later approach reflecting “a very strong substantial bias, namely that of promoting European 
integration”.178 Therefore, it can be concluded that in relation to measures that restrict free movement in 
the EU, the Court will generally adopt less intensive scrutiny of EU measures than national measures.  
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8.3 Conclusions 
Article 45 and related secondary legislation prohibits nationality discrimination that restricts the free 
movement of workers. The Court does not treat all restrictions under Article 45 in the same way. In 
particular, the Court draws a distinction between directly and indirectly discriminatory measures that 
restrict a worker’s free movement and other restrictions that are non-discriminatory in nature. Direct 
discrimination can only be justified with reference to one of the express Treaty derogations, namely 
public policy, public security or public health. Indirectly and non-discriminatory restrictions are subject to 
a wider open-ended justificatory regime (‘objective justifications’). Under this framework, in order to 
escape condemnation under Article 45 and related secondary legislation, the indirectly or non-
discriminatory contested measure must pursue a legitimate objective and must be suitable for securing the 
attainment of that objective, and the measure must not go beyond what is necessary in order to attain it.  
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Chapter 9 
Legal Analysis of the Rule and Conclusions 
 
9.1 The Test to be Applied 
 
As presented in Chapter 8, in Gebhard the Court established a four-pronged test for assessing whether 
national measures are liable to hinder or make less attractive the exercise of fundamental freedoms 
guaranteed by the Treaty:  
1. they must be applied in a non-discriminatory manner;  
2. they must be justified by imperative requirements in the general interest;  
3. they must be suitable for securing the attainment of the objective which they pursue;  
4. and they must not go beyond what is necessary in order to attain it’.179 
 
Each stage of the test will be applied in turn to the UEFA home grown player rule (the Rule) based on the 
data introduced and analysed in the preceding Chapters. 
 
9.2 Stage 1: Applied in a Non-Discriminatory Manner 
 
9.2.1 Who are the likely complainants? 
Before an assessment is made concerning whether the home grown player rule amounts to a restriction, 
and of what nature, it must first be established who the complainant might be. This study does not assess 
the causes of action in EU competition law for clubs
180
 and neither does it examine the limits of the 
European Commission’s enforcement powers against private parties.181 The focus of this current 
assessment lies, therefore, within the terrain of free movement law. A professional footballer could object 
to the home grown player rule on the grounds that it amounts to a provision which precludes or deters him 
from leaving his country of origin in order to exercise his right of freedom of movement. This is because 
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a number of places in a club squad are reserved exclusively for ‘locally trained players’. That limitation, 
and a system of penalties built into the regulations, is inherently liable to deter clubs from recruiting a 
non-national if that player does not meet the home grown criteria. This proposition remains unaltered by 
the fact that the rule does not place restrictions on the employment of players or on the composition of the 
starting XI. The essential purpose of a professional player’s activity is to be recruited to a team in order to 
play professional football. As the Court of Justice has already held in Bosman, “a rule which restricts that 
participation obviously also restricts the chances of employment of the player concerned”.182 
 
9.2.2 Can professional footballers invoke free movement rights?  
Article 45 prohibits nationality discrimination that restricts the free movement of workers. It is clear that 
professional sportspersons are workers since, for the period of their contract of employment, they perform 
services for and under the direction of the club in return for which they receive remuneration. The work 
of a professional footballer is an ‘effective and genuine’ activity and it is not ‘purely marginal and 
ancillary’ as per the Levin test.183 In Bernard, the Court established that “where a sporting activity takes 
the form of gainful employment or the provision of services for remuneration, which is true of the 
activities of semi-professional or professional sportsmen, it falls, more specifically, within the scope of 
Article 45 TFEU”.184 It went on to find that a professional footballer’s, “gainful employment falls within 
the scope of Article 45 TFEU”.185 Economically active minors, such as young footballers, also possess 
free movement rights within the EU. Placing restrictions on their movement may engage EU provisions 
on free movement of workers, notwithstanding the EU’s acceptance of the need to protect minors.186 Free 
movement rights are limited to those holding the nationality of one of the Member States. However, in 
Kolpak, Simutenkov and Kahveci, the Court of Justice held that non-EU sportsmen and women covered 
by non-discrimination provisions contained within association agreements concluded between the EU and 
non-EU states cannot be discriminated against in terms of working conditions, remuneration or dismissal 
when they are legally employed in the territory of the Member State.
187
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9.2.3 Can free movement rights be invoked against UEFA? 
The Court of Justice has established that Article 45 TFEU extends not only to the actions of public 
authorities, but also to rules of any other nature aimed at regulating gainful employment in a collective 
manner.
188
 As the Court has consistently argued,  
“[s]ince working conditions in the different Member States are governed sometimes by provisions 
laid down by law or regulation and sometimes by collective agreements and other acts concluded or 
adopted by private persons, a limitation of the application of the prohibitions laid down by Article 
45 TFEU to acts of a public authority would risk creating inequality in its application”.189  
Whereas in Bernard the contested measure derived from a national collective agreement, the home grown 
player rule is an act laid down by a private association – UEFA. In this regard, UEFA is to be considered 
a private collective regulator in so far as its rules determine the terms on which professional sportsmen 
can engage in gainful employment.
190
 These rules, and in particular the rules governing home grown 
players, have the potential to affect access to the labour market and economic activity once in post.  
As to the territorial scope of the free movement test, the Court has established that EU law applies to all 
legal relationships in so far as these relationships, by reason either of the place where they are entered into 
or the place where they take effect, can be located within the territory of the EU.
191
 This renders irrelevant 
any suggestion that as UEFA is located in non-EU Switzerland, its actions escape the reach of EU law. 
 
9.2.4 Does the home grown player rule relate to a wholly internal situation?  
Free movement provisions cannot be applied to situations that are wholly internal to a Member State. The 
enactment by UEFA of the home grown player rule cannot be described as a wholly internal situation. 
Whilst it is true that some leagues in Europe have adopted home grown player rules specific to their 
leagues, the UEFA rule is applicable to pan-European competitions. Furthermore, regardless of whether 
the rule derives from a national league or the European governing body, “[p]rovisions which preclude or 
deter a national of a Member State from leaving his country of origin in order to exercise his right to 
freedom of movement therefore constitute an obstacle to that freedom even if they apply without regard 
to the nationality of the workers concerned”.192 
 
                                                          
188
 Case 36/74 Walrave and Koch [1974] ECR 1405, paragraph 17. See also Case C-415/93 Union Royale Belge Sociétés de 
Football Association and others v Bosman and others [1995] ECR I-4921, paragraph 82. 
189
 Case 325/08 Bernard, paragraph 31. 
190
 Case 415/93 Bosman, paragraph 87. 
191
 Case 36/74 Walrave, paragraph 28. See also Case C-281/98 Angonese ECR [2000] I-4139 paragraph 36. 
192
 Case 415/93 Bosman, paragraph 96. 
83 
 
9.2.5 Is the home grown player rule covered by a sporting exception?  
In Walrave the Court of Justice declared that sport is subject to European law “only in so far as it 
constitutes an economic activity” and that the prohibition on nationality discrimination “does not affect 
the composition of sport teams, in particular national teams, the formation of which is a question of 
purely sporting interest and as such has nothing to do with economic activity”.193 A combined reading of 
paragraphs 4 and 8 gave rise to the so called ‘sporting exception’ in European law in which the non-
economic aspects of sport, or those aspects carrying economic effects but motivated by purely sporting 
interest, fell outside the reach of the Treaty prohibitions unless the rules were disproportionate and 
therefore not limited to their proper objectives.
194
  
In the slightly later case of Donà, the Court considered the legality of nationality discrimination in Italian 
professional club football as opposed to national team competitions. In his Opinion, AG Trabucchi argued 
that considerations of purely sporting interest could justify the imposition of restrictions on the signing, or 
at least on the participation in official championship matches, of foreign players so as to ensure that the 
winning team would be representative of the state of which it is the champion team. Trabucchi considered 
this reasonable given that the team which wins the national championship is often chosen to represent its 
own state in international competitions.
195
 The Court declined this invitation and instead argued that 
although players enjoy protection under EU law, those provisions do not preclude the adoption of rules 
“excluding foreign players from participation in certain matches for reasons which are not of an economic 
nature, which relate to the particular nature and context of such matches and are thus of sporting interest 
only such as, for example, matches between national teams from different countries”.196 These rules must 
remain limited to its proper objective.
197
 
In Bosman, the Court considered, inter alia, a UEFA rule amounting to a quota system in which clubs 
wishing to enter European competitions could only field three overseas players and two assimilated 
players (the ‘3+2 rule’). Attempts to rely on the sporting exception were rejected by the Court. Citing 
paragraphs 14 and 15 of Donà, the Court argued that although EU law does not preclude rules justified on 
non-economic grounds which relate to the particular nature and context of certain matches when limited 
to its proper objective, it cannot “be relied upon to exclude the whole of a sporting activity from the scope 
of the Treaty”.198 The Court found that the contested nationality clauses did not “concern specific matches 
between teams representing their countries but apply to all official matches between clubs and thus to the 
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essence of the activity of professional players”.199 Similarly, in Kolpak, the Court considered the level of 
protection from nationality discrimination afforded to non-EU nationals who were protected by 
association agreements containing non-discrimination clauses. The Court rejected the location of such 
differential treatment within the ‘sporting exception’ by employing the same language found in 
Bosman.
200
 
It is clear that the home grown player rule is not covered by the purely sporting rule exception. For 
financial and prestige reasons, participation in European competitions has become a key objective of 
clubs and a club’s participation in European competition has become a key consideration for players 
selecting a new employer. Even in the absence of home grown player rules in domestic leagues, the 
existence of such a rule for participation in European competitions is likely to inform the recruitment 
choices of clubs who aspire to compete at this level. The home grown player rule therefore affects the 
essence of the activity of a professional player.  
Furthermore, the ability of UEFA to rely on the ‘purely sporting interest’ exception to remove the Rule 
from the scope of the Treaty has been undermined by the Court’s approach to the sporting exception in 
Meca-Medina in which it stated that, “… it is apparent that the mere fact that a rule is purely sporting in 
nature does not have the effect of removing from the scope of the Treaty the person engaging in the 
activity governed by that rule or the body which has laid it down”.201 The Court went on to say that,  
“[i]f the sporting activity in question falls within the scope of the Treaty, the conditions for 
engaging in it are then subject to all the obligations which result from the various provisions 
of the Treaty. It follows that the rules which govern that activity must satisfy the 
requirements of those provisions, which, in particular, seek to ensure freedom of movement 
for workers, freedom of establishment, freedom to provide services, or competition”.202  
The home grown player rule cannot therefore be automatically removed from the scope of the Treaty 
without systematic analysis to establish whether the contested measure amounts to a restriction or not. In 
other words, the purely sporting interest defence no longer applies to sport except in relation to the 
composition of national teams and, arguably, to a narrow set of ‘rules of the game’ which carry no or very 
marginal economic effects.  
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9.2.6 Does the home grown player rule amount to an ‘inherent’ rule?  
Not all contested rules falling within the scope of the Treaty will be condemned. In Meca-Medina, the 
Court established that while the contested anti-doping rules could not be categorised as rules of purely 
sporting interest, they still did not infringe the Treaty’s competition prohibitions because they were 
“inherent in the organisation and proper conduct of competitive sport and its very purpose is to ensure 
healthy rivalry between athletes”.203 Such restraints cease to be necessary when they are 
disproportionate.
204
 In applying the inherency test, the Court stated that account must first of all be taken 
of the overall context in which the decision of the association of undertakings was taken, or produces its 
effects, and, more specifically, of its objectives. It has then to be considered whether the consequential 
effects restrictive of competition are inherent in the pursuit of those objectives and are proportionate to 
them.
205
 This approach, although developed in the context of the EU’s competition provisions, is 
appropriate for transposition into a free movement context.
206
 
Indeed, the logic of ‘inherent rules’ had already found expression in a free movement case. In Deliège, 
the referring Belgian court asked the CJEU to consider whether it is contrary to Articles 56, 101 and 102 
TFEU to require professional or semi-professional athletes, or those wishing to become so, to be 
authorized by their federation in order to be able to compete against each other in an international 
competition which does not involve national teams.
207
 The Court argued that the selection rules for high-
profile international tournaments did not restrict access to the labour market.
208
 Part of the Court’s 
reasoning was that rules “inherent in the conduct of an international high-level sports event” might not in 
law constitute restrictions on free movement even if they in fact involved some restrictive criteria being 
adopted”.209 The Court acknowledged that the choice of criteria is based on a large number of 
considerations unconnected with the personal situation of any athlete, such as the nature, the organisation 
and the financing of the sport concerned.
210
 It continued that “it naturally falls to the bodies concerned…. 
to lay down appropriate rules and to make their selections in accordance with them”.211 This is because 
the governing bodies, in this case the Belgian Judo Federation, possess “the necessary knowledge and 
experience” to exercise such judgement and that this “is the arrangement normally adopted in most 
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sporting disciplines”.212 A limit on the number of competitors that could be selected did not “in itself, as 
long as it derives from a need inherent in the organisation of such a competition, restrict the freedom to 
provide services”.213 
However, the inherency rule does not apply to UEFA’s home grown player rule because the rule does not 
derive from a need inherent in the organisation of the UEFA competitions in question. The organisation 
of the UEFA Champions League and the UEFA Europa League is not inherently linked to a regulation 
that has the effect of favouring nationals over non-nationals. It is clear that UEFA competitions (most 
strikingly the Champions League) had thrived in terms of both popular interest and commercial income 
prior to the introduction of this rule and no evidence has been put forward that they could not continue to 
do so in its absence. Furthermore, in Deliège and Meca-Medina, the Court limited its acceptance of rules 
‘inherent’ to the proper organisation of sport to non-discriminatory rules that bore no relationship to 
nationality. The home grown player rule does not fall into this nationality category as it amounts to 
indirect discrimination (as is discussed below). To illustrate, in Deliège the Court found that,  
“[i]t must be pointed out that, in contrast to the rules applicable to the Bosman case, the 
selection rules at issue in the main proceedings do not determine the conditions governing 
access to the labour market by professional sportsmen and do not contain nationality clauses 
limiting the number of nationals of other Member States who may participate in a 
competition”.214  
It should also be recalled that even those rules categorised as ‘inherent’ must also still satisfy the 
requirements of proportionality control.  
 
9.2.7 Does Article 165 TFEU offer additional protection? 
 
Article 6 TFEU establishes sport as a third tier supporting competence of the Union. Unlike in areas in 
which the EU has exclusive competence, or shares this competence with the Member States, supporting 
competences are limited to actions to support, coordinate or supplement the actions of the Member States. 
Sport is located in subsection (e): education, vocational training, youth and sport.  
Article 165(1) TFEU provides that “The Union shall contribute to the promotion of European sporting 
issues, while taking account of the specific nature of sport, its structures based on voluntary activity and 
its social and educational function”.  The wording of 165(1) does not unequivocally establish that, “taking 
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account of the specific nature of sport” is a horizontal obligation which applies to the exercise of other 
EU powers such as free movement and competition law. This contrasts with other areas of the Treaty in 
which horizontal obligations can be identified such as in the areas of environmental protection. Article 11 
TFEU states that “[e]nvironmental protection requirements must be integrated into the definition and 
implementation of the Union’s policies and activities...” 
This means that it cannot automatically be assumed that “taking account of the specific nature of sport” 
offers the home grown player rule any additional protection from EU law. The jurisprudence of the Court 
on Article 165 is not, currently, sufficiently developed to allow for definitive statements on this question. 
In Bernard, the Court found that: 
“…in considering whether a system which restricts the freedom of movement of such players is 
suitable to ensure that the said objective is attained and does not go beyond what is necessary to 
attain it, account must be taken …of the specific characteristics of sport in general, and football in 
particular, and of their social and educational function. The relevance of those factors is also 
corroborated by their being mentioned in the second subparagraph of Article 165(1) TFEU”.215  
From this statement, it appears that the Court prefers the well-trodden path of objective justification albeit 
acknowledging that Article 165 informs that assessment.  
Article 165(2) establishes that, “Union action shall be aimed at: developing the European dimension in 
sport, by promoting fairness and openness in sporting competitions and cooperation between bodies 
responsible for sports, and by protecting the physical and moral integrity of sportsmen and sportswomen, 
especially the youngest sportsmen and sportswomen”. Regardless of the horizontal question, Article 
165(2) is likely to carry persuasive authority within the context of the exercise of other Treaty 
competences relevant to sport. In relation to the home grown player debate, Article 165 is likely to be 
cited by both those who may wish to support and attack the rule on the “fairness and openness” 
question.
216
 Similarly, the home grown player rule requires assessment in relation to the Treaty objective 
of protecting minors in sport. 
It has been assumed in some quarters that the existence of Article 165 TFEU adjusts the proposition that 
sport is subject to EU law. This assumption must be rejected – sporting activity is still subject to 
European law. However, Article 165 might adjust the sensitivity to which EU law is applied to sport, 
                                                          
215
 Case C-325/08 Bernard, paragraph 40.  
216
 See for example, Weatherill, S. (2010), Fairness, Openness and the Specific Nature of Sport: Does the Lisbon Treaty 
Change EU Sports Law, The International Sports Law Journal, 2010/3-4: 11-17. Indeed UEFA has already articulated such a 
plea: UEFA’s Position on Article 165 of the Lisbon Treaty, accessed at: 
http://www.uefa.com/MultimediaFiles/Download/uefaorg/EuropeanUnion/01/57/91/67/1579167_DOWNLOAD.pdf .See also, 
Parrish, R., García, B., Miettinen, S., & Siekmann, R., (2010), The Lisbon Treaty and EU Sports Policy, Report for the 
European Parliament Committee on Culture and Education, Brussels: European Parliament: chapter 3. 
88 
 
although in this regard it is difficult to discern from the existing jurisprudence of the European Court and 
the decisional practice of the Commission, a pattern of insensitive application of EU law to sport. The 
relevance of Article 165 lies not only in shaping what is to be considered a legitimate objective, but which 
measures, taking into account the specific nature of sport and questions of fairness and openness, are 
considered suitable and necessary for the attainment of these objectives. Whilst in these contexts the 
impact of Article 165 might be significant, categorically it can be stated that Article 165 does not grant 
sport, and specifically the home grown player rule, immunity from the application of EU law.  
 
9.2.8 What is the nature of the restriction? 
From the foregoing it is suggested that the home grown player rule is incapable of being defined as either 
a ‘purely sporting’ rule which falls outside the scope of the Treaty or an ‘inherent’ rule which avoids 
classification as a restriction under Article 45. The existence of Article 165 TFEU does not adjust this 
proposition. The Rule therefore amounts to a restriction and in order to escape condemnation under 
Article 45 must satisfy the final three stages of the Gebhard test. Before these stages receive attention, it 
is first necessary to establish the precise nature of the restriction.   
It is clear from Bosman that rules which limit the right to take part in football matches as professional or 
semi-professional players solely to the nationals of the State in question are prohibited by Article 45 of 
the Treaty and relevant secondary legislation. This amounts to direct nationality discrimination, the nature 
of which is addressed above. The home grown player rule places no such direct restraint on non-nationals 
and so cannot be considered directly discriminatory. Any non-national can qualify as a home grown 
player if they meet the relevant criteria, namely if they have been trained for three years by the club or (to 
qualify as ‘association-trained’) a club in the same national association between the ages of 15 and 21. It 
is therefore not relevant to consider the Treaty derogations outlining the circumstances in which direct 
nationality discrimination is acceptable under EU law.  
Due to the specific focus of this study it also not relevant to comprehensively consider the now defunct 
‘6+5’ proposal of FIFA.217 The proposal was that a football club must begin a game with at least six 
players entitled to play for the national team of the country where the club concerned is located. As with 
UEFA’s rule, FIFA’s stated aim was to promote fairness in European competitions by guaranteeing 
equality in sporting and financial terms between clubs, promoting junior players, improving the quality of 
national teams, and strengthening the regional and national identification of clubs and a corresponding 
link with the public.
218
 This measure would be incompatible with EU free movement law as it gives rise 
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to direct nationality discrimination which cannot find shelter within the express Treaty derogations of 
public policy, public security and public health. The suggestion, raised in an expert opinion on the 6+5 
rule, that the measure does not constitute direct discrimination because it relates to eligibility to play for 
the national side and not to nationality, must be rejected.
219
 Nationality is the essence of the eligibility 
criteria meaning that all non-nationals are excluded. This is a form of overt discrimination.  
It must be stressed that the European labour market for professional players is already very open. There 
can be few professions characterised by such fluidity between Member States, with an average of 42.47% 
of football players in the top five European league being expatriates.
220
 It may even be possible that the 
home grown player rule promotes free movement for some young players by further incentivising the 
cross border movement of those between the ages of 15 and 21; it is rational for clubs to attract the best 
players to their academies regardless of the player’s nationality (for more discussion on whether the Rule 
restricts free movement see section 9.4.3 below on ‘The Necessity Test Applied to the Rule’). However, 
as the Commission has acknowledged,  
“[a]lthough it is difficult at the moment to state with any certainty that the ‘home-grown players’ 
rule will lead to indirect discrimination on the basis of nationality, the potential risk of this cannot 
be discounted, as young players attending a training centre at a club in a Member State tend to be 
from that Member State rather than from other EU countries”.221  
This could amount to a form of covert discrimination because even though the rule is apparently neutral 
in terms of nationality, national workers are potentially placed at an advantage over migrant workers. It 
stands to reason that nationals are more likely to meet the ‘locally trained’ criteria than foreign workers 
simply as a consequence of their geographical location. As has already been outlined above, proof of 
indirect discrimination does not require the applicant to demonstrate that the national measure in practice 
affected a higher proportion of foreign workers, but merely that the measure was intrinsically liable to 
affect migrant workers more than nationals and that there was a risk that it will place migrant workers at a 
particular disadvantage. Nevertheless, data presented in Chapter 5 demonstrates that considerably more 
nationals meet the home grown criteria than non-nationals thus confirming the indirectly discriminatory 
effect.  
It is our conclusion that the UEFA Rule does not amount to direct discrimination but that it does 
constitute indirect discrimination against EU workers on the grounds of their nationality. As a result, it 
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must be justified, suitable and necessary in order to be considered defensible under EU laws on freedom 
of movement. The legal assessment will now proceed to consider these tests.   
 
9.3 Stage 2: Justified by Imperative Requirements in the General Interest 
 
Determining that the home grown player rule amounts to indirect nationality discrimination and a 
restriction on a worker’s free movement does not, in itself, lead to a finding of incompatibility with 
Article 45. Indirectly discriminatory restrictions are compatible with freedom of movement if they can be 
justified by imperative requirements in the general interest. There is significant European Court 
jurisprudence that guides our assessment as the Court has established a set of imperative requirements 
specific to sport. In Bosman the Court found that,  
“[i]n view of the considerable social importance of sporting activities and in particular football in 
the Community, the aims of maintaining a balance between clubs by preserving a certain degree of 
equality and uncertainty as to results and of encouraging the recruitment and training of young 
players must be accepted as legitimate”.222 
In Lehtonen, the Court determined that late transfers could substantially alter the sporting strength of 
teams in the course of the championship thus calling into question the proper functioning of sporting 
competition.
223
 In Meca-Medina the Court recognised as legitimate the need to “combat doping in order 
for competitive sport to be conducted fairly”, safeguard “equal chances for athletes, athletes’ health”, 
ensure “the integrity and objectivity of competitive sport” and protect “ethical values in sport”.224 In 
Bernard it was decided that a system of training compensation in sport which restricts the freedom of 
movement of players could be justified with reference to the need to ensure that the objective of educating 
and training young players is secured.
225
  
From this jurisprudence can be synthesised the following legitimate objectives applicable to sport: 
preserving competitive balance; encouraging the recruitment and training of young players; maintaining 
the proper functioning of competitions; maintaining the integrity, objectivity and ethical values of sport. It 
must be stressed that this is not a closed list of justifications and it is for the Court to develop this list 
through its jurisprudence. Nonetheless, according to existing jurisprudence, the twin stated objectives of 
the home grown player rule - preserving a competitive balance between clubs and encouraging the 
education and training of young players - are therefore to be considered legitimate.  
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In this connection, it must be acknowledged that the objectives of the home grown player rule have 
received support from some of the institutions of the EU. For example, in its Resolution on the European 
Dimension on Sport, the European Parliament: 
“[r]eaffirms its commitment to the home-grown player rule, and considers that could be a model for 
other professional leagues in Europe; supports further efforts of sports governing bodies that 
stimulate the training of local young players within the limits of EU law thus strengthening the 
competitive balance within competitions and the healthy development of the European sports 
model”.226  
It added that it “[c]onsiders that the development of new talent is one of the core activities of a sports 
club, and that an over-dependence on the transfer of players can undermine sporting values”.227 The 
Commission has also stated that “the objectives underlying UEFA’s ‘home-grown players’ rule, namely 
promoting training for young players and consolidating the balance of competitions, seem to be legitimate 
objectives of general interest, as they are inherent to sporting activity”.228 
There is particular concern that the attrition rate for young footballers is high meaning that those not 
signing professional contracts with clubs face the prospect of having to find alternative employment. The 
risk is that during that player’s sporting development, his general educational needs are side-lined thus 
harming his non-footballing employment prospects. As a player’s career is relatively short, and 
susceptible to early curtailment through injury, even those players with employment contracts with clubs 
should consider the quality of their educational development during the period of their sporting 
development. An early focus on dual careers could assist with the reintegration of the player at the end of 
his career.
229
 Article 165 TFEU emphasised the importance of protecting the physical and moral integrity 
young sportsmen and women and this was confirmed as official policy of the EU in December 2008 at 
which point the European Council issued a Declaration on Sport which called for “the strengthening of… 
dialogue with the International Olympic Committee and representatives of the world of sport, in particular 
on the question of combined sports training and education for young people”.230 In the subsequent 
Communication on Sport, the Commission emphasised,  
“the importance of ensuring that young high-level athletes are offered quality education in parallel 
to their sport training. Young athletes, in particular those coming from third countries to train and 
compete in Europe, face multiple risks linked to their vulnerability. The quality of sport training 
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centres and their staff should be sufficiently high in order to safeguard the athletes' moral and 
educational development and professional interests”.231 
According to the Commission’s 2008 study on training of young sportsmen/women in Europe 2008, the 
home grown player rule “may allow young football players to stay as long as possible in their local 
environment, which is important for their personal stability and provide them with the chance to benefit 
from a dual career”.232 It is suggested that proximity to the home environment and familiarity with the 
native language benefits a young person’s educational and sporting development. Of course, this benefit 
needs to be weighed against the risk that the Rule creates and sustains a trade in young players thus 
facilitating their movement away from the home environment. Our statistical analysis in Chapter 5 
suggests that the introduction of the home grown player rule has coincided with an increase in the cross-
border migration of young players, although data gathered from clubs and discussed in Chapter 7 
provided little evidence that this was as a direct result of the UEFA rule.    
Based upon the European Court’s decisions in Bosman, Lehtonen and Bernard it is our assessment that 
the UEFA Rule can potentially be justified by an imperative requirement in the general interest, namely: 
a) The need to improve player training, education and development, and 
b) The need to protect competitive balance. 
 
As a result, we will be assessing the home grown player rule against these criteria. It should, however, be 
noted that we do not consider that some of the other objectives of the rule that were stated at the time of 
its inception would be viewed by the Court as being imperative requirements in the general interest (and 
indeed some were directly excluded from this category in Bosman). These excluded objectives include 
strengthening national teams
233
 and protecting links between club sides and their national identities.
234
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9.4 Stages 3 & 4: Proportionality - The Tests of Suitability and Necessity 
 
9.4.1 The Court’s position on suitability and necessity 
In addition to the EU’s objective justification process detailed above, stages three and four of the 
Gebhard test require that the measure remains proportionate. This general principle of EU law requires 
that the measure must be suitable for securing the attainment of the objectives which they pursue and 
must not go beyond what is necessary in order to attain it. The necessity test has been interpreted as also 
meaning that where no less restrictive alternatives exist, the contested measure must not have an 
excessive or disproportionate effect or the disadvantage caused by the measure is proportionate to the 
benefit of the aims pursued.
235
 The importance of proportionality control in the context of sport has been 
forthrightly reaffirmed by the Court in Meca-Medina. With regard to proportionality control, much will 
depend on the intensity with which the Court subjects the rule. As is discussed in Chapter 8, some 
academic authority considers that the Court will only strike down an EU measure if it is manifestly 
inappropriate to achieve its objectives whereas a national measure touching upon the fundamental 
freedoms, such as the home grown players rule, will be subject to much stricter proportionality control. 
However, within the sporting context other commentators take the view that: 
“[t]aking into consideration the Court’s awareness about the EU’s limited competence in sporting 
affairs and the corresponding conditional regulatory autonomy of the sporting federations, and also 
the societal relevance of sport, it is possible that the Court’s review of the tests of suitability and 
necessity in a sporting context will be merely marginal”.236  
A review of the jurisprudence of the Court reveals varying practice on the intensity with which sporting 
rules and practices are subject to proportionality control. In Bosman, UEFA and other parties submitted 
justifications in support of retaining the transfer system in which a professional footballer who is a 
national of one Member State could not, on the expiry of his contract with a club, be employed by a club 
of another Member State unless the latter club had paid to the former a transfer, training or development 
fee. UEFA submitted that the transfer rules were justified by the need to maintain a financial and 
competitive balance between clubs and to support the search for talent and the training of young players. 
Although these objectives were accepted as legitimate,
237
 the Court considered that the application of the 
transfer rules was “not an adequate means of maintaining financial and competitive balance in the world 
of football” because, “[t]hose rules neither preclude the richest clubs from securing the services of the 
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best players nor prevent the availability of financial resources from being a decisive factor in competitive 
sport, thus considerably altering the balance between clubs”.238  
On the question of encouraging the training of players, the Court stated that transfer fees are by nature 
contingent and uncertain and are in any event unrelated to the actual cost borne by clubs of training both 
future professional players and those who will never play professionally. The prospect of receiving such 
fees cannot, therefore, be either a decisive factor in encouraging recruitment and training of young players 
or an adequate means of financing such activities, particularly in the case of smaller clubs.
239
 The Court 
was also dismissive of claims that the transfer rules were necessary to safeguard the worldwide 
organization of football
240
 and that the rules in question were necessary to compensate clubs for the 
expenses which they have had to incur in paying fees on recruiting their players.
241
 
Most significantly for this assessment, the Court in Bosman subjected the justifications presented in 
support of the nationality quotas to critical scrutiny. First, UEFA argued that the 3+2 rule served to 
maintain the traditional link between each club and its country. Although the home grown player rule has 
been defended on the grounds of the connection with the locality, as opposed to the country, the logic is 
the same as it enables the public to identify with its favourite team and ensures that clubs taking part in 
international competitions effectively represent their countries.
242
 The Court rejected this logic by arguing 
that,  
“a football club's links with the Member State in which it is established cannot be regarded as any 
more inherent in its sporting activity than its links with its locality, town, region or, in the case of 
the United Kingdom, the territory covered by each of the four associations. Even though national 
championships are played between clubs from different regions, towns or localities, there is no rule 
restricting the right of clubs to field players from other regions, towns or localities in such 
matches”.243  
On the second justification regarding the nationality requirement creating a sufficient pool of nationally 
eligible players, the Court pointed out that while national teams must be comprised of players having the 
nationality of the relevant country, those players need not necessarily be registered to play for clubs in 
that country and that allowing footballers to benefit from free movement rules opened up opportunities to 
play in leagues other than the one in which they are eligible to represent the national team.
244
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The third proposed justification was that the nationality rules help to maintain a competitive balance 
between clubs by preventing the richest clubs from appropriating the services of the best players. While 
this objective was accepted as legitimate, the Court subjected the rules to a suitability test and declared 
that, “those clauses are not sufficient to achieve the aim of maintaining a competitive balance, since there 
are no rules limiting the possibility for such clubs to recruit the best national players, thus undermining 
that balance to just the same extent”.245 Cost control measures in European football have now been 
adopted by UEFA as a means of addressing competitive balance in the game meaning that UEFA 
measures on home grown players and Financial Fair Play might be considered complementary.
246
 
Finally, in defence of the 3+2 rule, UEFA pointed out that it was drawn up in collaboration with the 
European Commission. Rejecting this argument, the Court stated that the Commission is not in a position 
to provide guarantees concerning the compatibility of specific practices with the Treaty or authorize 
practices which are contrary to the Treaty.
247
 Following the entry into force of Article 165 and the 
publication of the Communication on Sport,
248
 the Commission has a policy of facilitating dialogue with 
the sports movement and this dialogue occasionally takes the form of discussing with stakeholders the 
legality of measures under European law. However, it is clear that the Commission cannot give legal 
guarantees concerning the compatibility of measures with the Treaty. The Commission’s preliminary 
assessment of the home grown player rule,
249
 and any position taken following its consideration of this 
study, in no way binds the Court of Justice.   
From the foregoing, it can be seen that in Bosman the Court subjected both the transfer and the nationality 
rules to a stringent test of suitability by dismissing the expertise and regulatory autonomy claimed by the 
party imposing the measure. Furthermore, the Court went on to state that the same aims that the transfer 
system sought to achieve could be achieved at least as efficiently by other means which do not impede 
freedom of movement for workers, thus demonstrating a similar stringency towards the test of 
necessity.
250
  
In Deliège the Court appeared more sympathetic to claims that sports governing bodies possessed “the 
necessary knowledge and experience”251 required in order “to lay down appropriate rules and to make 
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their selections in accordance with them”.252 In Meca-Medina, the Court was similarly unwilling to 
subject the contested doping thresholds to thorough scrutiny.
253
 
In Lehtonen, the Court was asked to consider whether transfer windows in basketball amounted to a 
restriction on a worker’s freedom of movement. Having established the existence of a restriction, the 
Court accepted the legitimacy of the objective of the measure which was to ensure the regularity of 
sporting competitions.
254
 The Court considered that, 
“[l]ate transfers might be liable to change substantially the sporting strength of one or other team in 
the course of the championship, thus calling into question the comparability of results between the 
teams taking part in that championship, and consequently the proper functioning of the 
championship as a whole”.255  
However, the transfer window in question did not survive proportionality control because international 
transfer windows were longer than those within the European zone and the difference in treatment had not 
been justified.
256
 Interestingly, the Advocate General in the case expressed the view that, “the 
organisational authority of sporting associations is in itself a public interest deserving of protection, and 
that any rule of the sporting associations is in principle suitable for implementing the exercise of that 
organisational authority to precisely the extent provided for”.257 However, AG Alber went on to argue 
that, “[o]vert or covert barriers to access… interfere so radically with fundamental freedoms that they 
require a more weighty justification than the sporting associations’ necessary organisational authority.”258 
In Bernard, the Court accepted as legitimate schemes that provide for compensation payments for training 
where a young player, at the end of his training, signs a professional contract with a club other than the 
one which trained him. This, it argued, could be justified, “by the objective of encouraging the 
recruitment and training of young players”.259 However, it went on to condemn the contested scheme in 
question on the grounds that it amounted not to a system of compensation but to one of payment of 
damages. These damages were not calculated in relation to the training costs incurred by the club 
providing that training but in relation to the total loss suffered by the club and the amount of that loss was 
established on the basis of criteria which were not determined in advance.
260
 Consequently the contested 
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scheme “went beyond what was necessary to encourage recruitment and training of young players and to 
fund those activities”.261 
  
9.4.2 The Suitability Test Applied to the Rule  
The suitability test in EU law requires that the contested measure under scrutiny is suitable or appropriate 
to achieve the desired end. In the case of the home grown player rule, the desired end relates to promoting 
competitive balance and encouraging youth development. Each is assessed in turn. 
9.4.2.1 Competitive Balance  
Evidence presented in Chapter 3 suggests that between 1992 and 2008 competitive balance has declined 
in European competitions. In order to examine the impact of the Rule on the performance of teams, and 
hence indirectly examine competitive balance, regression analysis was performed. This was undertaken 
separately for each of the UEFA Champions League and Europa League tournaments, and for the 
performance of teams in the group stages, and then their progression through to the various final stages of 
the competition. A full discussion of the methodology and results of this exercise can be found in Chapter 
6 and Appendix D. In summary, the results of this exercise are as follows: 
Overall the statistics measuring competitive balance suggest that the impact of the rule has been to 
rebalance the performance of teams across both the Champions League and Europa League competitions 
by reducing the success of teams finishing in the top two places of the Champions League group stage or 
the top three places of the Europa League group stage in favour of those towards the bottom. There is 
very little evidence to suggest that the Rule affects the final stages in either competition. 
Champions League: In the group stages of the Champions League the Rule has constrained the 
performance of the bigger clubs who would previously have been most likely to have employed more 
players from outside their home association, recruiting from a greater international market. This has the 
effect of making the outcome of the group stages of the competition less certain. The largest impact has 
been through association-trained players, with those teams naming relatively more home grown players in 
their squad experiencing a reduction in performance. The implication of this is that for clubs having to 
retain players from within a more localised, i.e. national market, as defined by the association, team 
performance falls. Statistically the results show that the effect is relatively small at this stage and typically 
less than 0.5%, although this could increase to 1.5% for the total of association-trained players in the 
Champions League. This would imply that as the number of association-trained players increases by one, 
there is a 1.5% chance that a team could fall from being second in the group stages, therefore missing out 
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on qualification for the knockout stages. When the Rule is measured on a seasonal basis (as opposed to 
averages across intervention periods) the impact is more marked with the results suggesting that the Rule 
could increase the chances of a team falling from second place by approximately 12%. The statistics for 
club-trained players do not support a negative impact. While the Rule has a small but statistically 
significant impact on the group stages of the Champions League, it has no impact on the knock out stages. 
The implication is that the best teams generally have gravitated towards this level of competition 
regardless of constraints on squads. 
Europa League: In the group stages of the Europa League although a similar pattern of results is observed 
as outlined for the Champions League, the impact of the Rule is less statistically significant. While the 
same reduction in performance is observed, the only statistically significant impact relates to association-
trained players, with the same implication as above. In the case of the finals’ stage of the Europa League 
there is some limited evidence of a contrary effect to the Champions League results. There is evidence of 
a positive effect on the quarter-final and semi-final achievement of teams if measured on a season-by-
season basis. The findings also show that more home grown players, particularly club-trained players, can 
improve the success of teams at this level, with the implication that clubs with more club-trained players 
are more likely to progress at this stage. This suggests that the rule has had the effect of making such 
teams potentially more competitive vis a vis Champions League teams, in the sense that they can gain 
access to this competition. Within the Europa League, this probably means that the better nationally-
trained players tend to be located at the relatively successful clubs, and cannot then get easily switched to 
Champions League clubs. 
There is insufficient data at the current time to make an accurate scientific assessment of trajectory. 
Experience from the regulation of player markets in other sports shows that it is possible we have already 
seen the full impact on competitive balance of association-trained players and that this will not increase, 
and may even reduce, in future (see Chapter 6). It is equally possible that there will be an additional 
gradual increase in competitive balance as club-trained players start to have a greater impact on the 
composition of first team squads. Therefore our view is that it would be unwise to speculate on either a 
future increase or decrease in competitive balance as a result of the rule. For the purposes of the 
application of the suitability rule, future trajectory should be viewed as neutral.  
 
9.4.2.2 Youth Development  
The home grown player rule potentially complements an existing UEFA measure designed to promote 
youth development. The UEFA club licensing system aims to “further promote and continuously improve 
the standard of all aspects of football in Europe and to give continued priority to the training and care of 
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young players in every club”.262 Clubs entering UEFA club competitions must be in possession of a 
UEFA license issued by the relevant national association or league. In order to receive a license, the 
licensee must satisfy a number of criteria, including sporting criteria relating to the quality of the youth 
development programme.
263
 In the White Paper on Sport, the European Commission acknowledged the 
“usefulness of robust licensing systems for professional clubs at European and national levels as a tool for 
promoting good governance in sport”.264 The home grown player rule represents a regulatory extension of 
this licensing system in so far as clubs must tangibly demonstrate that their youth development 
programmes are producing young professionals. A handful of clubs interviewed suggested that the Rule 
was having a positive impact in this manner by encouraging them to invest more in youth training and 
development (see Chapter 7).  
However, it is a matter for debate whether the issuance of the license is in itself a sufficient guarantee of 
youth development standards or whether the home grown player rule is a justifiable additional 
requirement. In other words, a robustly enforced licensing system could achieve the desired outcomes 
without the need to adopt labour market measures tainted by discriminatory effects (see 9.4.3 Existence of 
Less Restrictive Alternatives). 
Moreover, from the data gathered and the analysis set out in Chapter 7, the UEFA Rule has so far had a 
very limited impact on youth player training and development throughout the European Union. Statistical 
analysis of the number of minutes that under-21 players participated in UEFA competitions (which 
should reflect the quality of and investment in the training and development of young players) indicates 
that while there has been a significant increase in the number of young players competing in UEFA club 
competitions in the last twelve years, this increase was largely in the period 2001-06, before the Rule was 
introduced. In comparison, the period following the introduction of the rule (and its extension in 2008) 
showed a significant reduction in the rate of this increase. It is possible that this indicates both a lack of 
suitability for the Rule to achieve its aims in this respect and may also question the need for the Rule’s 
introduction in the first place in terms of improving youth training and development. However it is also 
possible that some of this increase in the latter stages of the 2001-06 period was connected with UEFA’s 
announcement of its intention to introduce this rule. 
The first of these explanations for the pre-2006 increase in the number of U21 players participating in 
European competitions is supported by the qualitative data gathered from stakeholders and EU clubs 
(Chapter 7); the vast majority of clubs interviewed indicated that they believed the Rule had little or no 
impact on their youth training and development strategies or investment. Primarily clubs believed this to 
be the case because the Rule was not considered to have sufficient ‘bite’ to increase the number of club or 
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association-trained players included in the vast majority of first team squads and because it only has an 
impact on a small minority of clubs (i.e. those regularly qualifying for UEFA Competitions).   
These findings contrast with the statistical analysis set out in Chapter 5 showing that the number of home 
grown players participating in UEFA Competitions has increased since the introduction of the Rule, but 
our data suggests that this is predominantly due to factors other than the introduction and extension of the 
Rule. The major factors identified by clubs and stakeholders were: 
 Domestic player eligibility rules which are often more restrictive. 
 Domestic or European licensing requirements to participate in competitions. 
 Domestic incentivised player development schemes. 
 A club’s financial situation (both chronic and acute). 
 Local or global economic pressures. 
 A club’s “ethos” or “tradition”. 
 
Some of these factors are more transient than others meaning that over time non-regulatory forces, such 
as economic conditions and club philosophy, may encourage or discourage investment in youth 
development. It is possible that a regulatory measure, such as the home grown player rule, may offer a 
more permanent incentivising effect to invest in youth and rely less on the market to fill club squads, 
meaning that the potential benefits of the Rule may be presented in the longer term. However we did not 
find any hard evidence for the potential for an upward (or downward) future trajectory in terms of 
investment in, or quality of, youth development as a result of the Rule remaining in existence in its 
current form. In any event, the trajectory analysis will remain problematic in the future given the 
difficulty in isolating the effect of the Rule from the influence of other factors, including other UEFA 
regulations such as Financial Fair Play. Moreover, the remit of the study was to assess whether the Rule 
achieves its outcomes in improving the training and development of young European Union players at the 
current time. Our conclusion is that the Rule’s effect has been minimal, discordant, and not as significant 
as other concurrent regulatory and economic factors. Therefore in terms of our legal assessment under 
this objective, the Rule is neutral or at best only marginally positive.  
It should also be noted that a number of stakeholders identified a negative effect of the Rule, namely that 
they believed it incentivised the ‘poaching’ of young players from competitor club academies. While 
‘poaching’ has the effect of promoting the cross-border movement of players, it potentially has three 
negative effects. First, most stakeholders agree that a child’s education and training is generally best 
served when that education and training takes place in such a way as not to disturb the child’s home life. 
Relocating a child for the purpose of pursuing a career in professional football can be destabilising. 
Second, the poaching of players can provide disincentives to particularly small and medium sized clubs to 
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develop young talent. Third, if larger clubs are able to poach young players, the ‘feeder’ clubs are placed 
at a competitive disadvantage, raising concerns about competitive balance. Of course, a combination of 
the UEFA Rule with other UEFA regulatory measures could address these negative consequences (see 
below).    
 
9.4.3 The Necessity Test Applied to the Rule  
The test of necessity in EU law requires that the contested measure under scrutiny does not go beyond 
what is necessary in order to secure the stated legitimate objectives. As discussed above, the test has been 
interpreted as also meaning that where no less restrictive alternatives exist, the contested measure must 
not have an excessive or disproportionate effect: the disadvantage caused by the measure must be 
proportionate to the benefit of the aims pursued. This means that a court could consider a measure as 
being suitable and necessary but it could still fail proportionality control because the burden placed on the 
complainant by the measure is disproportionate to the benefits secured.
265
  
The neutral or very limited positive effect of the Rule in terms of the legitimate objectives of improving 
competitive balance and the training and development of young European Union players must be 
balanced against the potentially negative effects of the Rule in terms of restricting the free movement of 
EU workers through its potentially indirectly discriminatory effect. As we have set out above, although 
there is some identifiable progress in terms of meeting the objectively legitimate aims (particularly with 
regard to competitive balance in the Champions League Group Stage) these gains are very limited. 
However, the identifiable negative impact upon the free movement of European Union players also 
appears to be very limited. The descriptive statistics presented in Chapter 5 show that since the 
introduction of the Rule, the number of foreign home grown players has increased in both Champions 
League and Europa League squads. There does also not appear to have been any particular uniform 
change in the numbers of foreign players in the top five leagues since the introduction of the Rule and in 
some instances national leagues have witnessed significant increases in the number of foreign players. It 
seems that in comparison to other sectors, the football labour market is very fluid and the Rule has not 
resulted in a discernible trend suggesting that, as a category of worker, non-national footballers are having 
their freedom of movement restricted. Indeed, to date we have not identified any formal legal challenge to 
the UEFA Rule in domestic or European courts. A number of factors might account for this:  
1. A complaint raised by a player would be heard, at first instance, by a domestic court with the 
potential for a reference to the CJEU. This process can take many years and it is understandable 
why a player may be reluctant to seek to enforce his free movement rights through this route.  
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2. The manner in which the Rule was introduced by UEFA - through consultation with stakeholders 
and negotiations with the European Commission - suggests that those affected by the Rule might 
have accepted the legitimacy of the measure regardless of its objective legal status under EU law, 
although it must be stressed that FIFPro retains concerns as to the discriminatory effects of the 
Rule. 
 
3. Of course, it is conceivable that the primary and main reason for the lack of complaints is that the 
Rule has adversely affected very few players. As the authors of the Commission’s 2008 study on 
training of young sportsmen/women in Europe argue, “a professional football player may exercise 
its [sic] activity very easily in Europe without having the status of home-grown player” because 
the maximum restriction is currently only eight out of 25, the restriction does not apply to the 
fielding of players, and clubs can still submit squad lists containing no home grown players if they 
are prepared to accept a limit of 17 in the squad (25 minus the eight home grown player quota).
266
 
The 2008 researchers attach particular significance to the fact that UEFA’s rule does not apply to 
all competitions, only those organised by UEFA. It should be noted that UEFA only made a 
recommendation that national associations adopt rules applicable to national competitions. The 
study cites Bosman as authority for the proposition that rules applied to all official matches 
between clubs necessarily entail a restriction on the whole professional activity of players.
267
 This 
is not the case with the home grown player rule. The 2008 assessment appears to suggest that the 
effect of the rule is “very limited” on players and does not go beyond what is necessary for the 
attainment of the objectives.
268
 Data gathered from clubs suggesting that their policies regarding 
youth training and development have typically not changed as a result of the Rule, would support 
this contention. 
 
From the above one can make the case that although the gains achieved by the Rule are very modest, the 
restrictive effects on players are not so great as to call into question the proportionality of the Rule. 
Before this proposition can be accepted a number of further issues require discussion:    
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1. In Bosman, the Court recognised the “fact that those clauses [the 3+2 rule] concern not the 
employment of such players, on which there is no restriction, but the extent to which their clubs 
may field them in official matches is irrelevant. In so far as participation in such matches is the 
essential purpose of a professional player’s activity, a rule which restricts that participation 
obviously also restricts the chances of employment of the player concerned”.269 Being a member 
of a club squad is obviously a prerequisite to being named in the starting XI. This means that any 
restriction on a player’s participation in the squad obviously restricts his employment chances 
with that club thus rendering impossible his participation on the pitch. However, this fact alone 
only establishes the existence of a restriction and not whether that restriction satisfies 
proportionality control.  
 
2. As is set out above, proof of indirect discrimination does not require the applicant to prove that the 
national measure in practice affected a higher proportion of foreign workers, but merely that the 
measure is intrinsically liable to affect migrant workers more than nationals and that there is a risk 
that it will place migrant workers at a particular disadvantage. Our findings suggest that, 
notwithstanding the fluidity of the European labour market for professional footballers, the UEFA 
Rule in its current form is intrinsically liable to have a restrictive effect because it has an impact 
(albeit a very limited one) on whether home grown players are selected for first team squads ahead 
of non-home grown (usually non-national) players. Again, this assessment assists in establishing 
whether a restriction can be identified. It does not necessarily undermine the conclusion that the 
Rule in its current form is proportionate, although the Rule still needs to satisfy the less restrictive 
alternative test (see below). 
 
3. On the issue of the UEFA Rule not applying to all competitions but only those organised by 
UEFA, it must be recalled that this was also the case with the 3+2 rule. In fact, the breadth of 
matches affected by the home grown player rule is larger than those affected by the 3+2 rule. This 
is because UEFA competitions have been re-configured largely on a league basis which entails a 
greater number of matches being played. Furthermore, many national leagues have adopted home 
grown player rules following UEFA’s recommendation that national associations adopt equivalent 
measures (see Chapter 4). Therefore, in some leagues the home grown player rule applies to most, 
if not all, official matches in which a player can participate. Proportionality arguments based on 
this contention are rendered irrelevant due to the wide range of games affected by the Rule. 
Nevertheless, proportionality can still be demonstrated with reference to the limited effect on 
players. 
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From the above, a case can be made that the Rule, in its current form, is proportionate in so far as its 
apparently limited restrictive effects do not appear to be disproportionate to the modest benefits generated 
thus far. This proposition can, however, be undermined by two considerations. First, should the benefits 
of the Rule diminish over time, the cost/benefit balance would shift, thus rendering current 
proportionality arguments less persuasive. In order to establish this, an additional future study into the 
Rule would be required. Second, alternative measures could potentially achieve a more uniform and 
substantive effect in terms of competitive balance and youth training and development and be less 
restrictive on the fundamental freedoms of EU workers. If this were the case, the proportionality of the 
measure could not be made out. It is to the question of less restrictive alternatives that the study now 
turns. 
 
9.4.3.1 Existence of Less Restrictive Alternatives 
Proportionality control in EU law requires consideration of whether the legitimate objectives of the 
contested measure can be achieved through less restrictive means. In assessing this issue, the research 
team have posed three questions: 
1. Can the Rule be amended to satisfy proportionality control? 
2. Can alternative and less restrictive regulatory measures better achieve the stated objectives?    
3. What forum is best suited to amending the Rule or agreeing alternative measures? 
 
9.4.3.2 Amending the Rule 
The most intuitive way to soften the restrictive effects of the UEFA Rule would be to reduce the number 
of home grown players that a club needed to register in its UEFA squad. The number of players 
potentially affected would therefore be reduced. However, the potential effect on some players would still 
remain – there would still be the intrinsic liability that the rule will have an indirectly discriminatory 
effect on the grounds of a player’s nationality. Proportionality control in EU law does not require that all 
restrictions are eliminated - the issue is whether the restrictive effects of the measure go beyond what is 
necessary to secure the stated legitimate objectives and whether the restrictive effects are disproportionate 
to the gains secured by it. In this regard, our data suggests that a reduction in the number of home grown 
players would reduce the already limited positive impact on competitive balance. Reducing the ‘bite’ of 
the rule will therefore reduce its chance of being considered suitable under freedom of movement laws 
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because it would be achieving its objectives to a lesser effect. Reducing the home grown player quota is, 
therefore, not recommended.  
 
We also considered whether the discriminatory effect of the Rule would be reduced by removing the 
‘association-trained’ aspect of the Rule and instead classifying home grown players only as those trained 
by the club for which they are registered. It is the ‘association-trained’ aspect of the UEFA Rule that has 
led many commentators to take the view that it has a discriminatory objective rather than merely an 
indirect discriminatory effect (although in practice the difference between the two is irrelevant under EU 
law). Three considerations point to a rejection of this approach. First, our analysis of the competitive 
balance data suggests that the use of association-trained players plays the major role in reducing the 
success of the higher ranked teams in the Champions League group stages. It appears to do so by limiting 
the recruitment choices of these teams. Second, some clubs with smaller incomes suggested that the 
association-trained part of the rule enabled them to draw income from larger clubs belonging to their 
association through transfer fees and training compensation. This served to incentivise youth 
development.
270
 Third, removing the association-trained player rule could encourage larger clubs to 
recruit players from competitors at an earlier age. For these reasons we do not recommend removing the 
association-trained player aspect of the Rule. 
 
A less intuitive method of looking to satisfy proportionality is to increase the restrictions on the number 
of home grown players that have to be listed in a club’s 25 man squad. This would increase the bite of the 
Rule in so far as our data suggests it would be likely to increase competitive balance in UEFA 
competitions in the group stages at least. It is also possible that it may have a more identifiable impact 
upon investment in training and development of young players, particularly at clubs with the greater 
incomes and those based in the ‘big five’ leagues. These potential gains must, however, be weighed 
against the impact a strengthening of the Rule would have on a worker’s circulation within the internal 
market (and indeed on a club’s recruitment choices). Currently the Rule places no requirement on a club 
to field a home grown player in the starting XI and clubs are not obliged to list any home grown players 
on the substitutes bench if they are prepared to accept a limit of 17 in the match day squad, instead of the 
permitted 18 (starting XI plus 7 substitutes).
271
 As is discussed above, it does not appear that the current 
4+4 rule has resulted in significant problems with respect to a worker’s circulation in the internal market. 
An increase in the quota from the current 4+4 to 5+5 would only affect 40% of the squad size and would 
still not require a club to field a home grown player in the starting XI or replace field players with home 
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grown substitutes throughout the course of the match. Given that our data supports the view that a modest 
increase in the quota could result in a similar increase in competitive balance, a case could be made that a 
slightly strengthened rule satisfies proportionality control on these grounds. Any such increase would 
need to be subject to a future study looking at the impact of the change. However, taking this action 
should only be considered if less restrictive alternative measures do not exist. It is the view of the research 
team that no expansion of the quota should take place until less restrictive alternative measures have been 
discounted. 
  
9.4.3.3 Alternative Regulatory Measures 
There are a number of alternative sporting regulatory measures that have the potential to secure the 
objectives of promoting competitive balance and youth training and development within the European 
professional football sector. It is beyond the scope of this study to assess the extent to which these 
alternative measures represent ‘least restrictive alternatives’ to the home grown player rule or the extent 
to which these measures are more likely to achieve more significant and uniform improvements to 
competitive balance and investment in young player development. Indeed, on first appearance and 
without the benefit of additional research, some of the alternative measures listed below are likely to 
interfere with the fundamental freedoms in a more restrictive manner than the home grown player rule. In 
this connection, the research team has not conducted an assessment of the legality of the measures under 
either EU free movement or competition laws. Nevertheless, and with this caveat in mind, UEFA should 
consider, following discussions with stakeholders, whether the adoption of one or more of the following 
alternatives would achieve its legitimate aims more successfully, and provide fewer restrictions on the 
fundamental freedoms of professional players. In particular, UEFA should be invited to consider the 
benefits of measures that do not give rise to discriminatory effects.  
In discussing alternative regulatory measures, a general observation can be made that regulatory 
interventions within the professional football sector can take two forms: those affecting the product 
market (measures affecting clubs) and those affecting the labour market (measures affecting players). It 
stands to reason that interventions in the labour market are more likely to affect the rights of workers 
(such as free movement rights) whereas product market interventions are more likely to affect the rights 
of clubs (thus potentially engaging EU competition law). Product market interventions are, therefore, less 
likely to offend EU free movement of workers principles.  
Product market interventions include: club licensing schemes requiring clubs to provide high quality 
youth development programmes; cost control measures such as Financial Fair Play and salary caps; 
financial inducements to develop home grown players; revenue sharing schemes; product market 
liberalisation thus allowing clubs to benefit from free movement rights enjoyed by players.  
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Labour market interventions include: requiring a player to sign his first professional contract with the club 
that trained him; the introduction of international contracts for players under the age of 18 which would 
allow for a uniform means for training clubs to contract their academy players throughout the world; 
lengthening the maximum term of contracts for players under the age of 18; reforming the training 
compensation scheme to provide greater club incentives for youth development; restricting the transfer of 
minors; imposing squad size limits.
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The preference of governing bodies to regulate the labour market appears to be historically rooted. For 
example, following the establishment of the English Football League in 1891, the League’s favoured 
approach to securing a competitive balance between clubs was to establish a retain-and-transfer system 
and a maximum wage – both measures impinging significantly on the economic activity of the 
professional player. The progressive liberalisation of the professional football labour market throughout 
Europe, prompted by litigation, has necessitated a re-evaluation of this approach. It does not follow that 
simply because labour market interventions are historically rooted, or that some (but by no means all) 
professional athletes are now well remunerated, that labour market interventions are an appropriate 
default position for a governing body seeking to remedy a perceived weakness in the sports market. 
Indeed, there are strong legal reasons why labour market restrictions should be considered the last resort 
and the authors of this study recommend that the institutions of the EU adopt this approach as their 
foundation principle when assessing measures that allegedly conflict with the freedoms of athletes. In this 
regard, the research team would not consider it desirable for sports governing bodies, faced with 
objections to their current player eligibility rules, to simply reconfigure directly discriminatory 
restrictions so that they gain the appearance of apparently more benign indirectly discriminatory measures 
without having first systematically established why non-discriminatory alternatives, particular those 
located out-with the labour market, are not suitable. Consequently, before the Rule can categorically be 
described as compatible with EU free movement law, less restrictive alternatives should first be 
examined, particularly those that do not carry discriminatory effects and are not located within the labour 
market. 
 
9.5 The forum for amending the Rule or agreeing alternative measures 
In the White Paper on Sport, the European Commission suggested that governance issues in sport should 
fall within a territory of autonomy and that most challenges can be addressed through self-regulation 
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which must however be “respectful of good governance principles”.273 While the experience and 
expertise of the governing body seeking to introduce new regulatory measures should be acknowledged, 
the exercise of its regulatory discretion should take into account the views of stakeholders who are subject 
to new rules, particularly those representing the two sides of the sports industry, namely the clubs and the 
players. One important governance standard recommended in the White Paper was the use of social 
dialogue in the sports sector which “can contribute to addressing common concerns of employers and 
athletes, including agreements on employment relations and working conditions in the sector in 
accordance with EC Treaty provisions”.274 The social dialogue committee in European professional 
football, established in 2008, could be one such forum through which the home grown player rule and 
alternative/additional regulatory measures could be discussed, although the research team is aware that 
the committee’s existing rules of procedure dictate that items for discussion within the social dialogue 
committee are first discussed within UEFA’s Professional Football Strategy Council. Consequently, 
UEFA is encouraged to make use of the social dialogue committee established for professional football in 
2008 and the EU is encouraged to offer sports bodies a wide margin of appreciation when assessing rules 
that have been openly and democratically debated and agreed by representative sports stakeholders.    
 
 
9.6 Final Conclusions 
From the foregoing, the following conclusions can be drawn: 
Having regard to the objectives of the European Union, sport is subject to EU law in so far as it 
constitutes an economic activity. Where a sporting activity takes the form of gainful employment or the 
provision of services for remuneration, which is true of the activities of semi-professional or professional 
sportspeople, it falls within the scope of Article 45 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union (TFEU). EU footballers are workers and can seek the protections afforded to them by EU free 
movement law. 
It is settled case-law that Article 45 TFEU extends not only to the actions of public authorities but also to 
rules of any other nature aimed at regulating gainful employment in a collective manner. UEFA is a 
collective regulator and therefore the applicable free movement rules can be invoked against them by a 
private party. 
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EU law applies to all legal relationships in so far as these relationships, by reason either of the place 
where they are entered into or the place where they take effect, can be located within the territory of the 
EU. Therefore despite being based in Switzerland, UEFA’s actions are subject to EU law. 
Rules of purely sporting interest are not subject to the Treaty rules governing freedom of movement. The 
home grown player rule cannot be categorised as such a rule. Rules ‘inherent’ to a sport fall within the 
scope of the Treaty but are incapable of being defined as a restriction as long as the restrictive effects of 
the measure are inherent in the pursuit of a legitimate objective and remain proportionate. The home 
grown player rule cannot be categorised as an inherent rule because it does not derive from a need 
inherent in the organisation of the UEFA competitions.    
Article 165 TFEU does not remove sport from the scope of the Treaty’s prohibitions but its provisions do 
inform the question of what constitutes a legitimate sporting objective and (taking into account the 
specific nature of sport and questions of fairness and openness) what is considered suitable and necessary 
for the attainment of these objectives.  
The home grown player rule constitutes a restriction on a worker’s free movement. It amounts to a 
provision which precludes or deters a national of a Member State from leaving his country of origin in 
order to engage in employment in a different Member State. However, in EU law a distinction is drawn 
between restrictions on a worker’s freedom of movement that are (a) directly discriminatory, (b) 
indirectly discriminatory, and (c) non-discriminatory. The home grown player rule amounts to an 
indirectly discriminatory rule because even though the Rule is neutral in terms of nationality, national 
workers are placed at an advantage over migrant workers. 
An indirectly discriminatory measure that restricts a worker’s free movement can be accepted in law only 
if it pursues a legitimate aim compatible with the Treaty and is justified by overriding reasons in the 
public interest. The justifications presented by UEFA in support of the rule, namely that it promotes 
competitive balance and encourages the training and development of young players, must be accepted as 
legitimate. There is some evidence of declining competitive balance in European competitions but far less 
to suggest that clubs are failing to invest in youth development. Even though the Rule pursues these two 
legitimate aims, it still needs to satisfy the twin proportionality tests of suitability and necessity.  
There has been a significant increase in the number of home grown players in first team squads and 
starting XIs in both UEFA and domestic competitions since the Rule was introduced. There is no data to 
prove to any certainty that this is a direct result of the Rule. Moreover, an increase in the number of home 
grown players cannot in itself be considered a legitimate objective for restricting free movement.  
The statistics measuring competitive balance suggest that the impact of the rule has been to rebalance the 
performance of teams across both the Champions League and Europa League competitions by reducing 
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the success of teams finishing in the top two places of the Champions League group stage or the top three 
places of the Europa League group stage in favour of those towards the bottom. However, this impact on 
competitive balance is very modest. There is very little evidence to suggest that the Rule affects the final 
stages in either competition. There is insufficient data at the current time to make an accurate scientific 
assessment of whether, with time, the Rule’s impact on competitive balance will increase, diminish or 
remain static.  
From the quantitative and qualitative data gathered, the UEFA Rule appears to have had a very limited 
impact on youth player training and development throughout the European Union. The number of young 
players in first team squads has increased slightly during the time the Rule has been in place (particularly 
at clubs participating in UEFA competitions) but this trend was more evident in the years leading up to 
the introduction of the Rule. Club policy in this area appears to be more influenced by factors other than 
the Rule. Our data reveals no evidence of the potential for an upward or downward future trajectory in 
terms of investment in, or quality of, youth development as a result of the rule remaining in existence in 
its current form.  
The neutrality or very limited positive effect of the Rule in terms of improving competitive balance and 
the training and development of young European Union players must be balanced against the impact the 
Rule has on restricting a player’s freedom of movement. There is very limited evidence to suggest that 
this restriction is currently manifestly restrictive, but it remains intrinsically liable to restrict free 
movement.  
The proportionality of the Rule could be established on the grounds that, in its current form, its apparently 
limited restrictive effects do not appear to be disproportionate to the modest benefits generated thus far. 
This proposition can, however, be undermined by two considerations. First, should the benefits of the 
Rule diminish over time, the cost/benefit balance would shift, thus rendering current proportionality 
arguments less persuasive. In order to establish this, an additional future study into the Rule would be 
required. Second, alternative measures could potentially achieve a more uniform and substantial impact in 
terms of competitive balance and youth development, and be less restrictive on the fundamental freedoms 
of EU workers. If this were the case, the proportionality of the measure could not be made out.  
Amending the Rule to lower the home grown quota or to remove the association-trained criterion will 
reduce the suitability of the measure and make it less likely to satisfy EU free movement law. Removing 
the ‘association-trained’ aspect of the Rule and instead classifying home grown players only as those 
trained by the club for which they are registered will remove the competitive balance improvements 
identified, potentially provide disincentives for smaller clubs to develop young players and could 
encourage larger clubs to recruit players from competitors at an earlier age.  
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Given that our data supports the view that a modest increase in the quota could result in a modest 
improvement in competitive balance, a case could be made that a slightly strengthened rule satisfies 
proportionality control on these grounds. This proposition is conditioned on the assumption that less 
restrictive alternative measures do not exist.  
In discussing alternative regulatory measures, a general observation can be made that regulatory 
interventions within the professional football sector can take two forms: those affecting the product 
market (measures affecting clubs) and those affecting the labour market (measures affecting players). It 
stands to reason that interventions in the labour market are more likely to affect the rights of workers 
(such as free movement rights) whereas product market interventions are more likely to affect the rights 
of clubs (thus potentially engaging EU competition law). Product market interventions are, therefore, less 
likely to offend EU free movement of workers principles.  
It does not follow that simply because labour market interventions are historically rooted in sport, or that 
some professional athletes are now well remunerated, that labour market interventions are an appropriate 
default position for a governing body seeking to remedy a perceived weakness in the sports market. There 
are strong legal reasons why labour market restrictions should be considered the last resort and it is 
recommended that the institutions of the EU adopt this approach as their foundation principle when 
assessing measures that may conflict with the freedoms of athletes. Consequently, before the Rule can 
categorically be described as compatible with EU free movement law, less restrictive alternatives should 
first be examined, particularly those that do not carry discriminatory effects and are not located within the 
labour market.  
It cannot be categorically established at this stage that the restrictive effects of the Rule on the free 
movement of workers are proportionate to the very limited benefits of the Rule in terms of competitive 
balance and the training and development of young players. It is the view of the research team that the 
very modest benefits of the Rule are likely to be achieved in a more substantial manner by the adoption of 
alternative, less restrictive, means, particularly those not carrying discriminatory effects. UEFA, in 
conjunction with the key football stakeholders, hold the necessary experience and expertise to explore 
these alternatives and should be afforded reasonable time to do so (a period of three years). This period 
should also allow UEFA to assess whether existing regulatory measures (such as Club Licensing and 
Financial Fair Play) are delivering such improvements to competitive balance and the quality of youth 
development to render discriminatory labour market restrictions unnecessary. In particular, the 
stakeholders are encouraged to make use of the social dialogue committee established for professional 
football in 2008.  
If UEFA can demonstrate that less restrictive alternative measures are not suitable to achieve the stated 
objectives of the Rule, and that existing measures have not delivered necessary improvements, then the 
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Rule is to be considered compatible with EU law, complementary to existing measures (such as club 
licensing), and an incremental increase in the quota could be contemplated. This assessment is 
conditioned on the existing benefits of the Rule being maintained over the next three years.  
If less restrictive alternatives are able to achieve more substantial improvements in competitive balance 
and the quality of youth development, the proportionality of the Rule will not have been made out and the 
Rule should be removed from the UEFA Regulations.        
It is recommended that a further study should be conducted in three years in order to assess: (1) whether 
the competitive balance improvements identified have been maintained, improved further or have 
declined, (2) whether a closer connection between the Rule and improvements in youth development can 
be identified, and (3) whether less restrictive alternatives can deliver more substantial improvements to 
competitive balance and the quality of youth development.    
 
UEFA’s home grown player rule has resulted in improvements to competitive balance 
in Champions League and Europa League competitions but these improvements are 
very modest. Despite the increases in the number of home grown players at EU clubs, 
there is little evidence to suggest that the Rule has had an impact in improving the 
quality of youth development in European football. Although there is little evidence to 
suggest that the Rule has manifestly restricted the freedom of movement of professional 
footballers, it is intrinsically liable to do so and it is not possible, at this stage, to state 
that the benefits of the Rule outweigh the restrictive effects. The proportionality of the 
Rule cannot be categorically established until UEFA demonstrates that less restrictive 
alternative measures are ill equipped at securing the objectives of the Rule. It is 
recommended that, rather than adopting a negative position on the Rule, the European 
Commission should extend an invitation to UEFA to consult with key stakeholders on 
whether alternative measures, that do not carry discriminatory effects, can deliver more 
substantial benefits for European football. A further study in three years should assess 
the outcome of these discussions and report on whether the proportionality of the Rule 
has been made out. 
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Appendix A   
UEFA’s Home Grown Player Regulations 
 
Article 18 of the UEFA Regulations.  
The rule states: 
18.08 No club may have more than 25 players on List A during the season, two of whom must be 
goalkeepers. As a minimum, eight places are reserved exclusively for “locally trained players” and no 
club may have more than four “association-trained players” listed on these eight places on List A. List A 
must specify the players who qualify as being “locally trained”, as well as whether they are “club-
trained” or “association-trained”. The possible combinations that enable clubs to comply with the List A 
requirements are set out in Annex VIII. 
 
18.09 A “locally trained player” is either a “club-trained player” or an “association-trained player”.  
 
18.10 A “club-trained player” is a player who, between the age of 15 (or the start of the season during 
which he turns 15) and 21 (or the end of the season during which he turns 21), and irrespective of his 
nationality and age, has been registered with his current club for a period, continuous or not, of three 
entire seasons (i.e. a period starting with the first official match of the relevant national championship 
and ending with the last official match of that relevant national championship) or of 36 months.  
 
18.11 An “association-trained player” is a player who, between the age of 15 (or the start of the season 
during which the player turns 15) and 21 (or the end of the season during which the player turns 21), and 
irrespective of his nationality and age, has been registered with a club or with other clubs affiliated to the 
same association as that of his current club for a period, continuous or not, of three entire seasons or of 
36 months. 
 
18.12 If a club has fewer than eight locally trained players in its squad, then the maximum number of 
players on List A is reduced accordingly. 
 
In addition,  
 
Conditions for registration: List B 
18.16 Each club is entitled to register an unlimited number of players on List B during the season. The 
list must be submitted by no later than 24.00 CET on the day before the match in question. 
 
18.17 A player may be registered on List B if he is born on or after 1 January 1991 and has been eligible 
to play for the club concerned for any uninterrupted period of two years since his 15th birthday by the 
time he is registered with UEFA. Players aged 16 may be registered on List B if they have been registered 
with the participating club for the previous two years without interruption. 
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Options available to the club to respond to the home grown players rule in 2012-13 are set 
out below: 
 
Total A 
List 
(Potential) 
Free' 
Players 
Club-
trained 
Association 
-trained 
Total A 
List 
(effective) 
1 25 17 8 0 25 
2 25 17 7 1 25 
3 25 17 7 0 24 
4 25 17 6 2 25 
5 25 17 6 1 24 
6 25 17 6 0 23 
7 25 17 5 3 25 
8 25 17 5 2 24 
9 25 17 5 1 23 
10 25 17 5 0 22 
11 25 17 4 4 25 
12 25 17 4 3 24 
13 25 17 4 2 23 
14 25 17 4 1 22 
15 25 17 4 0 21 
16 25 17 3 4 24 
17 25 17 3 3 23 
18 25 17 3 2 22 
19 25 17 3 1 21 
20 25 17 3 0 20 
21 25 17 2 4 23 
22 25 17 2 3 22 
23 25 17 2 2 21 
24 25 17 2 1 20 
25 25 17 2 0 19 
26 25 17 1 4 22 
27 25 17 1 3 21 
28 25 17 1 2 20 
29 25 17 1 1 19 
30 25 17 1 0 18 
31 25 17 0 4 21 
32 25 17 0 3 20 
33 25 17 0 2 19 
34 25 17 0 1 18 
35 25 17 0 0 17 
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Appendix B 
Descriptive Statistics on Number of Home Grown 
Players per Country 
 
Country Average Number - Post Rule 
HGP CTP ATP Non-HGP 
Albania  10 3 6 8 
Andorra  9 4 6 10 
Armenia  10 4 5 9 
Austria  9 1 4 13 
Azerbaijan  5 4 8 13 
Belarus  12 3 5 9 
Belgium  8 3 9 14 
Bosnia & Herzegovina 12 3 4 9 
Bulgaria  8 5 5 14 
Croatia  10 3 3 11 
Cyprus  6 3 3 16 
Czech Republic  6 4 6 13 
Denmark  10 5 5 11 
England  10 3 10 15 
Estonia  13 6 5 6 
Faroe Islands  12 4 7 7 
Finland  11 4 8 8 
France  12 4 9 10 
Georgia  13 4 7 6 
Germany  10 2 5 13 
Greece  7 3 9 15 
Hungary  12 7 6 9 
Iceland  13 4 7 7 
Israel  12 3 9 9 
Italy  12 2 10 12 
Kazakhstan  12 6 6 7 
Latvia  11 1 10 8 
Liechtenstein  11 5 7 9 
Lithuania  12 2 6 8 
Luxembourg  8 4 7 12 
Malta  11 3 3 7 
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Moldova  6 5 6 14 
Montenegro  12 4 6 7 
Netherlands  11 4 7 11 
Norway  11 3 6 9 
Nothern Ireland 9 2 7 10 
Poland  9 2 5 11 
Portugal  7 1 3 14 
Republic of Ireland  4 2 6 15 
Republic of Macedonia  8 2 10 11 
Romania  12 2 5 9 
Russia  8 3 6 14 
San Marino  9 4 5 11 
Scotland  10 3 7 12 
Serbia  10 3 7 11 
Slovakia  9 4 5 11 
Slovenia  9 5 4 11 
Spain  9 4 8 14 
Sweden  12 4 7 9 
Switzerland  11 3 7 11 
Turkey  9 4 5 14 
Ukraine  9 1 7 13 
Wales  8 3 6 10 
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Appendix C 
Descriptive Statistics on Squad Size 
  2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Aalborg BK   18 14 17     
Aberdeen FC   25   13     
AC Chievo Verona 21           
AC Chievo Verona           19 
AC Milan 27 24 23   25 26 
AC Omonia 18 24 25 21 19 22 
AC Sparta Praha 19 24 18 22   22 
AC Sparta Praha     17 21 19   
ACF Fiorentina   26 19 23     
ADO Den Haag           18 
AEK Athens FC 21 25 19 27 25 25 
AEK Athens FC         18 24 
AEK Larnaca FC           22 
AFC Ajax 24 24 26 22 20 17 
AIK   24     19   
AJ Auxerre 22 22         
Anorthosis Famagusta FC   23   24 23 20 
APOEL FC 19   24   19   
Apollon Limassol FC           19 
APOP/Kinyras Peyias FC       18     
Aris Thessaloniki FC   24 20   26   
Arsenal FC 26 18 23 22 24 21 
AS Jeunesse Esch 14 18         
AS Livorno Calcio 24           
AS Nancy-Lorraine 23   20       
AS Roma   25     24 20 
AS Saint-Étienne     23       
Aston Villa     23 18 24   
Athletic Club       23   23 
Atromitos FC 23           
Åtvidabergs FF 18           
AZ 24 21 22   27 23 
Bangor City     19 16 18   
Bangor City FC 18           
Bayer 04 Leverkusen 22 24     27   
Birkirkara FC   18 18 11   18 
Birmingham City           25 
BK Häcken   24       20 
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Blackburn Rovers FC 27 23         
Bohemian FC   19 19     21 
Bolton Wanderers FC   28         
Borussia Dortmund 24   22   25   
Brøndby IF 15   24 22 23 19 
Budapest Honvéd FC   26   20     
CA Osasuna 24         18 
Carmarthen Town AFC   22         
CD Nacional 21     23   25 
Celtic FC   19 20 24 24 23 
Cercle Brugge KSV         22   
CF Os Belenenses   21         
CFR 1907 Cluj   21   23     
Chelsea FC 25 21 22 22 25 23 
Cliftonville     21   19 21 
Club Atlético de Madrid   25 22 25 20   
Club Brugge KV 20 18 18 25 24 23 
Cork City     20     19 
Crusaders FC       19   18 
CS Fola Esch           20 
CS Gaz Metan Mediaş           23 
CS Grevenmacher     21 18 20   
CS Marítimo     20   21   
Debreceni VSC   22 25   26 19 
Derry City FC 18     21 18   
Djurgårdens IF     24     19 
Drogheda United FC 20 24   22     
Dukla Banská Bystrica         19   
Dundalk FC         22   
Dundee United FC         20 15 
Dunfermline Athletic FC   21         
Dungannon Swifts FC   21         
EA Guingamp       19     
Eintracht Frankfurt 18           
Empoli FC   21         
Ethnikos Achnas FC 21           
Everton FC   26 17 24     
F.C. Internazionale Milano 26 28 26 26 27 23 
F91 Dudelange 22   20 22 21 19 
Falkirk FC       19     
FBK Kaunas 14   18 23 21   
FC Baník Ostrava     18   21   
FC Barcelona 25 21 19 24 23 22 
FC Bayern München 18 24 24 21   25 
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FC Daugava Daugavpils           19 
FC Differdange 03       16 18 24 
FC Dinaburg       21     
FC Dinamo Bucureşti 24 17 20 23 22 20 
FC Etzella Ettelbruck 20 21         
FC Flora Tallinn 19 21 20 20 22   
FC Girondins de Bordeaux 17 22 20 18   21 
FC Groningen 18 21         
FC Honka Espoo     24 19 19 14 
FC Inter Turku         21   
FC København   22 26 22   21 
FC København 22 24 23   20 21 
FC Koper 19 20 21     18 
FC Lahti       18     
FC Levadia Tallinn 19 18 20 20 21 15 
FC Lusitans         19   
FC Midtjylland   18 23     15 
FC Nitra         21   
FC Nordsjælland     22   21 17 
FC Nürnberg   21         
FC Oţelul Galaţi 24 21         
FC Paços de Ferreira   22   18     
FC Porto 21   24 26 24 23 
FC Rapid Bucureşti 21 21 23     24 
FC Salzburg 20 25 25 23 22 18 
FC Schalke 04 18 26 23 19 25 27 
FC Šiauliai         18   
FC Slovan Liberec 22   15 20   18 
FC Sochaux-Montbéliard   20       18 
FC Spartak Trnava 19   14 19   25 
FC Steaua Bucureşti 18     28 25 27 
FC Timişoara     20 21 22   
FC TVMK Tallinn     17     21 
FC Twente 20 21 25 23 22 23 
FC Unirea Urziceni   20 21 19 18   
FC Utrecht         27   
FC Viktoria Plzeň 24       19 18 
FC ViOn Zlaté Moravce   20         
Fenerbahçe SK       28     
Ferencvárosi TC           20 
Feyenoord 19   19   20   
FK Austria Wien 24 23 21 25 22 26 
FK Banga           15 
FK Ekranas 20 21 16     20 
125 
 
FK Jablonec   19     19 21 
FK Jelgava         20   
FK Mladá Boleslav 21 20       19 
FK Senica           20 
FK Sūduva 19 19 18 15 20 16 
FK Tauras         22 18 
FK Teplice       19     
FK Ventspils 19   25 21 25 21 
FK Vėtra     18 21     
Floriana FC           15 
FSV Mainz 05           21 
Fulham FC       26     
Gefle IF 18       23   
Genoa CFC       23     
Getafe CF   25     25   
GKS Bełchatów   28         
Glentoran FC 25 21 20   19 22 
Gretna FC 20           
Groclin Grodzisk Wielkopolski   23         
Győri ETO FC     21   25   
Hamburger SV   23 25 26   25 
Hannover 96           23 
Heart of Midlothian FC 18     19   21 
Helsingborgs IF   28   24   22 
Hertha BSC Berlin 17   23 24     
Hibernians FC 13 15 12   20   
HJK Helsinki 14 16   16 18 16 
IF Elfsborg   18 18 20 25 17 
IFK Göteborg 14     18 18   
Iraklis FC 21           
Jagiellonia Białystok         22 19 
JFK Olimps/RFS     20       
JK Nõmme Kalju       19   18 
JK Sillamäe Kalev         21   
JK Trans Narva   19   17 17 17 
Juventus     24 26     
KAA Gent   20 20 20 27   
Kalmar FF     19   25   
KKS Lech Poznań   20 20 23 25   
KRC Genk 27     19 24   
KS Skënderbeu 18           
KSP Polonia Warszawa       22     
KSV Roeselare 17           
KuPS Kuopio           14 
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KVC Westerlo           20 
Larissa FC   22   17     
Legia Warszawa 20     21   25 
Linfield FC 19 18   18 18 26 
Lisburn Distillery       17     
Liverpool FC     22   25 28 
Llanelli AFC 17     20 19 23 
LOSC Lille 20     23 25 21 
Malmö FF 20         19 
Manchester City 21       25 21 
Manchester United FC 22 25 25 25 24 24 
Marsaxlokk FC     19   16   
MFK Košice       14     
MFK Petržalka 19 25 17 19     
MFK Ružomberok 20         16 
Montpellier Hérault SC         19   
Motherwell FC     18 24 20   
MŠK Žilina   27 19 25 20 19 
MTK Budapest   15   19     
Myllykosken Pallo-47   22     19   
NAC Breda       24     
ND Gorica   16   13 11 15 
Neath           18 
NEC Nijmegen     21       
Newcastle United FC 25           
NK Domžale 18     19 22 19 
NK IB Ljubljana     22 20     
NK Maribor 22   19 19 20 24 
NK Olimpija Ljubljana         16 23 
NK Rudar Velenje       18     
Odense BK 22 26   22 25 22 
Olympiacos FC 20   27 20 26 22 
Olympiacos Volou FC           22 
Olympique de Marseille 22 21 20 23 22   
Olympique Lyonnais 28 21 24 23 23 25 
Örebro SK           19 
Paksi SE           22 
Panathinaikos FC 25 25 23 24   20 
Panionios GSS   23         
PAOK FC   21   23 23   
Paris Saint-Germain 22   24   21   
Parma FC 24           
PFC Beroe Stara Zagora         19   
PFC Cherno More Varna     22 23     
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PFC CSKA Sofia 17     27 27   
PFC Levski Sofia     24 21 26 19 
PFC Litex Lovech 22 21 19 17 17 19 
PFC Lokomotiv Sofia 21   19     23 
Port Talbot Town FC         19   
Portadown FC 17       14   
Portsmouth FC     22       
PSV Eindhoven   21   23 22 27 
Queen of the South FC     24       
R. Standard de Liège 20 22 24 19   20 
Racing FC Union Lëtzebuerg     21       
Randers FC 20     22 17   
Rangers FC 16 19 18 18 24 20 
RC Celta de Vigo 21           
RC Deportivo La Coruña     25       
RC Lens 26 23         
RCD Espanyol 26           
Real Madrid CF 25 25 24 24 25 25 
Real Racing Club     19       
Real Zaragoza   21         
Rhyl FC 20 20 15       
RSC Anderlecht   26 20 22 24 25 
Ruch Chorzów         23   
S.S. Lazio       19 25 28 
Saint Patrick's Athletic FC   22 25 22   21 
SC Braga 28 25 26 19 19 28 
sc Heerenveen 21 20 24 24     
Sevilla FC 25   24   25 19 
Shamrock Rovers FC 21       20 22 
SK Austria Kärnten 21           
SK Liepājas Metalurgs   22 22 17   19 
SK Rapid Wien   23   25 23   
SK Sigma Olomouc       22     
SK Slavia Praha 15 18 23 25 23   
ŠK Slovan Bratislava 21   22 22 20 24 
SK Sturm Graz 24   19 26 20 23 
Skonto FC 19 21   18 18   
SL Benfica 25 23 24 26 24 22 
Sliema Wanderers FC 17 19   13 13   
Sligo Rovers FC       18   18 
Sporting Club Vaslui 22   20 23 25 26 
Sporting Clube de Portugal   22 19 23 21 22 
Sporting Fingal FC         21 27 
SSC Napoli 22   26   26   
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Stade Rennais FC   24 22     21 
SV Mattersburg 19 22         
SV Ried 19 21       22 
SV Werder Bremen 19 24 22 23 27 21 
SV Zulte Waregem 25           
Szombathelyi Haladás       24     
Tampere United   19   19 23   
The New Saints FC   19 18 18 18 20 
Tottenham Hotspur FC 27 26 25     25 
Toulouse FC   21   23 18   
TPS Turku         17 16 
UC Sampdoria   24 25   24   
UD Leiria   25         
Udinese Calcio 19   25     25 
Újpest FC 15     19     
UN Käerjéng 97   27   19   20 
US Città di Palermo 25 22     22 19 
Valencia CF 24 25 27 25 26 25 
Valkeakosken Haka 16           
Valkeakosken Haka   20 21       
Valletta FC 20     17 16   
VfB Stuttgart     23   20   
VfL Wolfsburg     24 22     
Videoton FC 20       20   
Villarreal CF 23 23   25 26   
Vitória FC 20   20       
Vitória SC     20 20   25 
West Ham United FC 18           
Wisła Kraków 22   18 19 22 22 
Wisla Plock 18           
WKS Śląsk Wrocław           20 
Xanthi FC 21           
Zagłębie Lubin 18       18   
Zalaegerszegi TE         18   
 
Please note that some clubs register over 25 players in a season when players are transferred, but 
they may not register any more than 25 on list A at any one time. 
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Appendix D  
Inferential Statistics and  
Competitive Balance Analysis 
The table below describes each of the variables 
 
Concept Variable Type and Description 
Success Group: Ordered 
 Groupstage  
 1st to 4th or 
1st to 5th 
 1
st
 = 4 or 5, 2
nd
 =3 or 4 etc.
275
  
 
 Finals: Binary 
 Quarterfinal 1= reached the stage or 0=not 
 Semifinal 1= reached the stage or 0=not 
 Final 1= reached the stage or 0=not 
 Champion 1=won competition or 0=not 
HGP Season2004to6: Binary 
 ‘1’ or ‘0’  1=Seasons 2004 to 2006 
0= Other Season  
 Season2007to9:  
 ‘1’ or ‘0’ 1=Seasons 2007 to 2009 
0= Other Season 
 Season20010to12:  
 ‘1’ or ‘0’ 1=Seasons 2010 to 2012 
0=Other Season 
  Continuous 
 Tothomegrown Number of home grown players 
 Totclubtrain Number of club trained players 
 Totasstrain Number of Association trained players 
Control UEFArank 1, 2, …..z Rank of team 
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 Note that the rank order in the group 1
st
 to 4
th
 or 5
th
 is reversed numerically for the analysis in order that the 
highest number corresponds to the highest level of sports performance.  
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Estimator   
 
The above discussion suggests that the following conceptual model is relevant for the 
analysis of the Rule.  
 
(1) )gUEFArankin,(HGPSuccessSuccess itititit   
 
Equation 1 indicates that the success of team ‘i’ in season ‘t’ depends on the impact of the 
Rule allowing for past performance as captured by the UEFA ranking.  
 
Because success is measured differently in the group and final stages different estimators are 
required to analyse the data. For the group stages an ordered-probit estimator is applied to 
examine the teams rank order performance. Equations 2 to 4 present these models based on 
the different ways in which the Rule was assessed.
276
 In these models dependent variables are 
functions of the Rule variables as well as UEFA rank. The coefficients to be estimated are 
presented in the symbols before each equation and the last term in each equation corresponds 
to the other random influences that might affect performance.  
 
 
(2) itit3it2it1it εUEFArankαto12Season2010αto9Season2007αGroupstage   
(3) itit2it1it UEFArankβwnTothomegroβGroupstage   
 
(4) itit3it2it1it ωUEFArankδnTotasstraiδinTotclubtraδGroupstage   
 
 
In each of these models Groupstage, as an ordered dependent variable, is subject to the 
following behaviour. 
 
Groupstage  = 1 if 0 < Groupstage* ≤ µ1 
  = 2 if µ1< Groupstage* ≤ µ2 
  …   … 
  …   … 
  = r if µr-1 < Groupstage* 
  
Consequently, equation 1 has no intercept. Instead discrete thresholds for the values of the 
dependent variable are defined from 1, 2, to 4 or 5 (i.e. r) as observed values of an underlying 
‘latent’ value representing greater team performance as defined by Groupstage* In other 
words all of the continuous behaviour that contributes towards sporting performance gets 
captured in discrete and ordered form by the allocation of points for results and consequently 
group table ranked position. For the purposes of analysis the table ranks that indicated that ‘1’ 
was highest and ‘4’ or ‘5’ lowest, were reversed such that the highest number corresponds to 
the underlying increasing scale for sporting success. This provides a more natural 
interpretation, where higher numbers correspond to higher performance.
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 In the case of the Europa League it was only possible to examine the transition period of 2007 to 9 and the 
2010 to 12 seasons.  
131 
 
In the case of the finals’ stages of the competitions, success is measured in a binary form, 
consequently equations of the type 5 to 7 apply in which Finalstage can be any of the 
dependent variables identified in Table 1. These can be estimated as probit equations. 
 
 
(5) itit4it3it21it υUEFArankto12Season2010to9Season2007Finalstage  
 
(6) 
tiit3it21it
ξUEFArankγwnTothomegroγγFinalstage   
 
(7) itit4it3it21it πUEFArankηnTotasstraiηinTotclubtraηηFinalstage   
 
Here, once again success is measured in a discrete form that captures the outcome of an 
underlying continuous sports performance, Finalstage* such that:  
 
Finalstage  = 1 if Finalstage* > 0 
  = 0 Otherwise   
 
These models are inherently nonlinear and unlike linear regression models. Consequently, 
there is no natural conditional mean function for the ordered case, and estimated coefficients 
depend on the values of all other variables and coefficients. Whilst the overall statistical 
significance and sign of the effect of the independent variables on the dependent variable can 
be easily established from the initial regression results, therefore, the scale of the impacts are 
more difficult to assess, as are the distribution of effects over the values of the dependent 
variable. Under such circumstances the partial effects of the impact of the independent 
variables on the dependent variable in either the ordered or binary probit models are useful 
aids to interpretation. 
 
In the ordered probit case these are:  
 
(8) x)]ββ'θ(μx)β'(μ[)x|rage*Pr(Groupst r1r     
Where r refers to a particular discrete outcome or rank of the team. β are the estimated 
coefficients, and x is the vector of independent variables, which are measurements of the 
Rule and UEFA ranking. Equation 8 suggests that the probability that the group stage ranked 
position corresponds to a particular value, for given values of the independent variables, is 
given by differences in the underlying probability density function θ(.) that helps to describe 
success, evaluated for given values of the variables and estimated threshold and slope 
parameters, and weighted by the latter. 
 
In the probit case the partial effects are given by  
(9) w)α)φ(α'
w
1)agePr(Finalst
ME
1)agePr(Finalst 



 
Where α represent the estimated coefficients and w the vector of independent variables.  
Equation 9 shows that coefficients only indicate probabilities for given values of the 
independent variables, that is the Rule measurements and the UEFA ranking of teams.  
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In this section results are presented for each of UEFA’s competitions. In each table, the first 
column indicates the independent variable in the analysis, and the headings for subsequent 
columns the name of the dependent variable. Reported in each column subsequently are the 
estimated coefficient values with an indication of their significance. Sample sizes and 
goodness of fit (pseudo-R
2
) statistics are also presented at the bottom of each column. In each 
table statistical significance is based on the calculation of robust standard errors to control for 
any heteroscedasticity problems that might affect the results. This could be because of the 
broadly cross-sectional nature of the data, with teams of varying sizes, abilities and past 
success being analysed together, as well as because of the nature of the dependent variables. 
 
Results 
Champions League  
Table 1 provides the results for the Group stages of the Champions League. The equations 
correspond to the variations in the way in which the Rule has been measured. 
Table 1. Ordered Probit Estimates Champions League Group Stage
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 Groupstage Groupstage Groupstage 
seasons2007to9 -0.176   
 (-0.92)   
seasons2010to12 -0.484
**
   
 (-2.76)   
Tothomegrown  -0.0244
*
  
  (-2.27)  
Totclubtrain   0.0231 
   (1.09) 
Totasstrain   -0.0571
***
 
   (-3.33) 
UEFArank -0.0851
***
 -0.0841
***
 -0.0830
***
 
 (-14.00) (-14.79) (-14.57) 
N 288 320 320 
pseudo R
2
 0.400 0.404 0.409 
t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
The results suggest that higher ranked teams by UEFA, rated 1,2 to n are more likely to 
succeed in reaching higher levels in the group stages, remembering that for analysis purposes 
this in ranked in the order that the number 4 or 5 implies winning the group in the Champions 
League or Europa League respectively, with 1 implying that the team came last. This 
suggests that the variable functions as expected as a control variable. 
 
Tables 2 and 3 report the results for the impact of the Rule on success in reaching the finals’ 
stages of the Champions League, or becoming Champion. Whilst the UEFA rank results are 
consistent with the group stages, the Probit estimates in contrast to the Ordered-probit 
estimates show that the Rule has no impact on these stages of performance of clubs.   
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 The threshold estimates are omitted for brevity. 
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Table 2. Probit Estimates Champions League Final Stages 
 Quarterfinal Semifinal Final Champion Quarterfinal Semifinal Final Champion 
seasons2007to9 0.0449 -0.0482 -0.0985 0.0510     
 (0.14) (-0.11) (-0.20) (0.09)     
seasons2010to12 -0.277 -0.240 -0.277 -0.126     
 (-1.00) (-0.60) (-0.54) (-0.23)     
Tothomegrown     0.00609 0.0142 -0.00209 0.00203 
     (0.34) (0.55) (-0.07) (0.07) 
UEFArank -0.141
***
 -0.331
***
 -0.484
***
 -0.391
**
 -0.143
***
 -0.322
***
 -0.491
***
 -0.422
**
 
 (-8.86) (-6.00) (-4.67) (-3.27) (-9.22) (-6.33) (-4.75) (-3.10) 
Constant 1.677
***
 1.970
***
 1.539
**
 0.405 1.538
***
 1.652
***
 1.407
**
 0.421 
 (5.16) (4.03) (3.12) (0.70) (5.93) (4.29) (3.03) (0.80) 
N 670 670 670 670 742 742 742 742 
pseudo R
2
 0.678 0.754 0.726 0.610 0.676 0.743 0.723 0.619 
t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
Table 3. Probit Estimates Champions League Final Stages 
 Quarterfinal Semifinal Final Champion 
Totclubtrain 0.0275 0.0202 -0.0700 -0.107 
 (0.88) (0.43) (-1.15) (-1.44) 
Totasstrain -0.0127 0.00551 0.113 0.192 
 (-0.37) (0.10) (1.11) (1.48) 
UEFArank -0.140
***
 -0.321
***
 -0.540
***
 -0.570
**
 
 (-8.93) (-6.23) (-4.10) (-3.20) 
Constant 1.512
***
 1.653
***
 1.474
**
 0.618 
 (5.82) (4.33) (2.95) (1.07) 
N 742 742 742 742 
pseudo R
2
 0.677 0.744 0.734 0.655 
t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Europa League 
Table 4 provides the results for the Group stages of the Europa League. As with the 
Champions League the alternative equations correspond to the variations in the way in which 
the Rule has been measured. 
 
Table 6.4 Ordered Probit Estimates Europa League Group Stage 
 Groupstage Groupstage Groupstage 
seasons2010to12 -0.278   
 (-1.91)   
Tothomegrown  -0.0226  
  (-1.78)  
Totclubtrain   -0.00409 
   (-0.21) 
Totasstrain   -0.0315
*
 
   (-2.16) 
UEFArank -0.0192
***
 -0.0200
***
 -0.0201
***
 
 (-5.13) (-5.63) (-5.64) 
N 264 264 264 
pseudo R
2
 0.072 0.070 0.071 
t statistics in parentheses 
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01, 
***
 p < 0.001 
 
The impact of the UEFA ranking variable is consistent with the Champions League, in that 
higher ranked teams perform better in the group stages. However, the results of the impact of 
Rule are less strong statistically, though a similar pattern of results are observed. All 
measures of the Rule suggest that a reduction in teams’ success follows the introduction of 
the Rule, however, the impact is only statistically significant for association trained players at 
the usual p value of 0.05 or less. In the case of seasons2010to12 the p value is 0.056, whilst, 
for the total number of home grown players the p value is 0.075.  
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Table 4. Probit Estimates Europa League Final Stages 
 Quarterfinal Semifinal Final Champion Quarterfinal Semifinal Final Champio
n 
seasons2010to12 0.843
*
 73.06
***
 0.871 0.906     
 (2.06) (56.38) (1.51) (1.72)     
Tothomegrown     0.0547 0.0928 0.0797 0.0598 
     (1.83) (1.57) (1.49) (1.00) 
UEFArank -0.165
***
 -11.31
***
 -0.356
***
 -0.327
**
 -0.152
***
 -0.469
***
 -0.327
***
 -0.293
**
 
 (-6.45) (-135.88) (-4.07) (-2.71) (-8.13) (-3.57) (-4.28) (-2.58) 
Constant 2.777
***
 102.2 1.973
**
 0.835 2.345
***
 4.182
**
 1.341
*
 0.422 
 (6.01) . (3.28) (1.06) (4.70) (3.10) (2.17) (0.43) 
N 1048 1048 1048 1048 1048 1048 1048 1048 
pseudo R
2
 0.808 0.983 0.800 0.733 0.799 0.909 0.793 0.721 
t statistics in parentheses 
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01, 
***
 p < 0.001 
 
Table 5. Probit Estimates Europa League Final Stages 
 Quarterfinal Semifinal Final Champion 
Totclubtrain 0.0322 0.374
*
 0.0457 0.0304 
 (0.62) (2.00) (0.75) (0.42) 
Totasstrain 0.0677 -0.00892 0.110 0.107 
 (1.39) (-0.14) (1.48) (1.54) 
UEFArank -0.151
***
 -0.544
***
 -0.338
***
 -0.321
**
 
 (-8.18) (-3.52) (-4.22) (-2.69) 
Constant 2.326
***
 4.796
***
 1.354
*
 0.420 
 (4.75) (3.40) (2.29) (0.44) 
N 1048 1048 1048 1048 
pseudo R
2
 0.800 0.924 0.796 0.726 
t statistics in parentheses 
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01, 
***
 p < 0.001 
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Size of effects 
Tables 6 and 7 report the partial effects for the Champions League and Europa League group 
stages. Results are provided for the significant (near significant) coefficients as discussed 
above. Three main impacts can be discerned from the tables. The first is that the impacts of 
the Rule are redistributive in that they reduce the success of teams for those finishing towards 
the top of the tables (First or second in the Champions League and First to Third in the 
Europa League) in favour of those towards the bottom.
278
 The second is that the effects are 
relatively small and typically less that 0.5%, though could increase up to approximately 1.5% 
for example for the total of association trained players in the Champions League. In the latter 
case this would imply that as the number of association trained players increases by 1, there 
is almost a 1.5% chance that a team could fall from being second in the group stages. The 
final characteristic is that measuring the impact of the Rule by seasonal variables tends to 
produce larger effects. In fact measuring the impact of the Rule by the seasonal variables 
suggests that the impact of the change towards a season in which the Rule applies could 
reduce the chances of a team falling from second place by approximately 12%.The difference 
in these magnitudes could plausibly be associated with the relatively discrete nature of the 
seasonal effect which captures the change in labour market regimes of three seasons at a time. 
 
Finally, examining the impact of the Rule of the Europa Leagues finals’ stages suggested that 
moving into a season in which the Rule applied could increase the probability of a team 
reaching the semi-finals by 0.076, whilst increasing the total number of club-trained players 
by 0.002.
279
 Once again this suggests relatively small effects.  
 
  
                                                          
278
 In ordered probit models the ‘single-crossing’ feature implies that probabilities are redistributed across the 
categories such that there can only be one sign change along the ordered scale.  
279
 The statistical analysis suggested that the marginal effects of the former impact were fragile and probably 
results from the small number of cases in which teams achieved this status. 
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Table 6. Partial Effects Champions League Group Stage        
  Fourth  Third Second First Fourth  Third Second First Fourth  Third Second First 
seasons2007to9               
seasons2010to12 0.082 0.094 -0.119 -0.056          
Tothomegrown      0.004 0.005 -0.006 -0.003     
Totclubtrain               
Totasstrain           0.008 0.013 -0.015 -0.007 
UEFArank 0.013 0.019 -0.021 -0.011 0.013 0.019 -0.021 -0.011 0.012 0.019 -0.021 -0.010 
N 288       320       320       
 
Table 7. Partial Effects Europa League 
Group Stage            
  
Fift
h 
Four
th 
Thir
d 
Seco
nd First 
Fift
h 
Four
th 
Thir
d 
Seco
nd First 
Fift
h 
Four
th 
Thir
d 
Seco
nd First 
seasons201
0to12 
0.0
76 
0.03
4 
-
0.01
8 
-
0.05
4 
-
0.03
8            
Tothomegro
wn       
0.0
06 
0.00
3 
-
0.00
2 
-
0.00
4 
-
0.00
3      
Totclubtrain                  
Totasstrain             
0.0
09 
0.00
4 
-
0.00
2 
-
0.00
6 
-
0.00
4 
UEFArank 
0.0
05 
0.00
2 
-
0.00
1 
-
0.00
4 
-
0.00
3 
0.0
06 
0.00
2 
-
0.00
1 
-
0.00
4 
-
0.00
3 
0.0
06 
0.00
2 
-
0.00
1 
-
0.00
4 
-
0.00
3 
N 264         264         264         
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